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Executive Summary 
Critical infrastructures refer to the array of physical assets, functions and systems 
that are vital for ensuring the EU’s health, wealth, and security. Ensuring climate 
resilience of critical infrastructures and EU regional investments and measures is an 
important component of EU policies and funding mechanisms. Information on the 
resilience of critical infrastructures and large investments to climate change, 
however, is staggeringly lacking in literature. The CCMFF project aim was to fill this 
gap by providing insight on current and future impacts of climate extremes on the 
present stock of critical infrastructures in Europe and on regional investments 
under the EU Cohesion Policy for the 2007-2013 programming period.  
 
The project performed the first comprehensive multi-hazard multi-sector risk 
assessment for Europe under climate change to identify the most vulnerable and 
impacted regions in Europe throughout the 21st century. The methodology applied 
integrates a set of coherent, high-resolution climate hazard projections, a detailed 
harmonized representation of sectorial physical assets, productive systems and 
investments, and estimates of their sensitivity based on surveyed expert opinion 
and literature review. The three components are linked with recorded climate 
disaster damages in order to derive quantitative estimates of risk under current and 
future climate conditions. Costs required to make infrastructures and investments 
climate resilient are evaluated based on possible avoided damage scenarios and 
cost-benefit information derived from literature. 
 
The key findings of the study can be summarized as follows 
 
 Europe will see a progressive and very strong increase in overall climate 
hazard with a prominent spatial gradient towards south-western regions. 
Key hotspots emerge particularly along coastlines and in floodplains. 
 Climate hazard impacts to critical infrastructures and EU regional 
investments may strongly rise in Europe: damages could triple by the 
2020s, multiply six-fold by mid-century, and amount to more than 10 times 
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present damages by the end of the century.  
 Economic losses are highest for the industry, transport and energy sectors. 
The strongest increase (>1,500% by the end of the century) in damage is 
projected for the energy and transport sectors, and for EU investments in 
environment and tourism.  
 Floods currently account for approximately half of climate hazard 
damages, but in the future droughts and heatwaves may become the most 
damaging hazards.  
 Substantial resources may be required to increase the resilience of critical 
infrastructures and EU regional investments against future climate 
 Impact and adaptation costs do not fall equally across Europe. Southern 
and south-eastern European countries will be most impacted.  
 
Notwithstanding that the numbers presented may be subject to uncertainty, they do 
highlight some important issues. The distribution of economic costs in space and 
amongst sectors provides an indication of the regions and sectors that may face 
substantial efforts for making present and planned critical infrastructures resilient 
to future climate. The disproportionate distribution of impacts across the EU leads 
to the question of how these costs could be shared. A better understanding of the 
regional and sector distribution of impacts could aid in orienting further EU 
investments such that Cohesion policy also gains meaning as a burden sharing 
instrument for adaptation to climate change. 
 
We further stress that the myriad of climate change impacts go far beyond those of 
the 7 climate hazards considered in this study; hence, it should be kept in mind that 
the damages presented here only reflect a fraction of the potential climate change 
impacts to society. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 General aim and settings 
Critical infrastructures represent a large economic value, both as capital asset and 
essential element in the functioning of the economy. Different types of 
infrastructures and investments have different levels of vulnerability to climate 
change. Moreover, as climate change impacts are manifested locally, individual 
assets have different hazard exposures depending on the geographic location.  
 
The potential negative consequences of climate change and the need to increase the 
resilience of our society to unwelcome impacts has received increased attention in 
the scientific and policy debate in recent years. The EU has made strong efforts for 
augmenting the profile of climate change in their budget and policies. This is 
expressed by the following actions.  
 The European Council has set as political objective to earmark at least 20% of 
the entire EU budget for climate-relevant actions in the period 2014-20201.  
 The current programming period is the first in which climate considerations 
have been included. Major projects funded by ESIF will need to be screened 
against climate-related vulnerabilities and necessary adaptation measures 
need to be reported2.  
 For European and Structural Investment Funds (ESIF) there is now the 
specific requirement that adaptation to climate change is part of the 
horizontal principle of sustainable development3.  
 One of the 11 thematic objectives under the new ESIF interventions includes 
specific measures for adaptation (Thematic Objective 5 – Promoting climate 
change adaptation, risk prevention and management)4.  
                                                        
1 Conclusions of the European Council (7/8 February 2013) as regards the Multiannual Financial Framework. 
2 Article 101 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013; Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/207 – Annex II, Section F.8. 
3 Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013. 
4 Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013. 
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 Guidelines and tools that have become available on how to take into 
consideration climate change adaptation actions in EU funded investments 
and measures5,6. 
 
Despite this increased attention and recent scientific advances, quantitative 
information on the vulnerability and risks of critical infrastructures and large 
investments to climate change and variability is barely available in literature. The 
CCMFF project aims to fill this gap by evaluating current and future impacts of 
climate extremes on the current stock of critical infrastructures in Europe and on 
regional investments under the Cohesion Policy for the period 2007-2013.  
Critical infrastructure are defined by the EC7 as “an asset, system or part thereof (…) 
which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, 
security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction 
of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure 
to maintain those functions”. According to this definition, critical infrastructures 
considered in this study include existing transport systems (roads, railways, 
airports, ports, and inland waterways), energy production (renewable and non-
renewable energy power plants) and transmission (electricity distribution and 
transmission infrastructures, gas pipelines) systems, heavy industries (metal, 
chemical, mineral + refineries), water and waste treatment facilities, and social 
infrastructures (education and health). 
The EU regional investments refer to projects financed by the Cohesion policy (CP), 
also referred to as ‘Regional policy’. They are a key financial instrument in the EU,   
redistributing about a third of the entire EU budget (347 billion € for the period 
2007–2013) among European regions based on economic and population indicators 
such as regional and national prosperity, unemployment rates and population 
                                                        
5 CLIMA.C.3/SER/2011/0011: Methodologies for climate proofing investments and measures under cohesion and regional policy and 
the common agricultural policy.  
6 ENV/CLIMA.C.3/SER/201l/0037r - Guidelines for project managers: "Making vulnerable investments climate resilient". 
7 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and 
the assessment of the need to improve their protection. 
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density8, with the aim of achieving social, economic and territorial cohesion across 
the EU. 
 
 
1.2 Scientific challenges 
Five fundamental scientific challenges have been identified which have driven the 
strategic research activities within the project. The problem to be addressed is 
highly complex and the development of a comprehensive assessment framework for 
appraising the risks to critical infrastructures of climate hazards in present and 
future climates requires the integration of different scientific disciplines across 
physical, social and economic fields.  
 
Challenge 1: Understanding how multiple climate extremes will evolve in 
Europe along the twenty-first century.  
Europe is expected to face major impacts from a changing climate over the coming 
decades. The hazard to society and environment will be largely connected to 
changes in extreme climate events, due to their disproportionate rise compared to 
changes in climatological averages. Threats will be more pronounced in areas prone 
to multiple climate hazards. In this context, a multi-hazard assessment accounting 
for possible regional variations in intensity and frequency of climate extremes is 
essential to identify areas potentially more exposed to climate change. The detailed 
multi-hazard assessment at pan-European scale as the one presented herein has not 
been documented in literature.  
 
Challenge 2: Developing a spatially coherent dataset of existing critical 
infrastructures.  
Geographic information on infrastructures is crucial to assess with spatial detail the 
potential impacts of climate change. Datasets of existing infrastructures collected 
                                                        
8 European  Council  (2006)  Regulation  (EC)  No  1083/2006  laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund,  the  European  Social  Fund  and  the  Cohesion  Fund  and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999. 
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and maintained by different organizations in Europe lack homogeneity in spatial and 
thematic coverage and measurement units. Filling incompleteness in the source 
databases and designing a harmonization framework to allow for comparability 
between infrastructures are key tasks to properly accounting for regional 
differences in infrastructures distribution and quantifying the potential exposure.     
 
Challenge 3: Determining the sensitivity to climate hazards of critical 
infrastructures and EU-funded projects.  
Climate sensitivity of a given infrastructure/investment depends on multiple factors 
including the nature of the climate-induced shock (e.g., temperature-based stress, 
dry spells, flood inundation, fire of windstorm damage), the on-site structure and 
processes (e.g., physical properties of the material) and the input sources exploited 
(e.g., water, energy). Establishing the climate sensitivity for a large set of 
infrastructures/investments is essential to comprehensively account for the diverse 
degrees of susceptibility of the current multifaceted socio-economic systems.  
 
Challenge 4: Assessing impacts at pan-European scale consistently and 
comparably across multiple sectors and climate-related hazards. 
Projected increases in frequency of multiple climate hazards in many regions of 
Europe emphasize the relevance of a multi-hazard multi-sector risk assessment. 
This requires the integration of the climate hazard, exposure and sensitivity 
components within a complex framework that allows to translating modelled 
impacts into cost figures. Deriving a comprehensive and comparable measure of 
expected monetary damages is fundamental to provide useful guidance for 
developing adaptation strategies and mitigate impacts of multiple hazards in Europe 
in relation to critical infrastructures. 
 
Challenge 5: Appraising the cost of adaptation of infrastructures. 
To make optimal use of limited resources for investments in climate impact 
mitigation, information about the cost and the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
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adaptation is needed. This involves an evaluation of different adaptation options and 
their costs and benefits. This task is complex as comprehensive frameworks for 
addressing costs and benefits of adaptation options are largely absent and 
quantitative information on these aspects are very limited and fragmented.  
 
These five challenges raised a series of methodological issues and scientific 
questions that have been addressed in a coherent workflow of which the different 
steps are detailed separately in Chapters 2-6. We focus on seven climate hazards 
including heat and cold waves, wildfires, droughts, river and coastal floods and 
windstorms. Future climate hazards in Europe have been generated for an ensemble 
of regional climate simulations under a “business-as-usual” (SRES A1B) greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions trajectory over the 1990-2100 period. Climate-induced 
expected annual damages to infrastructures and EU-funded investments related to 
the industry, energy, transport, social, environment and tourism and ICT sectors are 
quantified. Although these sectors do not cover the full range of possible societally 
relevant climate-change impacts, they include crucial aspects of livelihoods for 
Europe. Cost estimates reported in this study refer to damages to property due to 
direct physical contact with the hazard and damages related to the reduction in 
primary sources and productivity. The methodology, graphically represented in 
Figure 1.1, integrates a set of coherent, high-resolution climate hazard projections 
(Chapter 2), a detailed harmonized representation of sectorial physical assets and 
productive systems and investments (Chapter 4), and semi-quantitative estimates of 
their sensitivity based on surveyed expert opinion and literature review (Chapter 3). 
The three above-mentioned components have been combined in a coherent 
vulnerability framework based on recorded climate disasters in order to derive 
quantitative estimates of risk (Chapter 5). Additional costs required to climate proof 
infrastructures and investments are then evaluated based on possible avoided 
damage scenarios and cost-benefit analysis (Chapter 6). 
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Figure 1.1 Flow diagram of the proposed multi-hazard multi-sector risk assessment. 
 
Results are shown throughout the document in spatial maps as well as aggregated 
for five European regions to simplify interpretation: Southern (SEU), Western 
(WEU), Central (CEU), Eastern (EEU) and Northern (NEU) Europe (Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2 European regions. Grouping of countries in macro-areas shown in different colors. 
Southern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Kosovo, 
Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey), Central Europe 
(Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland), Western Europe 
(Belgium, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom), Eastern Europe (Belarus, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Ukraine), and 
Northern Europe (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden). Hatched areas are only covered 
(sometimes partly) in the hazard assessment and not in the risk assessment.  
 
This work provides the first comprehensive multi-hazard multi-sector risk 
assessment for Europe under climate change and identifies the most vulnerable and 
impacted regions in Europe throughout the 21st century. We believe that it 
significantly contributes to a better understanding and awareness that is crucial for 
the management of future climate risks.  
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2 Multi-hazard assessment in Europe under climate change 
2.0 Key messages 
 Projected changes in the occurrence of the seven climate extremes depict 
important variations in hazard scenarios with large spatial patterns modulated 
by local climate conditions.  
o Heat waves show a progressive and highly significant increase in 
frequency all over Europe. By the end of this century, a current 100-year 
heatwave may occur almost every year in Southern Europe, whereas in 
other regions of Europe such events may happen every 3 to 5 years.   
o Cold waves show an opposite significant trend with current cold extremes 
tending to mostly disappear in Europe in more distant futures.   
o Streamflow droughts are projected to become more severe and persistent 
in Southern and Western Europe, with current 100-yr events that could 
occur approximately every 2 to 5 years by 2080, respectively. In other 
regions of Europe an opposite trend can be expected, with a strong 
reduction in drought frequency in most areas.  
o In most regions of Europe wildfires may happen more frequently in the 
future, especially in Southern, Eastern and Central Europe, albeit that the 
signal is not always very strong and only significant in limited areas.   
o Western Europe shows a consistent rise in future flood occurrence 
(current 100-yr events could manifest every ~30 years in 2080s). In 
other regions projections of river floods show higher spatial and temporal 
variability, with lower and less significant changes. In Southern and 
Eastern Europe more areas (30%) show a significant decrease (vs 10% 
with increase) in flood hazard, in Northern Europe areas with a 
significant increase in flood hazard (24%) balance those with a significant 
decrease (23%), and in Central Europe more areas show a significant 
increase (26%) than decrease (15%).  
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o Coastal floods show a progressive and pronounced increase in recurrence 
frequency along Europe’s coastlines mainly due to sea level rise, with a 
current 100-yr event that may occur every 2 to 8 years, or even sub-
annually in Eastern Europe.  
o Evidence for changes in windstorms remains largely elusive. Areas with 
increases in windstorm hazard are mainly located in Western, Eastern 
and Northern Europe, while Southern regions present slight reductions in 
windstorm frequency.  
 
 Europe will see a progressive and strong increase in overall climate hazard with 
a prominent spatial gradient towards south-western regions.  
o By the end of this century, 76% of the area in Southern Europe is 
expected to be exposed annually to at least one climate hazard with a 
current 100-year intensity, or more than 15-fold the baseline value. For 
the other regions in Europe changes are somewhat less pronounced, but 
still considerable: for Western, Central, Eastern and Northern Europe, 
about 50% (+1,021%), 36% (+732), 31% (+614) and 29% (+597%) of the 
territory, respectively, will by the end of this century be exposed annually 
to at least one hazard with a current 100-year intensity. 
o Due to the increase in frequency of multiple hazards in many regions of 
Europe, the joint annual exposure expectancy to multiple hazards shows 
rises much sharper than for single hazards. In Southern Europe, 25% of 
the area could be annually exposed to at least two hazards with a 100-
year intensity by the end of this century, or nearly 250-fold the baseline 
value. When considering three hazards, the increase is 700-fold. For the 
other regions, rises in joint annual exposure expectancy for two and three 
hazards, respectively, amount to 24,500% and 9,500% for Western 
Europe, 6,250% and 2,100% for Central Europe, 4,335% and 1,400% for 
Eastern Europe, and 1,324% and 1,000% for Northern Europe.  
 
 Key hotspots emerge particularly along coastlines and in floodplains in Southern 
and Western Europe, which are often highly populated and economically pivotal.    
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2.1 Introduction 
Europe is expected to face major impacts from a changing climate over the coming 
decades (Collins et al., 2013). The hazard to society and environment will be largely 
connected to changes in extreme climate events due to their disproportionate rise 
compared to the corresponding change in climatological averages (Rummukainen, 
2012). Threats will be more pronounced in areas prone to multiple climate hazards. 
In this context, a multi-hazard assessment accounting for possible regional 
variations in intensity and frequency of climate extremes is essential to identify 
areas potentially more exposed to climate change. 
 
A number of climate change impact studies at the European level have been 
achieved, usually for a single specific climate or weather hazard, such as river floods 
(Lehner et al., 2006; Rojas et al., 2012), coastal floods (Hinkel et al., 2010; Nicholls 
and Klein, 2005), heat waves (Christidis et al., 2015; Fischer and Schär, 2010), 
streamflow droughts (Forzieri et al., 2014; Lehner et al., 2006), windstorms (Nikulin 
et al., 2011; Outten and Esau, 2013) and wildfires (Bedia et al., 2013; Mirco 
Migliavacca et al., 2013). The study of multiple hazards poses two major challenges: 
(a) hazards are not directly comparable as their processes and describing metrics 
differ; and (b) hazards can interact triggering cascade effects and coupled dynamics. 
In the existing literature, the first issue has been mainly addressed through 
standardization approaches, such as classification of hazard intensity and 
development of continuous indices (Dilley, 2005; Kappes et al., 2012; Lung et al., 
2013). While these approaches represent a starting point, they describe only a 
limited set of climate hazards and the techniques used to make different hazards 
comparable are largely subjective and inconsistent. The second issue has been 
addressed mainly qualitatively through descriptive matrices where coupled 
mechanisms are conceptualized based on multi-hazard dynamics observed at local 
scale and largely influenced by landscape figures (Gill and Malamud, 2014; Kappes 
et al., 2012). Deeper data-driven investigations are needed before interactions 
between hazards can be reliably incorporated into large-scale predictive systems. 
Thus, in this study we mainly focus on the first above-mentioned challenge.  
19 
 
Through a unique collaborative effort of different European modelling groups, a 
consistent set of climate hazard modelling data has been produced for this study 
including heat and cold waves, river and coastal floods, droughts, wildfires and 
windstorms. Future climate hazards in Europe have been generated for an ensemble 
of regional climate simulations under a “business-as-usual” (SRES A1B) greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions trajectory (Solomon, 2007) and synthesized in a coherent 
multi-hazard framework. The method is based on the analysis of the changes in 
frequency of climate-induced extreme events and the corresponding variations in 
expected annual exposure to these events. The latter is hereafter defined as 
Expected Annual Fraction Exposed (EAFE), where the fraction can relate to any 
variable of interest (e.g., population, infrastructure, cropland). For a range of hazard 
severities, single-hazard EAFEs and changes therein are combined into multi-hazard 
indices to synthesize the potential exposure to multiple climate hazards (2.2 
Methods).  
 
This work provides the first comprehensive multi-hazard assessment for Europe 
under climate change and focuses in particular on the comparability amongst single 
hazards and on the degree of overlap between areas exposed to multiple hazards 
throughout this century. The overall goal is to identify geographic areas with the 
highest potential exposure to multiple climate hazards in order to better steer 
adaptation efforts and land planning across Europe. It is worth to stress that this 
chapter should not be confused with a risk assessment study. A risk assessment 
implies the combination of hazard, vulnerability and spatial distribution of exposed 
assets, which is presented in Chapter 5.  
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2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Climate hazard indicators 
The analysis focuses on seven critical climate hazards for Europe: heat and cold 
waves, river and coastal floods, droughts, wildfires and windstorms. Climate hazard 
indicators were derived for the baseline (1981-2010), 2020s (2011-2040), 2050s 
(2041-2070) and 2080s (2071-2100) for an ensemble of bias-corrected climate 
projections obtained from different regional climate model simulations under the 
A1B emissions scenario (Solomon, 2007) (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 Climate simulations used to derive climate hazard indicators in the period 1981–2100. 
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Heatwaves were defined by the Heat Wave Magnitude Index (HWMI) that is based 
on the 3-day maximum temperature anomalies (Russo et al., 2014). Cold waves 
were similarly calculated by referring to minimum temperatures. Return levels of 
heat and cold waves were retrieved by empirical cumulative distribution functions. 
Wildfires were derived from projections of the monthly percentage of burned area 
(Mirco Migliavacca et al., 2013). Beta functions were selected to fit the annual 
fractions of burned area and to derive extreme events. Extreme windstorms were 
calculated using the Generalized Pareto distributions that have been derived 
through a peak-over-threshold analysis for daily maximum wind speeds (Outten and 
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Esau, 2013). Relative Sea Level Rise projections were combined with current 
extreme value distributions of total water levels obtained using a peak-over-
threshold approach (Cid et al., 2014; Pardaens et al., 2011). Following, a static 
inundation approach was applied to generate inundation maps along the coastline. 
For inland flooding the annual maximum discharges and flood inundation maps 
were derived from earlier works (Rojas et al., 2013, 2012). For drought the 
minimum discharges and return levels were obtained from a previous study 
(Forzieri et al., 2014). 
 
2.2.2 Frequency of extreme events in current and future climate 
Baseline return levels (RL,b) of the climate hazard indicators with return periods 
(TR,b) from 2 to 100 years were obtained at each grid cell. Future return periods 
(TR,f) of RL,b were calculated by inversion of the fitted probability functions (G).  
  
 bL,
bL,fR,
RG
=RT
1
1
        [2.1] 
Climate model variability was quantified by the coefficient of variance of the future 
return periods retrieved for the different climate realizations. The significance of the 
changes in climate hazard was evaluated by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test applied 
on the annual values of future time windows versus baseline, separately for each 
climate model. 
 
2.2.3 Expected Annual Fraction Exposed 
By analogy with risks of extreme events that are often communicated in terms of 
expected annual impact, the fraction expected to be annually exposed to a hazard – 
the Expected Annual Fraction Exposed (EAFE) – was calculated by integrating the 
exposure to hazard events over the probability of occurrence distribution of the 
hazard. The EAFE to hazard events with return period ≥ TR was obtained as in the 
following: 
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         [2.2] 
 
where f is the exposure-probability function. In the case of river and coastal floods f 
is a dummy function with value 1 when the pixel is flooded, 0 otherwise. For the 
remaining climate hazard indicators f is a constant function equal to 1, under the 
assumption that exposure to the hazard is spread homogeneously within the pixel. 
Future return periods retrieved from equation [2.1] are used to truncate the 
integration for future EAFE. For pixels with non-significant changes we keep 
baseline values for future EAFE. EAFE ranges between 0 (no fraction exposed to the 
hazard) and 1 (whole fraction expected to be annually exposed to climate hazard). 
The use of EAFE allows comparing quantitatively multiple hazards characterized by 
different processes and time scales based on a common intensity scale derived from 
the probability of occurrence of extreme events in the current climatology.  
 
2.2.4 Combining multiple hazards 
To quantify the total expected annual exposure to multiple hazards we define the 
Overall Exposure Index (OEI). Under the assumption that the considered hazards 
are mutually non-exclusive, from the inclusion-exclusion principle of combinatorics 
the OEI can be expressed as follows for a given 
RT :   
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where i refers to the hazard-specific EAFE, n is the number of hazards considered, 
the last sum runs over all subsets I of the indices {1,…,n} containing exactly k 
elements, and  
 
   R
Ii
iRI TEAFETEAFE 

:
        [2.4] 
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expresses the intersection of all those EAFEi with index in I. Equation [2.3] 
quantifies the expected annual exposure to at least one climate hazard. To account 
for the overall exposure to m overlapping hazards, equation [2.3] can be generalized 
using the intersections of m EAFEs in place of single-hazard components. Here, we 
use m values up to three to quantify different degrees of overlap amongst hazards. 
The scheme of calculation in a simplified case with three hazards is shown in Figure 
2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Schema of calculation of Overall Exposure Index. Example of calculation of Overall 
Exposure Index in a simplified case with three hazards, here visualized by coloured circles, named A, 
B and C, respectively. Grey areas represent the Overall Exposure Index with different degree of 
overlapping. 
 
To identify areas subject to large increases in exposure to multiple hazards, we 
define the Change Exposure Index (CEI). CEI expresses the number of hazards - of a 
given baseline return level - with a future relative increase in EAFE over a certain 
threshold (20%, 100% and 1000%). The use of three different thresholds allows 
capturing moderate, strong and extreme changes in hazard exposure. Note that an 
increase in EAFE of a current 100-year event by 20%, 100% or 1000% means that 
the future event will happen every 80, 50, or 9 years. The number of hazards for 
which there is an increase in exposure to the hazard over the given threshold is 
calculated in each grid cell and then aggregated at NUTS3 level as the 0.99th 
percentile of this distribution over all cells. The 99th percentile of the exposure 
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change distribution within the NUTS3 region excludes local fitting extrapolation 
errors and is considered representative of the maximum degree of change in 
exposure. CEI allows identifying key hotspots subject to predefined levels of change 
in exposure.  
 
Both OEI and CEI are calculated for each return period and time slice using the 
ensemble median of all climate model combinations for each hazard as inputs. Note 
that multi-hazard indices in regions close to the geographical limits of our domain, 
such as Island, Russian Federation and Turkey, may be underestimated due to the 
incomplete spatial coverage of some hazards (see Figure 2.2). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Spatial domains of climate hazard models. Note that the model domain for floods and 
droughts does not include Cyprus and Malta, the coastal model domain excludes only Cyprus.  
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2.3 Results and discussion 
2.3.1 Single hazard projections 
Figure 2.3 shows the projected changes in frequency of climatic extreme events with 
respect to current climate, where increasing (decreasing) hazard occurrences are 
denoted by lines under (over) the bisector, the coefficient of variance (CV) describes 
the inter-model spread (climate uncertainty) and S values the percentage of area 
subject to significant changes (5% level). The frequency analysis is complemented 
with the corresponding variations in Expected Annual Fraction Exposed (EAFE) 
shown in Figure 2.4 both in terms of its magnitude and relative change with respect 
to the baseline. Spatial patterns of EAFE are shown in Figure 2.5. Note that climate-
related uncertainty in the frequency of extreme events translates into analogous 
estimates of uncertainties in EAFE, which are not shown here to avoid redundancy.  
 
Heat waves show a progressive and highly significant increase in frequency all over 
Europe (S>74% in near future climate, approaching 100% in all regions by the end 
of this century), with larger climate variability in long-term scenarios (40≤CV≤60) 
and a more pronounced intensification in Southern Europe (where current 100-yr 
events could occur almost every year in the 2080s) (Figure 2.3). Consistently, EAFE 
values show a progressive increase as time proceeds, especially in Southern Europe 
where, by the end of the century, up to 60% of the territory could be annually 
exposed to a current 100-year heat wave (Figure 2.4).  
 
Cold waves show an opposite trend with current cold extremes tending to mostly 
disappear in Europe in more distant futures (current 2-yr event may occur less than 
every 100 years by the end of the century, significant almost everywhere, Figure 
2.3). Accordingly, cold waves could experience a rapid decrease in EAFE and a 
change up to -100% by the end of the century (Figure 2.4).  
 
Streamflow droughts may become more severe and persistent in Southern and 
Western Europe (current 100-yr events could occur approximately every 2 to 5 
years by 2080, respectively, S≥85) resulting from the reduced precipitation and 
increased evaporative demands with higher temperatures (Figure 2.3). This leads to 
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a consistent increase in EAFE and by the end of the century over 25% of the 
territories could be affected every year by baseline 100-yr droughts (Figure 2.4). 
Northern, Eastern and Central Europe show an opposite tendency with a strong 
reduction in drought frequency caused by higher precipitation that outweigh the 
effects of increased evapotranspiration (Forzieri et al., 2014). Such effects translate 
into consistent decreases in EAFE by up to 100%. Significance increases with time 
while climate variability shows variable tendencies depending on the return levels 
(S>75% and CV over 60% by the end of the century). 
 
Most of Europe, especially Western, Eastern and Central regions, could experience 
an increase in the frequency of extreme wildfires (current 100-yr events will occur 
every 5 to 50 years) with a progressive rise in significance and model agreement 
(S>10% and CV≤60% by the end of the century) (Figure 2.3). Interestingly, Southern 
Europe shows a decrease in the frequency of very extreme events, which is likely 
due to the expected reduction in net primary productivity of terrestrial ecosystem 
that may limit the fuel availability and, ultimately, the propagation of large wildfires 
(Mirco Migliavacca et al., 2013). Progressive increases in EAFE are visible for 
wildfires over the whole domain (one to three-folds the baseline value, Figure 2.5).  
 
River floods show in general more spatial variability and fluctuations with time in 
the frequency of extreme events as well as a larger climate-induced spread 
compared to the other hazards (higher CV values, Figure 2.3). This relates to the 
high variability in projected geographical patterns of heavy precipitation intensity 
due to structural and parametric model uncertainty and internal climate variability 
(Fischer et al., 2013). Western Europe shows a consistent rise in future flood hazard 
(current 100-yr events could manifest every ~30 years in 2080s, S up to 70%), 
mainly as a result of a pronounced increase in average and extreme rainfall (Rojas et 
al., 2012). Such effects result in a 50-100% increase in future EAFE (Figure 2.4). A 
modest but significant decrease in river flood frequency is projected in Southern, 
Central and Eastern regions, in the latter because of the strong reduction in 
snowmelt induced river floods, which offsets the increase in average and extreme 
precipitation.  
 
27 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Changes in frequency of climatic hazards. Baseline (x-axis) versus future (y-axis) hazard return periods for 2020s (green), 2050s (blue) and 2080s (red) for specific 
hazards. Return period values shown are the zonal median for different European regions of the grid-cell ensemble median return period of the experiments driven by the different 
climate realizations. Circle sizes represent the coefficient of variance (CV) amongst climate models and S values explicit the percentage of cells within a region with significant 
decrease/increase (-/+). Note that future scenarios with outstanding decrease/increase in frequency are out of plot margins (cold waves, droughts and coastal floods), projections of 
windstorm are only available for 2080s, significance analysis and climate variability have not been retrieved for coastal floods. 
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Coastal floods show a progressive and pronounced increase in recurrence along 
Europe’s coastlines chiefly caused by sea level rise (current 100-yr event may 
manifest every 2 to 8 years, or even sub-annually in Eastern Europe, in the 2080s, 
Figure 2.3) and leading to strong increase in EAFE (Figure 2.4). Noteworthy is the 
pronounced increase in EAFE in Eastern Europe as a consequence of the rapid 
intensification of inundations over the Danube delta. Due to sea level rise the 
increase in frequency of occurrence of extreme coastal events is so pronounced in 
this region that current 100-year (and more frequent) events will happen sub-
annually by the 2050s and 2080s, which explains why the curves for the 2050s and 
2080s drop below the x-axis and are not visible.  
 
Evidence for changes in windstorms remains largely elusive (S<16%) and with 
considerable inter-model spread for larger return levels (up to CV>60% for current 
100-yr events, Figure 2.3). Areas with increases in windstorm hazard are mainly 
located in Western, Eastern and Northern Europe, while Southern regions present 
slight reductions in frequency as observed in previous studies (Nikulin et al., 2011; 
Outten and Esau, 2013). EAFE of windstorms show modest changes with respect to 
the baseline (up to ±10%, Figure 2.4). 
 
Interestingly, larger increases in EAFE can be observed at higher return levels and 
for long-term scenarios due to the progressive intensification of very extreme 
events. This occurs also in regions prevalently experiencing a reduction (or slight 
change) in future frequency of climate hazards, such as Central and Eastern Europe 
for droughts, Southern Europe for wildfires and Southern, Central and Northern 
Europe for floods. The apparent contradiction manifests where few localized areas 
experience a very large increase in frequency that outweighs the opposite tendency 
occurring in most of the region. The projected changes in single-hazard exposed 
fractions suggest that future hazard scenarios will considerably deviate from those 
observed in current climate, especially for climate hazards strongly linked to 
temperature rises (e.g., heat and cold waves, droughts and coastal floods). 
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Figure 2.4 Changes in single-hazard Expected Annual Fraction Exposed. Baseline hazard return levels (on the x-axis) versus corresponding future EAFE (on the y-
axis) for specific hazards. EAFE values shown are zonal averages for different European regions of the grid-cell ensemble median EAFE of the experiments driven 
by the different climate realizations. Bars refer to a future scenario period as labelled in the top-left panel. Colours reflect the relative change in region-average 
EAFE with respect to the baseline. Note that EAFE lower than 0.001 (e.g., for cold waves) are out of plot margins. 
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Figure 2.5 Spatio-temporal patterns of 100-yr Expected Annual Fraction Exposed.  Spatial and temporal variations of Expected Annual Fraction Exposed to 100-yr 
climate hazards. Note that values for river and coastal floods are aggregated at NUTS3 level (see Figure 1) to better visualize their effects. Values refer to the 
ensemble medians of experiments driven by the available climate models. 
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2.3.2 Changes in overall and concurrent exposures to climate hazards 
Figure 2.6a shows the overall exposure to combinations of all hazards aggregated 
for each European region, expressed by the Overall Exposure Index that accounts for 
the overlapping of hazards. Spatio-temporal patterns of the 100-yr EAFE for OEI1, 
OEI2 and OEI3 are presented in Figure 2.6b. For all regions in Europe, the fraction 
exposed to at least one hazard, expressed by EAFE for OEI1, will progressively 
increase throughout this century, with the increase being more pronounced for 
higher return periods. In Southern Europe, about 76% of the area will be annually 
exposed to at least one climate hazard with a current 100-year intensity by the end 
of this century, more than a 15-fold increase compared to the present situation 
(currently nearly 5% of the area is expected to annually exposed to at least one 
hazard of this intensity). The distribution in space of the 100-yr EAFE for OEI1 
(Figure 2.6b, left column) shows that by the end of this century in many areas in 
Southern Europe the whole territory will be annually exposed to at least one hazard 
of this intensity. This is mainly caused by the large increase in heat and drought 
hazard projected for the most southern regions of Europe. For the other regions in 
Europe, the fractions annually exposed and the increase therein with time are 
somewhat less pronounced, but still considerable: for Western, Central, Eastern and 
Northern Europe, about 50%, 36%, 31% and 29% of the territory, respectively, will 
by the end of this century be exposed annually to at least one hazard with a current 
100-year intensity, corresponding to increases of 1021%, 732%, 614%, and 597%, 
respectively.  
 
The EAFE for OEI2, expressing the fraction that is expected to be annually exposed 
to at least two hazards, shows even steeper increases with time in all regions of 
Europe. Again, the highest raise is projected for Southern Europe, with about 25% of 
the area that could be annually exposed to at least two hazards with a 100-year 
intensity by the end of this century, or nearly 250-fold the baseline value (which 
corresponds to approximately 0.1% in the different regions of Europe). The 
distribution in space of the 100-yr EAFE for OEI2 (Figure 2.6b, middle column) 
shows the highest values in most of Southern Europe and also further north along 
coasts and in river flood plains. For the other regions, increases in EAFE(100-yr) for 
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OEI2 are somewhat less pronounced but still very high, with rises of 9,500% for 
Western Europe, 2,100% for Central Europe, 1,400% for Eastern Europe and 
1,000% for Northern Europe.  
 
The results above for OEI1 and OEI2 show that the joint probability of areas to be 
annually exposed to multiple hazards is much smaller than for single hazards (due 
to the combination of single hazard probabilities), but that the increases in joint 
probability rise much sharper than for single hazards. This is because in many 
regions of Europe multiple climate hazards will occur more frequent under future 
climate. This is exemplified by the EAFE for OEI3. By the end of the century 0.7% of 
the area in Southern Europe is expected to be annually exposed to at least three 
hazards of a 100-year intensity. Albeit that this may seem small, this corresponds to 
a staggering increase of more than 70,000% (or 700-fold the current value). The 
projected increases in OEI3 for the other regions by the end of the century amount 
to 24,500% for Western Europe, 6,250% for Central Europe, 4,335% for Eastern 
Europe and 1,324% for Northern Europe.  
 
These results suggest that the entire Europe will likely face a progressive increase in 
overall exposure to climate extremes, with a prominent spatial gradient towards 
south-western regions (Figure 2.6b) and along coastlines and in flood plains. Heat 
waves, droughts and coastal flooding, which particularly strong increases in such 
regions, provide the most relevant contribution in the estimation of future OEI 
(Figure 2.5). 
 
Spatial patterns of the Change Exposure Index (CEI) are presented in Figure 2.7b for 
the current 100-year event hazard intensity. The CEI maps represent the number of 
hazards that show moderate, strong and extreme (+20%, +100% and +1000%, 
respectively) increases in EAFE. For areas in dark blue (CEI = 0) none of the 7 
hazards considered shows the threshold level increase in EAFE, whereas for areas in 
red (CEI = 4) four hazards reach the defined level of increase in EAFE. Regions with 
high CEI values reveal potential key hotspots that will be prone to an increase in 
exposure to multiple hazards. These are mainly located along coastlines and in 
floodplains in Southern and Western Europe where inland and coastal flooding will 
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be likely relevant in combination with temperature-related hazards (see also 
hazard-specific contributions shown in Figure 2.8). More exposed regions include 
the British Isles, the North Sea area, north-western parts of the Iberian Peninsula, as 
well as parts of France, the Alps, Northern Italy and Balkan countries along the 
Danube River. These areas, even if they may present lower overall exposure to 
climate hazards compared to other regions in Europe (Figure 2.6), will be prone to 
the largest changes in exposure to multi-hazard, which potentially increases the 
presence of concurrent hazards and therefore results in larger risks. 
 
Figure 2.7a shows for each European region the aggregated spatial extent 
experiencing pronounced increases in EAFE for at least four hazards, as expressed 
by CEI=4 (hence the areas coloured in red in Figure 2.7b), calculated for the 
different threshold levels of increase in EAFE and return periods between 2 and 100 
years. It confirms that increases in hazards are more pronounced for higher return 
periods and for the long-term scenarios. Regions most prone to increases in multiple 
hazards are Southern and Western Europe. 
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Figure 2.6 Projections in Overall Exposure Index. Left (a) Baseline return levels (on the x-axis) versus corresponding future Expected Annual Fraction Exposed 
(EAFE) (on the y-axis) calculated as zonal average for different European regions resulting from the combination of all climate hazards accounting for the 
overlapping of one, two or three hazards (OEI1, OEI2 and OEI3, respectively). Bars and colours visualized as in Figure 2.5; Right (b) spatio-temporal pattern of 100-
yr EAFE for OEI1, OEI2 and OEI3.  
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Figure 2.7 Projections in Change Exposure Index. Left (a) Baseline return levels (on the x-axis) and corresponding area exposed to at least four hazards (CEI=4) 
with relative increases over 20%, 100% and 1000% with respect to the baseline (CEI20, CEI100 and CEI1000, respectively) for different European regions; bars 
grouped as in Figure 2.5; Right (b) spatio-temporal patterns of CEI20, CEI100 and CEI1000 calculated for 100-yr events. 
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Figure 2.8 Hazard-specific contributions to the Change Exposure Index calculation. NUTS3 regions whose relative increase in 100-yr EAFE is larger than 20% (in 
red). 
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2.4 Main limitations and knowledge gaps 
Despite the depth of this study, results should be viewed in light of the potential 
uncertainty sources and caveats of the proposed methodology. The multi-hazard 
maps are dependent on the chosen set of climate hazard indicators: the use of 
diverse input hazards (e.g., hail, landslides) might lead to different findings. We 
argue that the set of hazards selected includes the most relevant hazards for Europe 
in terms of average annual losses and deaths (“NatCatSERVICE | Munich Re,” n.d.). 
Metrics used to represent the selected climate hazards are crucial for the resulting 
impact scenarios: changes in return periods depend on the time scale selected to 
characterize an event type, e.g. 1-day temperature extremes, weekly heatwaves or 
seasonal heat anomalies experience different changes in return periods (Perkins and 
Alexander, 2012; Trenberth et al., 2014). In our approach we focus on hazard-
specific metrics of impact relevance that have been documented in recent literature. 
Details on the sensitivity analysis and calibration/validation exercises for each 
single hazard are reported in the references (Cid et al., 2014; Forzieri et al., 2014; M. 
Migliavacca et al., 2013; Outten and Esau, 2013; Rojas et al., 2012; Russo et al., 
2014). We recognize that extreme value fitting may introduce additional uncertainty 
in the projections of climate hazards especially at high return periods. Recent 
studies, though, documented its secondary role with respect to the inter-model 
spread (Forzieri et al., 2014; Rojas et al., 2012).  
 
We apply a conservative approach without accounting explicitly for hazard 
interrelations that could lead to greater impacts. Regions exposed to the overlap of 
multiple hazards and subject to concurrent increases in single-hazard EAFEs, 
however, are indicative of a more likely exacerbation of the overall impacts due to 
inter-hazard triggering relationships. Estimation of probabilities of coincidental or 
cascading events would require finer time resolution of hazard metrics (here annual 
or monthly) and a better knowledge of the inter-hazard physical interactions and 
coupled processes.  
 
The socioeconomic scenarios driving GHG emissions, the sensitivity of the climate 
models to GHG concentrations and the specific hazard modelling utilized are subject 
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to uncertainty, and all are relevant in influencing the final multi-hazard assessment. 
The use of different climate model ensembles for each hazard may have introduced 
additional artefacts (Table 2.1).  However, recent studies suggest that the reduced 
subsets utilized in this study for some hazards largely preserve main statistical 
properties of the initial 12-member ensemble (Russo et al., 2013). The use of 
identical - and possibly larger - ensembles could allow to better capturing climate-
related uncertainties (Kharin et al., 2013; Sillmann et al., 2013). We used a different 
baseline and only one future time window for windstorms. New dedicated runs for 
windstorms for the remaining temporal periods were not feasible within this study. 
We understand that such diversity may limit the comparability with the other 
hazards; however, changes in extreme winds seem to be lower compared to the 
other climate hazards, hence the potential bias is expected to play a minor role. 
Analyses of the multi-hazard indices are performed using the ensemble median of all 
climate model combinations for each hazard as input because only one single GCM-
RCM configuration is common amongst the hazards. While the median can be 
considered a robust estimate of single-hazard ensembles, this inevitably hampers 
the analysis of how single-hazard uncertainties (Figure 2.4) propagate to the 
combined metrics. 
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3 Vulnerability of critical infrastructures to climate hazards 
3.0 Key messages 
 There is limited understanding of vulnerability of infrastructures to different 
hazards and quantitative information on the sensitivity of critical infrastructures 
to climate hazards is largely absent.  
 Critical infrastructures are vulnerable to the various hazards in a myriad of ways. 
Some key vulnerabilities for each sector are exemplified in the Table 3.0 below. 
Table 3.0 Examples of main vulnerabilities of the sectors to the climate hazards 
 Energy Transport Industry Social 
Heat 
reduced power plant 
efficiency due to 
higher water 
temperature 
required for cooling 
material degradation 
and buckling of 
roads, rails and 
bridges due to 
thermal expansion 
increased cost for 
cooling and 
refrigeration 
increased cost for 
cooling 
Cold 
structural damage to 
distribution lines 
due to ice and snow 
loads 
buckling of roads, 
rails and bridges due 
to thermal 
contraction 
water pipes 
vulnerable to 
frost/icing 
increased cost of 
heating during cold 
episodes 
Drought 
reduction in 
hydropower 
potential and biofuel 
production 
reduced navigability 
of rivers and 
channels 
water quality 
degradation, 
reduction in usable 
water and increase 
in treatment costs 
structural damages 
due to drought-
induced subsidence 
and permafrost 
thawing 
Wildfire 
reduction in biofuel 
sources 
deterioration of 
roads, railways and 
power lines 
structural damages 
to industrial sites 
destruction of social 
infrastructures 
Flood 
structural damages 
to energy production 
sites and transport 
networks 
reduction of 
structural integrity 
of surface and 
subgrade material 
structural damages 
to industrial sites, 
increasing cost for 
water treatment 
structural damage to 
social infrastructures 
and reduction in 
operational services 
Windstorm 
disruption of 
transmission and 
distribution 
networks 
structural damages 
to transport facilities 
structural damages 
to industrial systems 
equipment 
structural damages 
to social structures 
and facilities 
 
 To ensure comparability in the multi-hazard and multi-
infrastructure/investment context considered in CCMFF, qualitative sensitivities 
have been derived for the thematic priorities of the EU Cohesion Policy Funds 
(CPF) and for types of key infrastructures to the considered climate hazards by 
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integrating information from an extended literature review with a survey that 
was conducted among a pool of experts in the considered sectors.  
 In the survey, 70% of the possible combinations of hazard (7) and 
infrastructures/investments (50) were considered sensitive by more than 80% 
of the respondents, while 40% of the themes are sensitive for more than 90% of 
the respondents. In general, the sensitivity is highest for inland floods, sea level 
rise and forest fires, whereas the sensitivity of infrastructures to drought seems 
less important.  
 The expert survey generally corroborates the findings reported in the literature 
and the more robust findings of the survey correspond to higher consensus in 
the scientific community.  
 Albeit that the derived sensitivity classes are subject to exposure, information 
and individual bias, and that infrastructure-specific vulnerability may show large 
variation depending on the institutional, economic, and technological context, 
they provide an indication of general sensitivities of different types of 
infrastructures and key economic assets to climate hazards and may help in 
orienting policy interventions for climate adaptation and resilience.  
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3.1 Introduction 
An evaluation of the risk of a critical infrastructure or investment from a hazardous 
climate event requires a consideration of the element’s vulnerability, further herein 
also referred to as sensitivity. We define vulnerability in accordance to the SREX 
report (IPCC, 2012) as the propensity or predisposition of the infrastructure to be 
adversely affected when exposed to a climate hazard. The potential degree to 
experience harm constitutes an internal characteristic of the affected infrastructure 
and is specific to the climate hazard.  
 
Evaluating the effects of climate hazards on key economic assets is a complex issue 
because of incomplete scientific methodologies and limited understanding of 
vulnerability of infrastructures to different hazards. The most important approaches 
for the analysis of the physical vulnerability of infrastructures are the use of 
vulnerability curves, damage matrices or vulnerability indicators.  
 
Vulnerability curves (frequently also referred to as damage, fragility, or risk curves) 
relate event intensity and resulting damages to a certain building type. While these 
functions offer continuous vulnerability information in relation to the degree of the 
hazard (for example, damage to an infrastructure for 1 m of flooding), they require 
extensive information on damaged buildings and are therefore typically only 
available for extensive and wide-spread processes like flooding (Kappes et al., 
2012a). Also, albeit that there is a wide variety of flood damage functions in use 
internationally, they differ substantially in their approaches and economic 
estimates, and current methodologies for estimating infrastructural damage are not 
as well developed as methodologies for the estimation of damage to (residential) 
buildings (Jongman et al., 2012). Moreover, for other hazards like drought, impacts 
are much more difficult to quantify and link to specific events and their magnitude, 
hence damage functions more difficult to construct.  
 
Vulnerability matrices provide discrete damage information for classified hazard 
intensities and are either based on observed damages or on rough appraisals. 
Despite the advantage of providing (semi-) quantitative information, damage 
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functions and matrices often relate damage with only one characteristic of the 
building, mainly the building type, hereby neglecting the properties of the element 
at risks (such as building age or number of floors). The method of vulnerability 
indicators, on the other hand, allows to integrating different building characteristics 
in the (qualitative) vulnerability description. However, whereas socio-economic 
indicators are more widely used to describe the multiple characteristics of humans, 
institutions and/or societies that contribute to their overall vulnerability, 
significantly less experience with vulnerability indicators has been acquired in the 
physical vulnerability context. Moreover, since vulnerability is primarily regarded as 
a characteristic of the element at risk, only in very few cases hazard-specific 
vulnerabilities are assessed in this way (Kappes et al., 2012b).  
 
In the CCMFF project, rather than looking in very detail at a specific critical 
infrastructure in a particular setting, for which it is already very difficult to appraise 
its vulnerability, the aim is to evaluate potential impacts to types/classes of 
infrastructures and investments across a great territorial diversity with a wide 
variety of socio-economic settings and physical boundary conditions in Europe. This 
includes, for example, different building standards, positioning of the infrastructure 
in the landscape, its relation to the economy and depending sectors, as well as the 
existence of special protection measures (hard infrastructures like dikes or soft 
measures like early warning systems).   
 
To ensure comparability in the multi-hazard and multi-infrastructure/investment 
context considered in CCMFF, a common method has to be adopted for the 
vulnerability assessment. We therefore derived general qualitative sensitivities for 
the thematic priorities of the EU Cohesion Policy Funds (CPF) and for types of key 
infrastructures to the considered climate hazards by integrating information from 
an extended literature review with a survey that was conducted among a pool of 
experts in the considered sectors. The performed analysis is an attempt to fill a gap 
in the scientific knowledge but also to provide a tractable database for assessing and 
comparing sensitiveness within future multi-hazard/multi-sector climate change 
impacts and adaptation studies.  
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3.2 Literature on climate sensitivity of infrastructures 
It is not the aim of this report to provide an extensive overview of the literature 
related to potential impacts of climate extremes on infrastructures in different 
sectors. For a comprehensive overview we refer the reader to AR5 of the IPCC, 
2014). Rather, we performed this review to understand what has been reported in 
the scientific literature about climate hazard sensitivities of critical infrastructures 
in order to supplement the expert survey (see section 4.3) in deriving vulnerability 
classes for types of infrastructures for the different climate hazards considered.  
 
A summary of the literature for the different sectors and hazards is presented in 
Table 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. Studies looking at the sensitivity of multi-sectorial critical 
infrastructures to climate hazards are practically not existing. This observation may 
be explained by the need for transdisciplinary knowledge and collaboration for a 
review building on the existing literature in several sectors that is huge. The amount 
and detail of coverage in literature of these aspects varies strongly on the sector 
considered and the hazard. 
 
For the energy sector, notwithstanding the variety of threats by climate extreme and 
their potential impacts on electricity generation and transmission systems, fuel 
infrastructure and transport systems, the range of the range of impacts modelled in 
the literature is still rather limited (IPCC, 2014). Most studies related to energy in 
relation to climate (hazards) have looked at climate impacts on changes in demand 
(typically related to changes in average temperature), whereas on the production 
side the majority of studies focus on renewable energy (hydropower, biomass) 
sources in relation to average climate changes, especially when compared to its 
share in the current installed capital/energy mix.  
 
Studies on the impact of climate hazards on the transport sector to date have been 
mostly qualitative, and only few quantitative assessments are available. Recently 
three FP7 projects, EWENT (Extreme Weather impacts on European Networks of 
Transport – http://ewent.vtt.fi), ECCONET (Effects  of  climate  change  on  the  
inland waterway networks - www.ecconet.eu) and WEATHER (Weather Extremes: 
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Assessment of Impacts on Transport and Hazards for European Regions - 
www.weather-project.eu), have studied impacts of weather phenomena to different 
aspects of the European transport systems. The main results of these projects are 
summarized in Michaelides et al., 2014) and several more detailed documents can 
be found on the project websites. Notwithstanding these and other recent advances, 
systematic and detailed knowledge on climate change vulnerability of and impacts 
on critical transport infrastructures remains limited in the literature (IPCC, 2014), 
especially with respect to climate extremes.  
 
Research on the potential effects of climate hazards on industrial facilities and social 
(health and education) infrastructures is very limited, apart from some studies that 
focus on buildings in general.  
 
Table 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 together with the paragraphs above show that many of the 
threats of extreme weather to different sectors are acknowledged and qualitatively 
described in the literature, but rather few quantitative assessment are available. 
Information on the sensitivity of infrastructures and economic assets in different 
sectors to climate hazards is not only scattered around many scientific disciplines, 
but also varies with local to regional boundary conditions that apply to the study. As 
such, there is no aggregated or global view allowing a comparison and application of 
a homogeneous methodological approach for assessing the sensitivity of 
infrastructures to climate hazards across Europe.  
 
We therefore opted to construct a sensitivity matrix on the basis of a survey 
amongst experts (described in the next section), where the literature review serves 
to explain the channels through which the impacts are transmitted and to verify the 
robustness of the sensitivity matrix.  
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Table 3.1 Overview of vulnerability (and impacts) of energy assets to climate hazards reported in literature 
 Heat waves Cold Droughts Wildfires River and coastal floods Windstorms 
Energy Structural damages due 
to expansion of different 
materials (Pryor et al. 
2010). 
Reduction of structural 
integrity due to melting 
permafrost (Ebinger, 
2011, Cruz et al., 2013).  
Increased resistance on 
the power lines. 
Decrease in power plant 
efficiency due to higher 
water temperature 
required for cooling 
systems (van Vliet et al., 
2012, van Vliet et al., 
2013, Rubbelke et al., 
2011, Chandramowli et 
al., 2014, EEA, 2012 ; 
Linnerud et al., 2011; 
Rübbelke, and Vögele, 
2011). 
Reduction in biofuels 
sources (Moiseyev et al., 
2011; Verkerk et al., 
2011). 
Reduced performance of 
solar photovoltaic 
modules in hot weather 
as electrons movement 
is slower in hot 
materials (EEA, 2012). 
Structural damages 
due to ice and snow 
loads overhead 
distribution lines 
(Bompard et al., 
2013, McColl et al., 
2012) and ice-
induced changes in 
pipeline pressures 
(Humphrey et al, 
2008). 
Increased corrosion 
on energy systems 
(Ebinger 2011; 
Cruz et al., 2013). 
Reduction in 
hydropower 
potential due to 
water freezing 
(Lehner et al. 2005; 
Mideska et al. 
2010). 
Reduction in 
biofuels sources 
(Mideska et al., 
2010). 
 
 
Reduction of structural integrity due 
to melting of permafrost and drought-
induced subsidence (Ebinger, 2011, 
Cruz et al., 2013).  
Deterioration of power systems 
caused by overexploitation of 
irrigation and water pumping 
(Rubbelke et al., 2011; Chandramowli 
et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2013). 
Decrease in power plant efficiency 
due to higher water temperature and 
lower water volumes required for 
cooling systems (Patt et al., 2013; 
Rubbelke et al., 2011; Paskal, 2010; 
Sieber, 2013; Arent et al., 2014; 
Mideksa, et al., 2010; Van Vliet, et 
al., 2013; Förster et al., 2010; 
Ebinger, 2011; EEA, 2012 ; Linnerud 
et al., 2011; Rübbelke, and Vögele, 
2011).  
Deterioration of cooling systems due 
to excessive biological growth and 
clog water intages (Cruz et al., 2013, 
Sieber, 2013). 
Reduction in biofuels sources 
(Moiseyev et al., 2011; Verkerk et al., 
2011). 
Reduction in hydropower potential 
due to reduced water volumes (van 
Vliet et al., 2012, van Vliet et al. 
2013, Schaeffer et al. 2012, Lehner et 
al. 2005). 
Damages to 
power systems 
equipment 
(Bompard et al., 
2013) 
Reduction in 
biofuels sources 
(Boisvenue, 
2005; Bompard 
et al., 2013). 
Damage to 
pipelines and 
electricity 
transmission 
lines from 
bushfires 
(IPCC, 2014).  
Structural damages to energy 
production sites and transport 
networks due to direct impacts of 
overflows, reduced soil stability and 
induced mass movements (soil 
erosion, landslide, siltation) (Ebinger, 
2011; Paskal et al., 2010; Brown et 
al., 2014; Bompard et al., 2013; 
Ebinger et al., 2011; Klein et al., 
2013; Kovats et al., 2014; Brown, 
2014; Chandramowli et al., 2014).  
Damages to power systems 
equipment due to debris and 
pollution in cooling water flows 
required (Sieber et al., 2013; Cruz et 
al.; 2013).  
Short-circuiting and power failure on 
electrical systems (Brown et al., 
2014). Disable corrosion protection 
equipment and produce pitting 
(Humphrey et al., 2008; Cruz et al., 
2013; Bompard et al., 2013). 
Reduction in biofuels sources 
(Mideska et al., 2010; Ebinger et al., 
2011) 
Reduction in hydropower production 
due to increased silting of sediment 
into reservoirs due to increased 
erosion and sediment displacement. 
Structural damages to 
power systems equipment 
and storage tanks due to 
wind pressure or debris 
impact (Pryor et al. 2010; 
Ebinger, 2011; Wilbanks et 
al., 2012; Bompard et al., 
2013), Arent et al., 2014). 
Overloads of tidal and 
wave energy plants 
(Paskal, 2010). 
Disruption of electricity 
lines (transmission and 
distribution networks) and 
damages to cables due to 
falling trees (Bompard et 
al., 2013; Arent et al. 2014, 
McColl et al. 2012).  
Short-circuiting triggering 
possible fires especially 
with storage of liquid 
flammable hydrocarbons 
(Bompard et al., 2013; 
Sieber 2013; Ebinger 
2011). 
Reduction in biofuels 
sources (Boisvenue, 2005; 
Bompard et al., 2013). 
Extreme storm gusts may 
damage wind turbines 
(EEA, 2012). 
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Table 3.2 Overview of vulnerability (and impacts) of transport assets to climate hazards reported in literature 
 Heat waves Cold Droughts Wildfires River and coastal floods Windstorms 
Transport Buckling of roads, rails and 
bridges due to thermal 
expansion; structural material 
degradation; melting of 
asphalt and increased rutting 
and softening of pavement, 
signaling problems (Arent et 
al., 2014, Peterson et al. 2008, 
Jaroszweski et al. 2010; 
Mehrotra et al., 2011; 
Chinowski et al., 
2012; Chinowsky et al., 2013; 
Mehrotra et al., 2011 ; Suarez, 
2005 ; Peterson et al., 2008 ; 
Dobney et al., 2009 ; 
Eichhorst, 2009; Thornes et 
al., 2012 ; Cramer et al., 
2014 ; Mills and Andrey , 
2002 ; Molarius et al., 2011 ; 
Oslakovic et al., 2013, EEA, 
2011; Nolte et al., 2011). 
Failures of power lines 
(Nemry et al., 2012). 
Overheating impacts on 
infrastructure equipment, 
lifetime reduction, reliability 
of the electronic and electric 
components (e.g., rail rolling 
stock equipment) (EEA, 
2012); 
Slope instabilities due to the 
thawing of permafrost in 
alpine regions (EEA, 2012) 
Buckling of roads, 
rails and bridges 
due to thermal 
contraction (Enei 
et al., 2011; 
Koetse et al., 
2009; Oslakovic et 
al., 2013). 
Icing of aircraft 
wings and 
disruptions of 
airport functioning 
(Pejovic et al., 
2009; Doll et al., 
2013; Przuluski, 
2012). 
Ice accumulation 
on vessels, decks, 
riggings, and 
docks (Molarius et 
al., 2013; 
Humphrey et al., 
2008 ; Mehrotra et 
al., 2011). 
Boat traffic 
disrupted due to 
thick river ice 
cover 
(Schweighofer et 
al., 2014). 
Reduced 
clearance 
under 
waterway 
bridges, 
reduced 
navigability 
of rivers 
and 
channels 
due to low 
level 
streamflows 
(Jonkeren 
et al., 2007; 
Jonkeren et 
al., 2013) 
Earthworks 
desiccation, 
increased 
abrasion of 
mechanical 
components 
(EEA, 
2012) 
Deterioration 
of roads, 
railways and 
power lines 
(Peterson et 
al., 2008).   
Reduction of structural integrity of surface and 
subgrade material due to wave action and induced-
mass movements (erosion, landslide, subsidence) 
(Wright et al., 2012; Peterson et al. 2008; Eichhorst, 
2009; Jaroszweski et al., 2010; Arent et al., 2014; 
Nemry et al., 2012; Cramer et al., 2014). 
Scour on bridges and embankments, track and rail 
lineside equipment failure (Suarez, 2005; Humphrey 
et al., 2008; NRC, 2008 ; Peterson et al., 2008 ; 
Nemry et al., 2012 ; Eichhorst, 2009 ; Palin et al., 
2013 ; Cramer et al., 2014 ; Mills and Andrey, ; 
2002 ; Thornes et al., 2012 ; Molarius et al., 2011 ; 
Oslakovic et al., 2013). 
Structural damages to transport mode facilities 
(Hallegatte et al., 2011, Brown, 2014). 
Increased deterioration of infrastructures that lack a 
fouling-resistant design against salt water, Peterson et 
al., 2008). 
Disruption of transport vehicles (Koetse et al., 2009; 
Molarius et al., 2013).  
Reduced clearance under waterway bridges, reduced 
navigability of rivers and channels due to increased 
sedimentation (Jonkeren et al., 2007; Jonkeren et al., 
2013; Humphrey et al., 2008; Molarius et al., 2013; 
Koetse et al., 2009; Arent et al., 2014; Eichhorst et 
al., 2009; Schweighofer et al.,2014). 
Drainage systems, tunnels, increased scour of bridges. 
Risk of weather-related delays in all modes of 
services (EEA, 2012) 
Damage to rail installations, catenary, all modes 
potential traffic disruption (EEA, 2012) 
Structural damages to transport 
facilities (bridges, flyovers, 
electric tracks with overhead 
cables, train platforms, street 
lighting and signs) due to wind 
pressure or debris impact 
(Eichhorst, 2009; Enei et al., 
2011; Molarius et al., 2011). 
Damage to rail installations, 
catenary, all modes potential 
traffic disruption (EEA, 2012) 
Short-circuiting along electrical 
cables (Burlando et al., 2010; Enei 
et al., 2011; Molarius et al., 2011) 
Obstruction of roads and rails due 
to fallen vegetation (Burlando et 
al., 2010; Molarius et al., 2011; 
Oslakovic et al., 2013). 
Air and boat traffic disrupted due 
to high turbolences (PWC, 2010; 
Kulesa et al., 2003). 
Piled shipping containers may tip 
over (PWC, 2010; TRB, 2008) 
Reduced clearance under 
waterway bridges, reduced 
navigability of rivers and channels 
due to floating debris (Jonkeren et 
al., 2013) 
Reduction in all transport modes 
(EEA, 2012) 
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Table 3.3 Overview of vulnerability (and impacts) of industrial assets to climate hazards reported in literature 
 Heat waves Cold Droughts Wildfires River and coastal floods Windstorms 
Industry Enhanced degradation of 
materials and structures (Arent 
et al., 2014 ; Delpla et al., 2009; 
van Vliet et al., 2012; Tang et 
al., 2013) 
Structural damages to landfill 
due to increased methane 
production and potential 
leachate escape (Bebb et al., 
2003). 
Increased cost for cooling and 
refrigeration.  
Higher treatment costs due to 
increase in distribution of 
vermin and pests (Bebb et al., 
2003).  
Reduction in decomposition rate 
leading to lower operability and 
productivity (Bebb et al., 2003). 
Water 
pipes 
vulnerable 
to 
frost/icing 
(Bebb et 
al., 2003; 
Whitehead 
et al., 2009; 
PWC, 
2010) 
Structural damages due to 
drought-induced 
subsidence and permafrost 
thawing (Tang et al., 
2013; PWC, 2010) 
Water quality degradation, 
reduction in drinkable 
water and increase in 
treatment costs (Tang et 
al., 2013; Delpla et al., 
2009; Whitehead et al., 
2009; Cisneros et al., 
2014; van Vliet et al., 
2012)  
Reduction in 
decomposition rate 
leading to lower 
operability and 
productivity (Bebb et al., 
2003). 
Forest fires 
affect the 
viability of 
mining 
operations 
and 
potentially 
increases 
operating, 
transportatio
n and 
decommissio
ning costs 
(IPCC, 
2014) 
Structural damages to industrial sites due to direct 
impacts of overflows, reduced soil stability and induced 
mass movements (soil erosion, landslide, siltation) 
(Burton et al., 2005; Ahmed, 2012; Cisneros et al., 2014; 
Cozzani et al., 2010; Krausmann et al., 2011). 
Increasing cost for water treatment due to release of 
pollutants into the drainage and sewer system when 
brownfields are exposed to overflows (Major et al., 
2011). 
Overburden of drainage and sewer systems (Neu man et 
al., 2014; Delpla et al., 2009). Damages to transportation 
and transfer structures leading to disruption in water 
supply (Langeveld, 2013). 
Increased intrusion of salty water, damages for 
withdrawals, water quality degradation, wells pumping 
cut off, increasing cost for water treatment and reduction 
of water available for industrial purposes (Delpla et al., 
2009; Ahmed, 2012; Major et al., 2011; Cozzani et al., 
2010; Krausmann et al., 2011). 
Structural damages to 
industrial systems 
equipment due to wind 
pressure or debris 
impact (Krausmann et 
al., 2011; Tannahill et 
al., 2011). 
Pipelines vulnerable to 
wind gust, strong 
winds may contribute 
to initiating 
unfavorable 
geodynamic processes 
and falling trees over 
the distribution system 
(Whitehead et al., 
2009; Depla, 2009; 
Wilbanks et al., 2012). 
 
Table 3.4 Overview of vulnerability (and impacts) of social (education and health) assets to climate hazards reported in literature 
 Heat waves Cold Droughts Wildfires River and coastal floods Windstorms 
Social Enhanced degradation of materials and 
structures (Hertin et al., 2003; Stewart et al., 
2011). 
Higher dependence of people to water 
availability and quality (Pita et al., 2013) 
Overheating buildings, such as houses, hospitals, 
schools, (Crump et al., 2009; DCLG, 2012) 
 Structural damages due to drought-induced 
subsidence and permafrost thawing (Corti et al., 
2009, 2011) 
Higher dependence of people to water availability 
and quality (Pita et al., 2013) 
Drought-induced soil subsidence and associated 
damage to dwellings (Corti et al., 2009) 
 Structural damage to 
social infrastructures and 
reduction in operational 
services (Carmichael et 
al., 2012; Hallegatte et 
al., 2011a) 
Structural damages to 
education and health 
structures and facilities 
due to wind pressure or 
debris impact (Hallegatte 
et al., 2011b; Pita et al., 
2013; Stewart et al., 2011). 
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3.3 Expert survey 
To derive a comparable vulnerability measure in the multi-hazard and multi-
infrastructure/investment context considered in CCMFF a web-based survey was 
run amongst specialists, using the secured European Commission tool: EUSurvey 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey). In the survey the key economic assets and 
investments were grouped into the following sectors: (1) transport,, 2) energy, (3) 
information, industrial and social infrastructures and investments, (4) 
environmental/waste management and/or water treatment infrastructures, and (5) 
conservation of cultural and/or natural heritage. Based on the literature review, in a 
first screening of the allocations under the Cohesion Policy 2007-2013 programming 
period, 36 out of the 86 priority themes were considered not sensitive to climate 
hazards, so they were not retained in the survey (indicated without colour in Table 
3.5). For each sector about 500 experts were inquired to complete the survey, 
including facility operators, authors and editorial boards of peer-reviewed journals 
in the field of climate change and sector-specific structural engineering. In the 
survey, sensitivity was defined as: “the degree an asset or system is affected when 
exposed to a climate hazard”. Experts assigned anonymously a degree of sensitivity 
(high, moderate, low, no) of sector-specific infrastructures to each of the 7 climate 
hazards considered. About 10% of the invited experts responded, resulting in a 
sample size of approximately 50 per investment/infrastructure type and hazard. 
The modes of the Likert distributions were considered representative of the 
sensitivities, and in case of low consensus amongst the experts and/or strong 
disagreement with reported impacts or sensitivities some adjustments were made 
based on the literature review.  
 
The resulting sensitivity matrix for the Cohesion policy thematic priorities is shown 
in Table 3.5, for the critical infrastructures in Table 3.6. Green = no, yellow = low, 
orange = medium, and red = high sensitivity.   
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Table 3.5 Sensitivities of CPF priority themes based on expert survey and literature Red = high, 
orange = medium, yellow = low, and green = no sensitivity. No color indicates the CPF priority themes 
that a priori were assumed to be not sensitive to climate hazards, hence was not included in the 
survey. DR = drought, FL = inland flooding; FF = forest fires; CL = cold; HE = heatwaves; SLR = sea 
level rise; and W = windstorms. (*) CPF does not foresee investments in power plants so the 
sensitivity values for transmission/distribution are used instead).  
Code Thematic priority name DR FL FF CL HE SLR WI 
1 R&TD activities in research centres        
2 
R&TD infrastructure and centres of 
competence        
3 
Technology transfer and improvement 
of cooperation networks        
4 
Assistance to R&TD, particularly in 
SMEs        
5 
Advanced support services for firms 
and groups of firms        
6 
Assistance to SMEs for the promotion 
of environmentally-friendly products        
7 
Investment in firms directly linked to 
research and innovation        
8 Other investment in firms        
9 
Other measures to stimulate research 
and innovation        
10 
Telephone infrastructures (including 
broadband networks)        
11 
Information and communication 
technologies        
12 
Information and communication 
technologies (TEN-ICT)        
13 Services and applications for citizens        
14 Services and applications for SMEs         
15 Other measures         
16 Railways        
17 Railways (TEN-T)        
18 Mobile rail assets        
19 Mobile rail assets (TEN-T)        
20 Motorways        
21 Motorways (TEN-T)        
22 National roads        
23 Regional/local roads        
24 Cycle tracks        
25 Urban transport        
26 Multimodal transport        
27 Multimodal transport (TEN-T)        
28 Intelligent transport systems        
29 Airports        
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30 Ports        
31 Inland waterways (regional and local)        
32 Inland waterways (TEN-T)        
33 Electricity*        
34 Electricity (TEN-E)*        
35 Natural gas*        
36 Natural gas (TEN-E)*        
37 Petroleum products*        
38 Petroleum products (TEN-E)*        
39 Renewable energy: wind        
40 Renewable energy: solar        
41 Renewable energy: biomass        
42 
Renewable energy: hydroelectric, 
geothermal and other        
43 
Energy efficiency, co-generation, 
energy management        
44 
Management of household and 
industrial waste        
45 
Management and distribution of water 
(drink water)        
46 Water treatment (waste water)        
47 Air quality        
48 
Integrated prevention and pollution 
control        
49 
Mitigation and adaption to climate 
change        
50 
Rehabilitation of industrial sites and 
contaminated land        
51 
Promotion of biodiversity and nature 
protection        
52 Promotion of clean urban transport        
53 Risk prevention        
54 
Other measures to preserve the 
environment and prevent risks        
55 Promotion of natural assets        
56 
Protection and development of 
natural heritage        
57 
Other assistance to improve tourist 
services        
58 
Protection and preservation of the 
cultural heritage        
59 Development of cultural infrastructure        
60 
Other assistance to improve cultural 
service        
61 
Integrated projects for urban and rural 
regeneration        
62 
Development of life-long learning 
systems and strategies        
63 
Design of innovative and more 
productive ways of organising work        
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64 
Development of special services for 
employment and training        
65 
Modernisation and strengthening 
labour market institutions        
66 
Implementing active and preventive 
measures on the labour market        
67 
Measures encouraging active ageing 
and prolonging working live        
68 
Support for self-employment and 
business start-up        
69 
Measures to improve access to 
employment        
70 
Specific action to increase migrants' 
participation in employment        
71 
Integration and re-entry into 
employment for disadvantaged people        
72 
Design, introduction and 
implementing of reforms in education        
73 
Measures to increase participation in 
education and training        
74 
Developing human potential in 
research & innovation        
75 Education infrastructure        
76 Health infrastructure        
77 Childcare infrastructure        
78 Housing infrastructure        
79 Other social infrastructure        
79 Other social infrastructure        
80 
Promoting partnerships, pacts and 
initiatives        
81 
Mechanisms for improving good policy 
and programme design        
82 
Compensation of any additional costs 
due to accessibility        
83 
Compensation of additional costs due 
to market forces        
84 
Compensation of additional costs due 
to climate conditions        
85 
Preparation, implementation, 
monitoring and inspection        
86 
Evaluation and studies; information 
and communication        
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Table 3.6 Sensitivities of critical infrastructures based on expert survey and literature Red = high, 
orange = medium, yellow = low, and green = no sensitivity.  
ENERGY drought flood SLR fire cold heat wind 
Nuclear power plants               
Coal fired power plants               
Gas fired power plants               
Oil fired power plants               
Electricity 
transmission/distribution               
Gas pipelines               
Wind               
Solar               
Biomass               
Hydro               
                
TRANSPORT drought flood SLR fire cold heat wind 
Rails               
Roads               
Airports               
Ports               
Inland Waterways               
                
INDUSTRY drought flood SLR fire cold heat wind 
Metals               
Chemical               
Refineries               
Minerals               
Water/waste 
management               
                
SOCIAL drought flood SLR fire cold heat wind 
Education               
Health               
 
In the survey, 70% of the possible combinations of hazard (7) and 
infrastructures/investments (50) were considered sensitive by more than 80% of 
the respondents while 40% of them are sensitive for more than 90% of the 
respondents. In general, the sensitivity is highest for inland floods, sea level rise and 
forest fires, whereas the sensitivity of infrastructures to drought seems less 
important.  
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The expert survey generally corroborates the findings reported in the literature and 
the more robust findings correspond to higher consensus in the scientific 
community. The consensus about the survey sensitiveness is linked to the number of 
referenced impacts found for droughts, flood and forest fires, while it is much less 
pronounced for heat waves, frost/snow/cold and wind. There is also clearly a 
relation between the number of impact channels inventoried in the literature and 
the average sensitivity assessed by experts, albeit that the number of channels does 
not give any information about the strength of a given channel nor the scale of the 
potential impacts.  
 
We acknowledge different potential sources of bias in the survey: 
 Exposure bias: respondents seem to sometimes confound (potentially 
unintentionally) exposure as part of the vulnerability when they indicate the 
level of sensitivity. The first evidence of the existence of such bias is the 
difference in sensitivity indicated by experts between sea-level rise/storm 
surges and floods for some investments (for instance telephone and 
broadband networks, high impact while for sea level rise/storm surges it is 
low, which can only be justified by a difference in exposure). Other evidence 
of such bias is the heterogeneity of answers from the survey for related 
infrastructures; for example, regional roads are estimated as more sensitive 
to frost/snow/cold and floods than motorways and national roads. Exposure 
bias was removed to the extent possible based on literature impacts and 
sensitivities. 
 Information bias, both in the literature review and the survey: a general bias 
towards some more well-known and largely studied infrastructures vs. other 
ones to which the academic community has shed less light on (less studies on 
old technologies in energy production, apart from nuclear energy, especially 
compared to renewable energy). Some discrepancies between both 
assessment methods may also be the result of information bias. Impacts that 
are often discussed in the academic and grey literature (because associated 
with higher probability of occurrence or higher exposure) seem to be less 
acknowledged in the survey than in the review (meaning stronger bias in the 
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survey than in the literature review, potentially showing that this heuristic 
bias may be stronger when people try to gather expertise quickly to answer a 
survey online rather than when they write an article or choose a topic to 
study). For instance, the impact of droughts and heat waves on asphalt (both 
in the case of road transportation, which is very largely acknowledged by the 
literature, and of airports, the latter being associated with much less 
references) and on bridges is not well assessed by experts. 
 Individual bias: The individual/personal representation of the overall impact 
of climate hazards and change was verified and shown to be very limited. We 
checked for individual bias by dropping the global representation of climate 
hazard impact within sectors, i.e. removing the average of all answers for 
each respondent, and this check lead to the same results. Some heterogeneity 
between sector-specific samples (distinct panels of experts), however, may 
further bias the comparisons of results between sectors. 
 
We further acknowledge that our approach has several limitations, including the 
following: 
 Sensitivities for a given investment/infrastructure to a given hazard depend 
on the institutional and economic environment, especially on the upward and 
downward side of the production chain and thus on the dependency 
networks of critical infrastructure which are complex systems. Different 
degrees of interconnectivity of infrastructures indeed lead to different 
criticalness in case of a hazard (Kröger, 2008). Currently, there is, however, 
no satisfactory set of metrics or models that articulate the risk of failures, 
either naturally caused or human induced, for highly interdependent 
infrastructures.   
 Technological heterogeneity among infrastructures may also have a great 
role in the sensitivity estimation. For example, power plants with closed 
circuit cooling systems are more efficient and less vulnerable to rising air 
temperatures.  
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 The life span of existing or planned infrastructure can influence its current 
and future vulnerability. For example, wind power systems have lower life 
spans making them more adaptable in the long run. 
 
We implicitly consider in our survey exercise that experts are aware of the existing 
context (for instance the share of installed capital for a given technology of an 
infrastructure) and that they take this knowledge into account when answering the 
survey. Keeping these caveats in mind, our approach provides indications of general 
sensitivities of different types of infrastructures and key economic assets to climate 
hazards and may help in orienting policy interventions for climate adaptation and 
resilience. Further herein, when the vulnerability and exposure are combined with 
current climate hazards it is detailed how the qualitative sensitivity matrix is 
translated into quantitative estimates of impacts per sector.  
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4 Exposure: critical infrastructures and EU regional investments 
4.0 Key messages 
 Exposure refers to the inventory of the assets that may be affected by hazardous 
events. The assessment of exposure may address many classes of assets, their 
characteristics and geographical distribution. The value of an asset is function of 
its usefulness to an individual, group of individuals or the society as a whole. 
 Two types of assets have been considered in this study: EU regional investments 
and current critical infrastructures in Europe. 
 EU regional investments refer specifically to the investments under the Cohesion 
policy during the programming period 2007-2013 in the EU27. The funds 
allocated to European regions by the Cohesion policy are classified in 86 
categories of expenditure. In this study, a total of 50 categories of expenditure 
were considered potentially vulnerable to natural hazards, which accounts for 
53.1% of the 2007-2013 investment program, or roughly 185 billion Euros. 
Investments in transport and environment and tourism account for more than 
75% of all vulnerable investments. Other vulnerable domains of investment are 
social, technology and communication and energy infrastructure. Regions in the 
South and Eastern parts of Europe are the main beneficiaries. 
 A critical infrastructure is an asset which is essential for the maintenance of vital 
societal functions, health, safety, security, economic, or social well-being of 
people, as defined in the Council Directive 2008/114/EC. In this study, a total of 
24 infrastructure types were considered including transport, energy, industry 
and social infrastructures. 
 Data from various open and proprietary sources were collected to build a geo-
database storing both the location and key attributes of each critical 
infrastructure in vector format. The vector layers were then converted to raster 
layers and ‘harmonized’ using a procedure implemented in Geographical 
Information Systems to minimize potential data completeness issues and to 
allow the comparability between infrastructures of the same sector. The 
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harmonized infrastructure layers represent both the location of infrastructures 
and their ‘intensity’. The intensity of a particular infrastructure type in a given 
location is a function of both the infrastructure’s characteristics and its location, 
which defines its potential usefulness and value to society. 
 The geo-database of critical infrastructures can be used to map the location of 
each infrastructure type in Europe. The spatial distribution of critical 
infrastructures varies considerably across Europe. For many types of 
infrastructures, there is a strong correlation between population density and the 
presence of infrastructures. For example, highly populated areas are generally 
well served by transport and social infrastructure. Some specific infrastructure 
types, however, are absent in many countries. For example, nuclear power plants 
are present in only a limited set of countries, and navigable inland waterways 
are mostly present in Central Europe. 
 The presence of an infrastructure at a given location (exposure) does not 
necessarily imply that such infrastructure is at risk. To evaluate risk, the location 
of infrastructures needs to be combined with the probability of occurrence and 
intensity of a hazard and its vulnerability to the hazard (Chapter 5).  
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4.1 Introduction 
Exposure refers to the people, property or any other interest that would be subject 
to a given hazardous event, and loss is a measure of its direct or indirect socio-
economic consequences (Mileti 1999, UNDP 2004, Lerner-Lam 2007). Exposure is 
therefore a fundamental component of disaster risk (IPCC 2012). Disaster risk exists 
only when all its three components occur simultaneously in a given geographical 
area: climate/weather-driven hazardous events (hazard) and exposed assets that 
are vulnerable to those events (exposure and vulnerability). To illustrate, if there is 
a hazard occurring in a geographical area without any assets, no losses can be 
expected, and no stakes are at risk. Similarly, there is no risk if the assets exposed to 
a particular hazard are not vulnerable to it. Exposure and vulnerability are, 
therefore, tied closely. However, due to practical and methodological convenience, 
exposure and vulnerability are treated separately in this study. 
 
The previous chapter focused on vulnerability, i.e. the propensity or predisposition 
of assets to be adversely affected (IPCC 2012). Vulnerability depends on the intrinsic 
characteristics of the assets that make them more or less sensitive to different types 
of hazardous events, in other words, the factors that contribute to loss, including the 
physical fragilities of buildings and infrastructure that may amplify losses (Lerner-
Lam 2007). This chapter focus on exposure only, and refers specifically to the 
inventory of assets and their geographical distribution. 
 
An ‘asset’ is anything that is useful to somebody or something9. Consequently, an 
asset always holds some sort of value, which often can be measured or expressed in 
monetary terms. Assets can be classified as material/physical (e.g. goods, 
infrastructure), financial (e.g. cash, investments), or intangible (e.g. know-how, 
culture). In agreement with DG CLIMA, two specific types of assets have been 
considered in this study: 
 EU regional investments 
 Critical infrastructures 
                                                        
9 According to Cambridge, Oxford and Collins dictionaries (consulted online in June 2015). 
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The EU regional investments refer to projects financed by the Cohesion policy (CP), 
also referred to as ‘Regional policy’. The Cohesion policy is part of the multi-annual 
financial framework (MFF), which regulates the annual budgets of the European 
Union typically over periods of seven years. In the programming period 2007-2013, 
the Cohesion policy accounted for about 1/3 of the total MFF budget, and a similar 
share has been agreed for the on-going programming period (2014-2020). 
 
The Cohesion policy is put into practice through ‘operational programmes’ (OPs), 
which are policy instruments that define the investment priorities for regions, 
countries, or trans-boundary regions. The Cohesion policy aims at kick-starting 
growth, employment, competitiveness, and development on a sustainable basis, and 
thus aiming to reduce economic, social and territorial disparities between regions. 
The Cohesion policy’s funds are used in a range of domains of intervention, like 
infrastructure, environment, research and development, aid to the private sector, 
human resources, and technical assistance. Not all the domains of intervention and 
specific projects supported by the Cohesion policy are vulnerable to natural hazards. 
The objective is therefore to focus on those that are vulnerable to natural hazards 
and quantify the potential risks given future climate conditions. 
 
Data regarding EU funded projects was made available by the Directorate-General 
for Regional and Urban Policy of the European Commission (DG REGIO), which 
manages the EU Cohesion policy. In this project, we used data regarding the 
Cohesion policy 2007-2013 only. Specific investment allocation data for the on-
going programming period (2014-2020) were not available during the writing of 
this report. In section 4.2, we provide more details on the configuration of the 
Cohesion policy, and on the data used to quantify EU funded projects per region and 
per type of investment. 
 
‘Critical infrastructure’ has been defined as “an asset, system or part thereof (…) 
which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, 
security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction 
of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure 
to maintain those functions” (Council Directive 2008/114/EC). In this study we 
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selected a large set of infrastructure types that may classify as ‘critical’ according to 
the definition above. These broadly include transport, energy, industrial, 
environmental and social infrastructures. The objective was therefore to collect 
geospatial data on specific infrastructure types at the highest spatial resolution 
possible, for all the EU+EFTA countries. To our knowledge, this study has been the 
first one that attempted to collect and catalogue in the most complete, detailed and 
harmonized way data regarding critical infrastructures in the context of natural risk 
assessment at EU level. Section 4.3 describes in more detail the collected critical 
infrastructure data. 
 
 
4.2 EU regional investments: Cohesion policy funds 
The basis for the current model of the Cohesion policy was laid in the 1988 reform. 
Since then, the structural funds were integrated into an overarching policy, with 
strategic guidelines defined by the Commission and strong involvement of Member 
States and regions that drafted operational and regional development plans on a 
multi-annual basis. Different strategic objectives were set for regions depending on 
their economic situation, but with particular emphasis on the lagging regions of the 
community (Manzella and Mendez 2009). Since then, a total of four multi-annual 
programs have been implemented: 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-
2013. The ongoing multi-annual program covers the period 2014-2020. 
 
In the 2007-2013 programming period, the Cohesion policy was operationally 
structured in three different funds, each with specific objectives: The Cohesion Fund 
(CF), the European Social Fund (ESF), and the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF). The latter aims at strengthening economic and social cohesion in the 
European Union and specific measures consist of direct aid to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), co-financing of infrastructure linked to research and innovation, 
information and telecommunication, environment, energy and transport, and 
technical assistance measures. Actors in all regions of the EU can be funded by the 
ERDF. The European Social Fund supports actions that contribute to improve human 
capital and social integration in order to increase access to the labour market and 
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create opportunities for employment. Only the most developed EU regions 
(GDP/capita >90% of the EU average) are not eligible for ESF funding. Finally, the 
Cohesion Fund invests in key trans-European transport and energy networks, while 
improving the environment by increasing energy efficiency, renewable energy 
production, inter-modality and mass public transportation. Only the regions under 
the ‘Convergence’ objective (GDP/capita <75% of the EU average) are eligible for the 
CF. 
 
A total of 347 billion Euros were distributed among the three funds, with 201 billion 
Euros allocated to the ERDF, 76 billion Euros to the ESF and 70 billion Euros to the 
CF. In terms of regional distribution, the regions under the ‘Convergence’ objective 
benefited the most, with a total of 283 billion euros allocated. While the total 
amount of the Cohesion policy represented a very small portion of the EU’s GDP (~ 
0.3%), in less developed regions, the yearly allocated investments can represent as 
high as 5% of their annual product. 
 
As the manager of the Cohesion policy, the mission of the DG REGIO is, first, to 
ensure that the available financial instruments contribute to a sustainable economic, 
social and territorial cohesion by reducing disparities between the levels of 
development of regions and countries of the European Union, and furthermore to 
ensure that these objectives are not met at high environmental cost, and that 
potential negative impacts are foreseen and minimized. A study on direct and 
indirect land use impacts of the Cohesion policy has been done by the JRC at the 
request of the DG REGIO (Batista e Silva et al. 2013b). However, impacts of future 
weather and climate-driven hazardous events on EU investments have not been 
thoroughly assessed until this JRC study commissioned by the Directorate-General 
for Climate Action (DG CLIMA). 
 
In this project, we used data regarding the Cohesion policy 2007-2013, which 
consisted of allocated investments per NUTS2 region (271 regions) and per category 
of expenditure (86 categories). The categories can be as specific as ‘R&TD 
infrastructure’, ‘Support for self-employment and business start-up’, ‘Motorways’, 
‘Multimodal transport’, ‘Ports’, ‘Renewable energy: solar’, ‘Integrated projects for 
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urban and rural regeneration’, ‘Promotion of natural assets’, ‘Education 
infrastructure’, to mention just a few. The data was provided by DG REGIO in a 
matrix of investment allocations, with regions in rows and expenditure categories in 
columns. 
 
Specific investment allocation data by the Cohesion policy for the 2014-2020 
programming period were not available within the writing of this report, as many 
operational programs were still being finalized. Operational programs can be 
regional, thematic (national scope) and trans-boundary (multi-regional scope), and 
define the strategies for investment during the seven year programming period 
given: 1) the overarching EU’s objectives of competitiveness and cohesion and 2) the 
specific regional and/or thematic goals. The OPs define in detail the share of each 
fund (ERDF + CF + ESF) that is used to support each objective and specific 
intervention. All summed together, the hundreds of OPs allow for a complete 
portrait of how the EU funds are expected to be used across regions and expenditure 
categories. 
 
Not all the categories of expenditure are equally sensitive to natural hazards. The 
different sensitivity levels of investments to natural hazards have already been 
addressed in Chapter 3 of this report. However, a first screening was conducted to 
differentiate investment typologies that are more vulnerable to natural hazards 
from those that are not. In general, investments in infrastructure or any kind of 
physical assets were considered potentially vulnerable to natural hazards, while 
investments in immaterial actions like financial support to firms and to research and 
development, improvement of the human capital and social inclusion, strengthening 
of institutional capacity, technical assistance or direct compensations to outermost 
regions were considered not vulnerable. Investments targeted to make regions more 
resilient to environmental risks and climate change were not considered vulnerable 
by definition. According to this first screening, 50 expenditure categories out of 86 
were considered potentially vulnerable to natural hazards, which accounts for 
53.1% of the total Cohesion policy investments. 
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The potentially vulnerable expenditure categories were then grouped in 5 relevant 
sectors of investments, namely: transport, energy, environment and tourism, social 
infrastructure and information, communication and technology. The share of 
investments per each of these sectors is depicted in Figure 4.1. Investments in 
transport and environment and tourism represent more than 75% of the total 
vulnerable investments. Figure 4.2 shows the regional distribution of these 
investments, with a quite remarkable pattern of Southern and Eastern regions 
absorbing most of the investments. Because Croatia joined the EU in 2013, it did not 
benefit from the Cohesion policy for the period considered at its fullest. As such, 
Croatia was not included in the analysis on EU Regional Investments. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Share of main vulnerable categories of EU regional investments under the Cohesion policy 
2007-2013. 
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It is finally worth noting that data on specific projects were not available. The DG 
REGIO database has information for only a sample of large projects. Information on 
all specific projects, their nature, characteristics and precise locations would permit 
a much more accurate quantification of future expected damages due to natural 
hazards and changing climate conditions. However, such data are still very scattered 
and have not yet been systematized. Therefore, to what concerns exposed assets, 
only allocated investments per region and per category of expenditure have been 
considered. Moreover, these were assumed to be homogeneously distributed across 
each region’s geographical extent. It was further assumed that allocated investments 
at the begging of the program were implemented during the programs duration. 
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Figure 4.2 Regional distribution of Cohesion policy funds, per major type of investment 
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4.3 Critical infrastructures 
As already mentioned in section 4.1, we took the definition of critical infrastructure 
from the Council Directive 2008/114/EC, which defines critical infrastructures as 
assets that are essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, 
safety, security, economic or social well-being of people. Such a broad definition 
encompasses necessarily many types of infrastructures. 
 
The selection of infrastructure types to consider in this study was initially guided by 
the categories of investment of the Cohesion policy. As explained in section 4.2, a 
first qualitative screening was made to select the investment categories that were 
potentially vulnerable to natural hazards, which normally corresponded to physical 
infrastructure. From these infrastructure types we retained those that broadly fitted 
the definition of criticality. Although heavy industries are not directly targeted by EU 
investments, this type of infrastructure was added to the list due to their economic 
criticality. The results of the vulnerability survey were finally used to validate and 
adjust the selection. A total of 24 specific infrastructure types were finally 
considered in this study. These were then classified in four broad and meaningful 
sectors: transport infrastructure, energy infrastructure, industrial infrastructure, 
and social infrastructure (see Table 4.1). 
 
A geographical database with the location of the different infrastructure types was 
constructed by compiling and preparing information gathered from multiple data 
sources (Marin Herrera et al., 2015). To allow consistency and comparability 
amongst the various infrastructure layers within sectors the data were further 
‘harmonized’. The ‘harmonization’ process is described in more detail in section 
4.3.2. The final, harmonized infrastructure layers were used in the subsequent risk 
analysis, which is explained in detail in Chapter 5 of this report. A simplified scheme 
of this workflow is depicted in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 General workflow followed to collect and harmonize infrastructure geospatial data. 
 
4.3.1 Data collection  
A large part of this study was devoted to collecting detailed geospatial information 
of current critical infrastructures, as a one-stop-shop was not available. It actually 
became quite clear from the early stages of the project that information on 
infrastructures in Europe was rather scattered, with different sources available for 
different infrastructure types, or with different data sources providing data for the 
same infrastructure type. 
 
The first step was therefore to seek and list all possible data sources for each 
infrastructure type, explore and learn about the main relevant characteristics of 
each data source and then select the optimal way to accurately represent the data. 
The following criteria were used to guide the selection of data sources: 
 European geographical coverage: European data sources were preferred over 
national and worldwide sources to avoid, respectively, inconsistent data and low 
resolution levels; 
 Data completeness: the highest stated or perceived data completeness was 
preferred; 
 Data consistency: data sources with transparent and consistent mapping/reporting 
methodologies; 
 Highest spatial resolution; 
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 Most recent data update; 
 Large within-sector thematic coverage: Data sources which included data on the 
most infrastructure types within a sector. 
 
The resulting geo-database consists of a set of layers in vector format, each 
representing one infrastructure type, covering the EU+EFTA countries. In the case of 
the energy infrastructure layers, additional information provided by the PLATTS 
database (proprietary database acquired by the European Commission) was kept, in 
particular the installed capacity of each power plant, the diameter of gas pipelines 
and the voltage of the electricity grid. 
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the result of the process of infrastructure type selection, and 
their classification per major sector. The data sources, the original data structure, 
and the reference dates are specified for each infrastructure type as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 List of infrastructures used in this study, sources used and reference dates. 
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Sector Sub-sector Infrastructure type Data structure Main sources 
Reference 
date 
Transport 
Roads 
Local roads 
Vector (lines) 
Open Street Map 2014 
Roads of national 
importance 
Motorways 
Other modes 
Railways 
Vector (lines) 
Inland waterways GISCO + UNECE  
Ports 
Vector (points) 
CORINE Land 
Cover + GISCO 
2006 
Airports 
Energy 
Non-renewable 
energy 
production 
Coal power plants 
Vector (points) 
PLATTS 2013 
Gas power plants 
Oil power plants 
Nuclear power plants 
Renewable 
energy 
production 
Biomass and geothermal 
power plants 
Vector (points) Hydro power plants 
Solar power plants 
Wind power plants 
Energy 
transport 
Electricity distribution / 
transmission Vector (lines) 
Gas pipelines 
Industry 
Heavy 
industries 
Metal industry 
Vector (points) 
EPRTR v7 2013 Mineral industry 
Chemical industry 
Refineries 
Global Energy 
Observatory 
2010 
Water/waste 
treatment 
Water and waste 
treatment 
Vector (points) EPRTR v7 2013 
Social 
Education Education infrastructure 
Vector (points) Open Street Map 2014 
Health Health infrastructure 
 
 
4.3.2 Harmonization 
Despite the careful selection of data sources and the various checks carried out to 
evaluate the quality of the data, an exhaustive, quantitative validation of the data 
was outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, there were some critical issues 
that had to be taken into account before overlaying the infrastructure data with the 
hazard information. 
 
Data completeness was the first of those issues. First, some data sources have a 
limited scope. That is the case of the European Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Register (EPRTR) that was used to obtain the location of most of the industrial 
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infrastructures. The scope of EPRTR is to monitor pollution levels from the largest 
emitters, thus ignoring smaller ones. Second, it cannot be guaranteed that data 
sources such as the Open Street Map (OSM) contain each and every infrastructure 
location as found in reality at a given time. Moreover, as a voluntary geographical 
information project, the degree of completeness of the OSM can vary considerably 
from country to country and even from region to region. Finally, even proprietary, 
more structured and consistent data sources such as PLATTS do not report the 
degree of completeness of their databases. 
 
Another issue relates to the comparability between different types of infrastructure 
within the same sector. For example, in terms of impacts in the transport sector, 
how can a port (which is represented as a point feature in a Geographical 
Information System (GIS)), be compared to 1 Km of road (which is represented as 
line feature in a GIS)? Or how can 1 Km of motorway be compared to 1 Km of local 
road? The same applies to the other sectors: how can a metal industry be compared 
to a refinery, or a hospital to a school? A more general question is: how can impacts 
of a given hazardous event on two different infrastructure types be compared using 
a sufficiently straightforward and generic methodology, applicable to all Europe? 
To allow a consistent impact framework, infrastructure types belonging to the same 
sector thus required a data transformation process to bring them to a level of 
comparability, in which their relative importance could be evaluated. To illustrate, 
rather than describing transport infrastructures by their typologies (categorical, 
discrete data), they would have to be described in terms of their actual usage or 
value. This data transformation process is hereinafter referred as ‘harmonization’. 
The harmonization required, first and foremost, a conversion from vector to raster 
data structure, with a cell size of 1 Km x 1 Km. Subsequently, an ‘intensity’ 
measurement was assigned to each raster cell of each individual infrastructure type, 
with the intensity measurement varying per sector, as reported in Table 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the procedure applied to the road infrastructures, showing the 
transformation from discrete and categorical vector data to a raster and continuous 
data, with intensity values assigned to individual raster cells (locations). Locations 
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with higher intensity values are assumed to suffer higher impacts in case of a 
hazardous event. 
 
Table 4.2 Intensity variables used. 
Sector Variable Unit 
Transport infrastructure Annual freight transported k tonnes 
Energy infrastructure Electricity produced / transported k tonnes oil equivalent (ktoe) 
Industry infrastructure Annual turnover Million EUR (MEUR) 
Social infrastructure Annual expenditure Million EUR (MEUR) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Illustration of the ‘harmonization’ process: from categorical information to a 
continuous indicator of intensity. 
 
 
In all cases, the intensity data was collected from Eurostat10 at national level, for a 
series of the five most recent years available (typically 2009-2013). The entire series 
was averaged to avoid potential data artifacts, and the resulting values were finally 
assigned to infrastructures. The implicit and desirable outcome of this procedure is 
that impacts of a hazardous event on infrastructures differ depending on the 
different ‘intensity’ values of the infrastructures (apart from differences in impact 
due to varying degrees of vulnerability for different infrastructure types).  
 
                                                        
10 Data collection conducted in early 2015, from Eurostat’s online database. 
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Two assignment methods were used: 
 Direct assignment 
 Downscaling  
 
The direct assignment is the most accurate way to assign an intensity value to 
infrastructures. However, this method was only applied to ports and airports, for 
which Eurostat data were available in detail. This allowed a reliable measurement of 
the usage in terms of annual freight transported for each port and airport. 
 
The downscaling procedure consisted of disaggregating the national intensity values 
of each infrastructure type (e.g. annual turnover of the metal industry, or total 
electricity production from nuclear power plants) to the locations of those 
infrastructures within the respective country. It is worthwhile noting that the 
downscaling procedure minimized the impact of geospatial data incompleteness 
issues, as the total intensity of a given infrastructure type in a given country was 
preserved within that country. This means that even if an important power plant of 
a given country is missing from the geo-database, the total produced electricity in 
that country is kept, as it is redistributed among all the other power plants. This 
does not solve the problem of missing infrastructure in a particular location within a 
country, but allows aggregated impacts between countries to be reasonably 
compared. 
 
The generic downscaling approach can be described by equation 4.1: 
  [4.1] 
where 
Ij,i = intensity of infrastructure j in pixel i 
Vj,c = total intensity of infrastructure j (or volume) in country c, as reported by 
Eurostat at national level. 
w = weight = f(j) 
 85 
 
for j = roads, wi,j = f(lengthi,j, capacityi,j, nr. of peoplei,j), with capacity of 
motorways = 5, capacity of national road = 3, capacity or local roads = 2, and 
nr. of people in a predefined radius around i11. 
for j = rails or inland water ways, wi,j = f(lengthi,j, average flow from 
exogenous modeli,j12)  
for j = energy production, wi,j = f(installed capacityi,j13) 
for j = electricity grid, wi,j = f(lengthi,j, voltagei,j4) 
for j = gas pipelines, wi,j = f(lengthi,j, pipeline diameteri,j4) 
for j = industry, wi,j = f(nr. of facilitiesi,j) 
for j = social infrastructure, wi,j = f(nr. of potential usersi,j) = nr of people in 
predefined radius / nr infrastructures in radius 
 
One major advantage of the harmonization approach is that it allows the summation 
of intensities from different infrastructure types j of the same sector s: 
  [4.2] 
 
In summary, the described harmonization procedure was applied to each individual 
infrastructure type, thus allowing to 
 minimize incompleteness of the geospatial data sources; 
 compare different types of infrastructures in the same unit of measure, and, 
consequently, 
 merge different infrastructure types into four more significant sectors: 
transport, energy, industry, social infrastructure. 
 
                                                        
11 Population distribution taken from the JRC population grid map at 100 x 100m resolution 2006. See 
Batista e Silva et al. (2013). 
12 TRANSTOOLS model (JRC-IPTS). Documentation available online: 
http://energy.jrc.ec.europa.eu/transtools/TT_model.html. 
13 As reported by the PLATTS energy geo-database. 
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Figure 4.5 shows some examples of harmonized infrastructure layers. After the 
harmonization procedure, the layers can be combined with hazard data to derive an 
impact measured in the same units as of the harmonized layers. The translation to 
actual monetary losses can be finally achieved by applying cost coefficients (or cost 
curves) which link the estimated impacts (harmonized layers * hazard) with actual 
observed losses due to natural hazards. This is explained thoroughly in Chapter 5. 
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Roads (annual freight transported in k tons) 
 
Rail (annual freight transported in k tons) 
 
Energy production (electricity produced in ktoe) 
 
Energy transport (electricity transported in ktoe) 
 
Education infrastructure (total expenditure in MEUR) 
 
Health infrastructure (total expenditure in MEUR) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Examples of harmonized infrastructure layers.
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4.4 Main limitations and challenges 
One setback in this study was the delay in the preparation of the operational 
programs for the programming period 2014-2020, which prevented access to 
detailed regional and sector allocations of the European Structural and Investment 
Funds (ESIF). Therefore, and contrary to what had been initially planned, only the 
2007-2013 regional investments were considered in this study. Impacts of natural 
hazards on the ESIF for the period 2014-2020 depend intrinsically on its 
geographical and sector distribution, which, at the time of this project, were largely 
unknown. 
 
An important limitation of the analysis carried out to assess risk of EU regional 
investments is related to the assumption that investments were homogeneously 
distributed within NUTS2 regions. In reality, investments in regions may have 
marked spatial patterns, or target very specific locations within regions, depending 
of course on the type of investment. However, micro-data on past financed projects 
are extremely scattered and have not yet been systematized and published by the 
European Commission, which prevented a more spatially precise analysis. 
 
The current stock of critical infrastructures has been assessed by using the most 
complete and up-to-date data sources. However, the exposure of future 
infrastructure was not addressed in this study, and remains still one of the main 
challenges in the evaluation of future risk. The location of future stock of 
infrastructures would require a more sophisticated approach based on trend 
analysis, or modelling/simulation. Lung et al. (2013), for example, have used results 
from a land use model (Lavalle et al. 2011) which projected future locations of forest 
and industrial/commercial areas.  
 
Another limitation concerns the lack of information on the completeness level of the 
geographical data sources used in this study. Potential incompleteness was partially 
addressed by the harmonization procedure (see section 4.3.2), which, however, did 
not prevent underestimation of exposure at site-specific level when infrastructure 
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data were missing. As obvious at it may seem, the quality of input data affects 
significantly the reliability of the final risk estimates, yet, an actual assessment of the 
input data quality is not straightforward, and its influence on the accuracy of the 
final impact results remains unknown. 
 
Various authors have emphasized the importance of population data to assess 
exposure and risk (e.g. National Research Council 2007a, Freire 2010). Although the 
focus of this study was essentially on investments and critical infrastructure, the 
information on the current and future location of people is essential to estimate the 
number of users of infrastructure, and the potential indirect losses resulting from 
damaged infrastructure. In an attempt to assess global exposure and vulnerability 
towards natural hazards, Peduzzi et al. (2009) have used population distribution as 
a proxy of exposure and various socio-economic factors were used as a measure of 
vulnerability. However, the location of people per age and social strata, and across 
different time-frames is still nowadays a key challenge in most countries. 
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5 Multi-hazard risk assessment in Europe under climate change 
5.0 Key messages 
Critical infrastructures 
 Multi-hazard multi-sector impacts 
o Europe will face a significant increase in multi-hazard multi-sector 
damages in the coming decades. Current damages of 3.4 billion €/year in 
the  EU+ (EU28 + Switzerland, Norway and Iceland) are projected to triple 
by the 2020s, multiply six-fold by mid-century, and rise up to 38 billion 
€/year by the 2080s (undiscounted and no socio-economic changes 
assumed). These numbers reflect only the (combined) damages from the 
7 climate hazards to the sectors considered in this study, hence they do 
not reflect the total damages of these hazards to society.  
o Indicative estimates of total damages from the 7 climate hazards to 
society could rise from currently 12 billion €/year to nearly 80 billion 
€/year by the end of this century.  
 
 Sector impacts 
o The strongest increase in multi-hazard damages is projected for the 
energy sector, for which the baseline expected annual damage (EAD) of 
0.5 billion €/year could rise to 2.0, 4.4, and 8.2 billion €/year (or 
increases in EAD of 394%, 860% and 1,612%) by the 2020s, 2050s and 
2080s, respectively.  
o A comparable trend can be observed for the transport sector, for which 
the baseline EAD of 0.8 billion €/year is expected to reach nearly 12 
billion €/year (increase of 1,496%) by the end of this century.  
o For industry, which shows the largest damages amongst the sectors 
considered, current EAD of 1.5 billion €/year is estimated to surpass 16 
billion €/year by the 2080s, corresponding to a 10-fold increase.  
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o For the social sector, the rising trend in damages is less pronounced, but 
current EAD of 0.6 billion €/year could still more than double by the end 
of this century due to climate change.    
 
 Hazard contributions 
o Aggregated over the four sectors, current climate hazard damages relate 
mostly to river floods (44%) and windstorms (27%). Their relative 
contribution to the total damage diminishes rapidly in time. The shares of 
drought and heat strongly rise, covering more than 70% of climate hazard 
damages by the end of the century (vs 12% in present times).  
o The contribution of wildfires and coastal floods is low, albeit that a strong 
increase in coastal flood damages is projected in the coming century.  
o The contribution of cold waves is also low and cold-related damages in 
Europe could completely disappear with global warming.  
o Hazard-contributions vary amongst the sectors. For the social sector, 
damages from windstorms and inland flooding will remain important. 
The industry and energy sector will be most impacted by droughts, with 
56% and 67%, respectively, of sector damages relating to droughts by the 
end of this century. For the transport sector, on the other hand, 
heatwaves will largely dominate future damages (92% of total damages 
by 2080s). 
 
 Regional impacts 
o For EU+ as a whole, the share of GDP at risk rises progressively from 
0.03% now to 0.28% by the end of century. Southern and south-eastern 
countries will be most impacted. For Bulgaria (0.40%), Romania (0.45%), 
Italy (0.49%) and Slovenia (0.56%) damages remain below or close to 
0.5% of GDP, whereas for Portugal (0.77%), Spain (0.87%) and Croatia 
(0.97%) damages could reach nearly 1% of GDP. 
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EU Cohesion Policy investments 
 Multi-hazard multi-sector impacts 
o Annual damages to EU regional investments will rise rapidly from 146 
million €/year, or 0.04% of the total 2007-2013 regional investments, to 556 
million €/year (382% baseline EAD) or 0.16% of total investments by the 
2020s. By the 2050s damages further climb to 1,109 million €/year (761% 
baseline EAD) or 0.32% of total investments, and by the end of this century 
the annual risk amounts to 1,703 million €/year (1,168% baseline EAD) or 
0.49% of total investments.  
 
 Hazard contributions 
o Floods is currently the most damaging hazard to EU regional investments, 
accounting for about half (51%) of total impacts, followed by drought (26%) 
and heat waves (10%).  
o Drought damages increase significantly, from 38 million €/year now to 888 
million €/year by the 2080s (2,315% baseline EAD), and form the largest 
share of future damages (52% by the end of the century).  
o The strongest relative increase in damages, however, is projected for 
heatwaves and coastal flooding (increases both around +4,500%). As a result 
heatwaves will become the second damaging hazard to EU structural 
investments (40% of total damages by 2080s).  
o Damages due to cold waves will evanesce in the coming decades, whereas 
damages due to wind, floods and fires show more moderate increases, with 
absolute damages rising this century by 10%, 30% and 50%, respectively.  
 
 Sector impacts 
o Currently 48% of hazard impacts relate to transport investments, and 37% to 
the environment and tourism sector. Annual damages in the transport sector 
rise by 722% from 70 million €/year in the baseline to 573 million €/year by 
the 2080s. For the environment and tourism sector damages increase at a 
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rate double as high (+1,619%) from 55 million €/year now to 940 million 
€/year by the end of the century. Hence, this sector will under future climate 
account for more than half of the total hazard damages (55% vs 34% for the 
transport sector) to EU investments.  
o Damages in the energy sector increase by more than tenfold (+1,077%), from 
13 million €/year in the baseline to 157 million €/year by the 2080s.  
o Impacts in the ICT and social sector are smaller and show less pronounced 
increases. Where damages to ICT investments are expected to rise by 160% 
from 1.9 to 5 million €/year by the 2080s, an increase of 363% from 6 to 28 
million €/year is projected for the social sector.  
 
 Regional impacts 
o Where by the 2080s multi-hazard multi-sector expected annual losses for the 
whole EU27 may correspond to 0.49% of total investments, in regions of the 
Iberian and Balkan Peninsulas impacts can amount to 3% of investments.  
o When looking at sector level, relative impacts can even be substantially 
higher in some parts of Europe. For the transport sector, by the end of the 
century expected annual losses to investments rise to about 5% of the 
transport investments for Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria and regions of Spain. For 
the energy and the environment and tourism sectors, expected yearly losses 
by the 2080s may rise up to, or locally exceed, 1/10 of the total sector 
investment in south-west and south-east regions of the EU. For the social and 
ICT sectors expected annual losses at regional scale remain mostly below 1% 
and 0.5% of sector investments, respectively.  
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5.1 Introduction 
The projected increases in exposure to multiple climate hazards in many regions of 
Europe, as shown in the hazard assessment of this work (see Chapter 2), emphasize 
the relevance of a multi-hazard risk assessment to comprehensively quantify 
potential impacts of climate change and develop suitable adaptation strategies. In 
this context, quantifying the future impacts of climatic extremes on critical economic 
sectors, both in terms of critical infrastructures and EU-funded investments, is 
crucial due to their key role for human wellbeing and their effects on the overall 
economy.  
 
As detailed in Chapter 4 of this report, critical infrastructures describe the existing 
assets and systems that are essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, 
health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption 
or destruction of which would have a significant impact as a result of the failure to 
maintain those functions. EU regional investments refer to the investments under 
the Cohesion policy during the programming period 2007-2013 in the EU27, aimed 
to specific regional development projects or actions. Of particular relevance in 
relation to potential climate change impacts in Europe are the transport, energy, 
industry, social, environment and tourism, and ICT sectors.   
 
Evaluating the effects of multiple climate hazards on infrastructures and 
investments is a complex task because of incomplete scientific methodologies and 
limited understanding of vulnerability of infrastructures (see Chapter 3). Existing 
direct cost assessment methods generally focus on specific hazards or sectors by the 
use of susceptibility curves derived analytically under specific conditions (Ciscar et 
al., 2011; Meyer et al., 2013). Difficulties in establishing comparisons across hazards 
and sectors remain particularly relevant (Kappes et al., 2012). The recently 
developed InterSectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISI-MIP) offers a 
framework for comparing multiple climate impact models within and across 
different sectors based on a common set of climate and socioeconomic scenarios, 
providing a quantitative estimate of impacts and uncertainties (Warszawski et al., 
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2014). While this open archive represents an unprecedented opportunity and a 
significant step forward to a better understanding of the potential impacts of climate 
change, systematic and detailed knowledge of the risk imposed by multiple climate 
extremes is still lacking.  
 
This work provides the first comprehensive multi-hazard multi-sector risk 
assessment for Europe under climate change and identifies the most vulnerable 
regions throughout the 21st century. We focus on seven climate hazards (see 
Chapter 2) including heat and cold waves, wildfires, droughts, river and coastal 
floods and windstorms. Expected impacts to industry, energy, transport, social, 
environment and tourism, and ICT infrastructures and EU regional investments are 
investigated under current and future climate conditions. Although these sectors do 
not cover the full range of possible societal and environmental climate-hazard 
impacts, they include crucial aspects of livelihoods for Europe. Cost estimates 
reported here refer mostly to direct damages to infrastructures due to physical 
contact with the hazard and to a lesser extent also include damages related to the 
reduction in primary sources and productivity (see sections 5.2.4 and 5.3.3). The 
methodology integrates a set of high-resolution climate hazard projections (Chapter 
2), a detailed representation of sectorial physical assets and productive systems and 
investments (Chapter 4), and a qualitative appraisal of their sensitivity based on 
expert view and literature review (Chapter 3). The three above-mentioned 
components have been combined in a vulnerability framework with recorded 
damages from climate disasters in order to derive quantitative estimates of risk. We 
then derive a comprehensive and comparable set of climate hazard cost figures for 
different sectors in the EU28 + Switzerland, Norway and Iceland (further denoted 
herein as EU+). Results are presented in spatial maps as well as aggregated for five 
European regions to simplify interpretation, analogously to the presentation in the 
hazard chapter (Chapter 2): Southern (SEU), Western (WEU), Central (CEU), Eastern 
(EEU) and Northern (NEU) Europe (see Figure 1.2). For clarity of presentation, after 
the description of the methods we first detail the impacts on the present stock of 
critical economic infrastructures, which allow a better interpretation of the potential 
impacts of climate change on the current socio-economic system, and then we 
synthesize the risk to EU regional investments. 
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5.2 Methods 
The risk assessment focuses on direct tangible damages related to the impacts to 
physical assets, the disruption of productivity and loss of primary sources due to 
climate hazards. Expected Annual Damages are obtained from the combination of 
climate hazard, exposed infrastructures and investments, and the vulnerability of 
exposed assets (IPCC, 2012) and are expressed in 2010 € assuming no socio-
economic change in future scenarios. In other words, we have modelled the 
economic effects of future climate change on the current economy (quasi static 
analysis).  
 
The three main components that are utilized here for the risk assessment, namely 
climate hazard (Chapter 2), exposure (Chapter 4) and sensitivity of exposed assets 
(Chapter 3), are already amply discussed in their respective chapter. They are 
recalled here briefly for clarity and then we detail how they are combined in a 
coherent risk framework to translate impact scenarios into quantitative estimates of 
damage based on recorded loss data. 
 
5.2.1 Hazards 
The risk analysis focuses on seven critical climate hazards for Europe: heat and cold 
waves, river and coastal floods, streamflow droughts, wildfires and windstorms. 
Climate hazard indicators were derived for the baseline (1981-2010), 2020s (2011-
2040), 2050s (2041-2070) and 2080s (2071-2100) for an ensemble of bias-
corrected climate projections obtained from different regional climate model 
simulations under the A1B emissions scenario. Hazard magnitude levels (HL) are 
classified based on the probability of occurrence of events in current climatology; 
given TR as return period corresponding to HL, we assign the intensity class to the HL 
event according to the Table 5.1. 
 
 99 
 
The fraction of a given area that is expected to be annually exposed to a hazard of HL 
magnitude – the Expected Annual Fraction Exposed (EAFE) – was derived for each 
scenario period. More details can be found in Chapter 2. 
 
Table 5.1 Classification of hazard intensity class based on probability thresholds 
Hazard intensity class (HL) Probability threshold 
very high TR ≥ 100yr 
high 100yr > TR ≥ 50yr 
moderate 50yr > TR ≥ 20yr 
low 20yr > TR ≥ 10yr 
very low 10yr > TR ≥ 2yr 
no hazard 2yr < TR 
 
 
5.2.2 Exposure 
Exposure is described by two sets of GIS layers that refer to critical infrastructures 
and EU regional investments, respectively. The first set represents the present stock 
of transport, industry, energy and social infrastructures; the second set 
comprehends EU regional investments under the 2007-2013 period in the sectors 
transport, environment and tourism, energy, social, and information, 
communication and technology.  
 
In order to allow intra-sector comparability between different types of 
infrastructures and to overcome possible incompleteness in the source databases, 
the original infrastructure data have been harmonized by assigning sector-specific 
intensity measurement to each infrastructure. Intensity values were obtained from 
EUROSTAT and assumed correlated to the economic value of the asset and its 
productivity. We assume no changes in exposed infrastructures along the century. 
EU regional investments are already expressed in a common unit (€) and do not 
require additional processing. More details are reported in Chapter 4. 
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5.2.3 Sensitivity 
A web-based survey was set up amongst specialists to assess the climate sensitivity 
of critical economic infrastructures and investments. Here, sensitivity refers to what 
degree the asset or system is affected when exposed to a climate hazard. For each 
sector a sample of ~50 experts (vs. potential 500 respondents) was collected from 
private companies, authors and editorial boards of peer-reviewed journals in the 
field of climate change and sector-specific structural engineering. Experts assigned 
anonymously a degree of sensitivity (high, moderate, low, no) to infrastructures and 
investments with respect to each climate hazard. The distribution modes retrieved 
from the survey have been combined with vulnerability information obtained from 
literature in order to derive a representative set of sensitivities (S). More details are 
described in Chapter 3. 
 
5.2.4 Multi-hazard risk framework 
For each hazard and the different infrastructure types considered, every grid cell 
where an infrastructure is located was labelled by a set of potential risk levels (very 
high, high, moderate, low, very low, no). They express how much of the 
infrastructure type in a particular cell is subject to certain levels of risk, which are 
based on the combination of the sensitivity of the infrastructure type and the hazard 
magnitude, as expressed by a pre-defined risk matrix (M) (Figure 5.1). The 
infrastructure asset expected to be annually exposed to a given risk level RL - the 
Expected Annual Asset Exposed EAAE – is then calculated as follows: 
 
   
  




LL
L
RSHEAFEM
H
LL IHEAFEREAAE
,
       [5.1] 
 
where the sum runs over all HL magnitudes that in combination with the sensitivity 
S lead to the risk level RL in the risk matrix M. I refers to the exposed asset 
(harmonized infrastructure layer or EU regional investment). 
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Figure 5.1 Risk matrix M 
 
The cumulated EAAE under very high and high risk level is considered linearly 
correlated to the corresponding damages. Note that this implies that for highly 
sensitive infrastructures and investments, hazard events with a 50-yr return period 
or higher are considered to contribute to the damage, whereas for moderately 
sensitive infrastructures and investments only 100-year or more extreme events 
result in damages. The EAAE-EAD relations are retrieved at sector and NUTS2 level 
for the baseline (base) and propagated for the future scenarios (scen) (Figure 5.2) 
based on the following equation: 
  
base
base
scen
scen EAD
EAAE
EAAE
EAD          [5.2] 
 
The implementation of Equation 5.2 is described in the following lines for the 
analysis of the impacts on critical infrastructures. After that we detail the application 
for the EU regional investments.  
 
EAAE refers to the amount of asset at risk for a given sector and is expressed 
according to the sector-specific intensity value as defined by the harmonization 
process. As shown in Equation 5.1, EAAE values are obtained by combining exposure 
intensity values with hazard information. The latter, expressed by EAFE, varies 
amongst climate realizations, which explains the uncertainty bounds shown in 
Figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2 Scheme of calculation for the EAAE-EAD relations in a two hazards case 
 
Baseline annual damages (EADbase) are obtained for each hazard and sector at 
NUTS2 level by the integration of multiple disaster datasets (EMDAT, Munich RE) 
and economic statistics (EUROSTAT). More than 1100 disaster loss records for 
climate-related hazards that occurred in the 1981-2010 period have been collected 
from EMDAT. Information for each disaster include: hazard type, country, year and 
loss estimate (direct damages to asset and production interruption expressed in US 
$ in the value of the year of occurrence). All data have been converted into €2010 
using the country Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices derived from EUROSTAT. 
The resulting overall losses are compared with the estimates provided by Munich Re 
for Europe over the same period. Munich Re recorded an overall damage that is 30% 
larger than that derived from EMDAT, which can be imputable to minor events that 
are not reported in EMDAT. The 30% residual damages were, for each European 
region, disaggregated amongst hazards based on the hazard damage shares (for that 
region) derived from EMDAT statistics. Within each region the residual minor 
damages were further distributed amongst countries based on national GDP values. 
As such, baseline damage values were obtained for each of the 7 hazards for each 
country.  
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It is important to note that the baseline damages derived per country for each 
hazard reflect the total damage (as reported in the EMDAT and Munich Re 
databases) in that country due to the specific hazard. This total damage relates to 
impacts in all sectors, hence not only to critical infrastructures in the sectors 
considered in this study. For example, for droughts a considerable share of the 
damages typically relate to agricultural losses, which are not considered herein. To 
account for this, the hazard-specific country baseline damages have been distributed 
over sectors in each country based on the national shares of the monetary value of 
sector-specific capital stock and gross value added, and their sensitivity to the 
considered hazard. The shares of the total (reported) climate damages that relate to 
critical infrastructures considered in this work differ strongly between hazards: 
28% for coastal flooding, 90% for cold, 45% for drought, 14% for fire, 28% for flood, 
heat for 67%, and 21% for windstorms. This means that for wildfires, for example, 
86% of the damages relate to other assets/sectors than the critical infrastructures 
considered here, such as forests and nature (~35% of fire damages), or residential 
buildings (~30% of fire damages). For windstorms, inland and coastal flooding, 
large shares (up to 50%) also relate to residential infrastructures that are not 
included in our study.  
 
Finally, hazard-specific damages to each sector in a country were disaggregated to 
NUTS2 level based on NUTS2 GDP shares within a country. Baseline EAD for EU 
regional investments have been obtained by rescaling the EAD values retrieved for 
the sector-specific critical infrastructures based on the share of the EU regional 
investments to the total capital stock and gross value added for each sector. 
 
Baseline and future EAD values were calculated separately for all climate 
experiments, scenario periods and climate hazards. Multi-hazard damages are 
obtained by summing up single-hazard multi-model median EAD values under the 
assumption of static vulnerability (complete post-event recovery) and independent 
hazards (no hazard interrelations). 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Impacts to critical infrastructures 
Here we present how climatic extremes are projected to affect critical 
infrastructures in the energy, transport, industry and social sector in the coming 
decades up to the end of the century. Impacts are estimated for EU28 as well as for 
Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, together further referred to as EU+. Damages 
reported further herein reflect median ensemble results, are undiscounted and 
expressed in 2010 € assuming no socio-economic change in future scenarios (only 
account for climate change). When reporting multi-hazard damages, for wind, where 
projections of hazard are not available for 2020 and 2050, damages for these 
periods were obtained by linearly interpolating between the baseline and the 2080s. 
Further note that the modelling domain of the flood and drought analysis do not 
include Cyprus and Malta, where Cyprus is also not included in the coastal flood 
domain. Hence no damages are reported for these hazards in Cyprus and Malta.  
 
5.3.1.1 Multi-hazard damages in Europe 
Figure 5.3a shows the evolution in time of the multi-hazard EAD aggregated at 
European level (EU+) for each economic sector and the sectors combined, both in 
terms of magnitude and relative change with respect to the baseline. Results show 
that Europe will face a significant increase in multi-hazard multi-sector EAD in the 
coming decades. Baseline damages of 3.4 billion €/year are projected to triple by the 
2020s, multiply six-fold by mid-century, and rise up to 38 billion €/year by the 
2080s. These numbers reflect only the (combined) damages from the 7 climate 
hazards to the sectors considered in this study, hence they do not reflect the total 
damages of these hazards to society. Based on the shares of damages that relate to 
the infrastructures considered herein to the total (reported) climate damage (28% 
for coastal flooding, 90% for cold, 45% for drought, 14% for fire, 28% for flood, 67% 
for heat, and 21% for windstorms, see first paragraph page 102 of Section 5.2.4), 
and assuming that changes in the remaining damages follow the same trend, total 
damages from the 7 climate hazards to society could rise from currently 12 billion 
€/year to nearly 80 billion €/year by the end of this century. We further stress that 
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the myriad of climate change impacts go far beyond those of the 7 climate hazards 
considered herein; hence, it should be kept in mind that the damages presented here 
only reflect a fraction of the potential climate change damages to society.  
 
Multi-hazard damages to the individual sectors evidently also show strong rises in 
time, with the actual degree and pace of change depending on the sector sensitivity 
to the different hazards and the rate and magnitude of change of the latter. The 
strongest increase in multi-hazard damages is projected for the energy sector, for 
which the baseline EAD of 0.5 billion €/year could rise to 2, 4.4, and 8.2 billion 
€/year (or increases in EAD of 394%, 860% and 1,612%) by the 2020s, 2050s and 
2080s, respectively. A comparable trend can be observed for the transport sector, 
for which the baseline EAD of 0.8 billion €/year is expected to reach nearly 12 
billion €/year (increase of 1,496%) by the end of this century. For industry, which 
shows the largest damages amongst the sectors considered, current EAD of 1.5 
billion €/year is estimated to surpass 16 billion €/year by the 2080s, corresponding 
to a 10-fold increase. For the social sector, the rising trend in damages is less 
pronounced, but current EAD of 0.6 billion €/year could still more than double by 
the end of this century due to climate change.  
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Figure 5.3 Multi-hazard risk aggregated at European level (EU+) for each time period and sector of 
critical economic infrastructures: a) Expected Annual Damages: Bar length indicates the ensemble 
median – also reported in numerical labels in millions – where colours reflect the relative change in 
EAD with respect to the baseline; b) distribution of damages over the 7 hazards. 
 
The hazard contribution (in time) to the total and sector damages is presented in 
Figure 5.3b. Aggregated over the four sectors, current climate hazard damages relate 
mostly to river floods (44%) and windstorms (27%). The relative contribution to 
the total damage of these two hazards diminishes rapidly in time, whereas the 
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shares of drought and heat damages strongly rises due to their more pronounced 
increase in view of climate change compared to the other hazards. Heat waves and 
droughts will likely cover more than 70% of climate hazard damages by the end of 
the century (vs 12% in the baseline period). This suggests that drastic changes in 
damage scenarios could manifest not only in terms of the magnitude of damage, but 
also in typologies of impacts. The contribution of wildfires and coastal floods is low, 
albeit that a strong increase in coastal flood damages is projected in the coming 
century. The low contribution of coastal flood damages may relate to the fact that in 
EMDAT there is no specific entry for coastal floods, and coastal flood events can be 
reported under storms or floods. So likely part of the coastal flood damages is 
reflected in the inland flood and windstorm damages. The contribution of cold 
waves is also low and cold-related damages in Europe could completely disappear 
with global warming. Hazard-contributions vary amongst the different sectors. For 
the social sector, damages from windstorms and inland flooding will remain 
important. The industry and energy sector will be most impacted by droughts, with 
56% and 67%, respectively, of the sector damages relating to droughts by the end of 
this century. For the transport sector, on the other hand, heatwaves will largely 
dominate future damages (92% of total damages by 2080s). It is important to note 
that a decrease in the share of the damage of a specific hazard to the total multi-
hazard damage does not imply that in absolute terms the damage due to this hazard 
will be lower.  
 
5.3.1.2 Impacts in the energy, transport, industry and social sector 
Figure 5.4 shows baseline and projected EADs both in terms of magnitude and 
relative change aggregated at European level for each sector and climatic hazard. 
Each horizontal bar reflects a different time period, while the whiskers describe the 
inter-model spread (i.e., reflects the climate uncertainty). It is complemented by 
Figure 5.5 that displays the marginal contribution of infrastructures within a sector 
to the total hazard-induced damage (EADIMC) for that sector. 
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Figure 5.4 EAD to critical infrastructures aggregated at European level (EU+) for each hazard, time period and sector. Bar length indicates the ensemble median – 
also reported in numerical labels in millions – while the whiskers correspond to the 10 and 90 percentiles of the ensemble distribution. Colours reflect the relative 
change in EAD with respect to the baseline. 
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Results suggest that energy infrastructures will be increasingly affected by heat 
waves and droughts, up to 2,192 and 5,515 million €/year, respectively, by the end 
of the century, or approximately 4,700% and 3,400% of baseline damages. Fossil-
fuel and nuclear power plants could be seriously affected by the decrease in 
efficiency due to higher air and water temperatures and periods of lower water 
volumes for cooling systems (Linnerud et al., 2011; Rübbelke and Vögele, 2011; van 
Vliet et al., 2012). Hydropower production could also be negatively impacted by 
more frequent low flow conditions (Lehner et al., 2005). System deterioration due to 
excessive biological growth and clog water intakes and a reduction of the structural 
integrity due to melting permafrost and drought-induced subsidence could further 
endanger physical infrastructures (Cruz and Krausmann, 2013; Ebinger, 2011). 
River and coastal flood impacts in the energy sector could amount up to 300 million 
€/year by the 2080s, or an increase of 130% compared to baseline flood damages 
(relative increases with respect to baseline of ~85% and 5,900%, respectively, for 
inland and coastal flooding). Impacts on electricity transport systems will be 
relevant likely due to short-circuiting, power failure and enhanced corrosion 
(Brown et al., 2013; Cruz and Krausmann, 2013). Structural damages to energy 
production sites due to direct impacts of flood flows may be also critical (Brown et 
al., 2013; Chandramowli and Felder, 2014; Cruz and Krausmann, 2013; Ebinger, 
2011). Windstorms could increasingly endanger energy infrastructures, with 
damages reaching 162 million €/year by the 2080s, nearly a 20% increase with 
respect to baseline damages. This is mostly related to the disruption of 
transmission/distribution electricity lines due to fallen trees or wind gusts (94% 
EADIMC) (Ebinger, 2011; Sieber, 2013). Wildfire impacts on the energy sector could 
rise with 50% by the end of the century, amounting to 27 million €/year. Fires result 
in potential failures of the power system mainly due to damages to transmission and 
distribution equipment such as electricity lines and gas pipelines (92% EADIMC) 
(Bompard et al., 2013). Future impacts of cold waves are expected to decrease 
rapidly and they will fully disappear by 2080s. Residual damages along the twenty-
first century will prevalently disrupt the electricity transport network (93% EADIMC) 
due to ice and snow loads overhead distribution lines (Bompard et al., 2013; McColl 
et al., 2012).  
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Transport infrastructures could be strongly affected by heat haves in the future, 
with damages showing a ~5,000% increase to amount to nearly 11 billion €/year by 
the end of the century. Roads and rails will likely be the most threatened (89% and 
11% EADIMC, respectively) due to melting of asphalt, increased rutting and softening 
of pavement and buckling of rails (Chinowsky et al., 2013; Dobney et al., 2009; Palin 
et al., 2013). Drought-related damages in the transport sector could rise up to 42 
million €/year, corresponding to 6-fold the baseline value, due to the reduced 
navigability of rivers and channels (Jonkeren et al., 2013, 2008, 2007). Impacts of 
river and coastal floods may increase up to 835 million €/year by 2080s, a doubling 
of the current damages, affecting prominently roads and rails due to the reduction of 
structural integrity of surface and subgrade material deteriorated by the wave 
action and induced-mass movements, scour on bridges and embankments, 
disruption of transport vehicles and facilities (Koetse and Rietveld, 2009; Suarez et 
al., 2005; Wright et al., 2012). Inland waterways could be increasingly affected by 
inland floods (9% EADIMC) due to a reduced navigability of rivers and channels 
(Koetse and Rietveld, 2009; Love et al., 2010), while port infrastructures are 
impacted by coastal floods (32% EADIMC) due to wave action and a deterioration of 
infrastructures that lack a fouling-resistant design against salt water (Hallegatte et 
al., 2010). Projected damages of wind extremes on the transport sector rise by little 
over 10% to 74 million €/year and relate mainly to wind pressure or debris impact 
on transport facilities and transport interruption (Doll et al., 2014; Molarius et al., 
2013). Damages to transport systems due to wildfires could rise from 20 to 28 
million €/year and will affect prevalently roads and rails (93% and 7% EADIMC, 
respectively) due to the deterioration of materials. Damages of cold waves, currently 
around 76 million €/year, will considerably fall with time and become negligible by 
the end of this century. They affect pre-eminently roads due to bucking of asphalt, 
airport functioning due to icing of aircraft wings, and port infrastructures due to ice 
accumulation on vessels and deck, as well as the freezing of sea water (Doll et al., 
2014; Koetse and Rietveld, 2009; Molarius et al., 2013; Pejovic et al., 2009; 
Schweighofer, 2013). 
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Figure 5.5 Distribution of hazard impacts over infrastructures types per sector, calculated over 2011-2100. 
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Industry infrastructures could be strongly affected by heat waves and droughts in 
the future, with expected annual damages rising up to 5,197 (+4,600%) and 9,118 
(+3,300%) million €/year by 2080s, respectively. Waste management systems will 
be largely prone to increased methane production and potential leachate escape 
from brownfields and a reduction in decomposition rate leading to lower operability 
and productivity (Tannahill and Booth, 2012). Water management systems will be 
likely subject to prolonged periods of water shortage and increasing freshwater 
degradation with corresponding higher costs for water and its treatment (van Vliet 
et al., 2012). River and coastal flood impacts are expected to double to 1,412 million 
€/year for the industry sector. They affect predominantly water management 
systems due to an increasing cost for water treatment required to face the increased 
release of pollutants from flooded brownfields and augmented intrusion of salt 
water (Delpla et al., 2009; Langeveld et al., 2013; Sir, 2012). Chemical, metal, and 
mineral industries and refinery sites are also affected by the direct contact with 
flood water (Cozzani et al., 2010; Krausmann et al., 2011). Total windstorm damages 
are expected to slightly increase up to 501 million €/year. Wind pressure and debris 
impact similarly endanger all industry infrastructures (Krausmann et al., 2011). 
Wildfires impacts will likely rise to 9 million €/year by 2080s, mainly affecting 
waste management systems due to possible system failure. Cold waves mainly affect 
water management systems due to the possible disruption of water pipes vulnerable 
to icing (Whitehead et al., 2009) but results show a strongly decreasing trend in cold 
related damages to industry.  
 
For the social sector no damages are obtained for heat and cold waves, as the 
sensitivity (derived from the survey and literature) of education and health 
infrastructures to the considered hazards is low. Damages in the social sector for the 
other hazards show mostly similar marginal contributions for education and health 
infrastructures, with slightly larger impacts for the latter. Drought induced damages 
could rise significantly from 13 to 456 million €/year, mainly as a result of increased 
structural damages due to drought-induced subsidence (Corti et al., 2011, 2009). 
River and coastal flood impacts will roughly double to 516 million €/year by the 
2080s. Damages include direct damages to infrastructures from contact with flood 
water, including the reduced structural integrity of buildings due to wave action and 
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reduced soil stability (Carmichael et al., 2012; Hallegatte et al., 2010; Oven et al., 
2012; Radovic et al., 2012). Damages related to windstorms and wildfires show a 
modest increase of 22% (348 million €/year) and 36% (19 million €/year), 
respectively, by the end of the century. Such impacts could be largely related to 
structural damages to social infrastructures due to wind pressure or debris impacts 
and fires-related failures (Stewart et al., 2011). 
 
The inter-model spreads shown by whiskers in Figure 5.4 quantify the potential 
effects of climate variability on the resulting uncertainty of EAD estimates. This is 
largely driven by the influence of climate variability on climate hazard indicators 
(see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 on hazards) and further modulated by the spatial 
distribution of exposed infrastructures and their specific vulnerability. This results 
in a larger spread in the risk scenarios for climate hazards whose projections are 
more uncertain, such as floods, especially in areas with many exposed assets and a 
high sensitivity to the hazard. The relevant inter-model spread of EAD estimates 
reinforces the advantage of an ensemble-based approach for obtaining statistically 
robust projections of future risk. 
 
 
5.3.1.3 Regional impacts to critical infrastructures 
The aggregated results presented above mask the strong geographical differences in 
impacts across Europe for different hazards. Regional impacts depend on the spatial 
variations in the frequency of occurrence and magnitude of a hazard, the latter 
connected in turn to regional climate conditions and changes therein, as well as on 
the spatial distribution of assets and regional welfare. Figure 5.6 displays for each 
hazard and the hazards combined the relative distribution of multi-sector EAD over 
European regions for the baseline and by the end of this century. The upper two 
plots represent region contributions based on absolute damages per region. Results 
show that in absolute terms, most of the current and future climate hazard damages 
are largely concentrated in Southern (SEU), Western (WEU) and Central (CEU) 
Europe regions (see Figure 1.2). This, however, is in large part due to the areal 
extension of the macro regions considered herein, with the Eastern Europe (EEU) 
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region for example having a much smaller spatial domain compared to the other 
regions. The bottom two plots in Figure 5.6 therefore represent region contributions 
based on damages scaled by region GDP. They show that current multi-hazard 
damages are in relative terms highest in EEU, followed by SEU and CEU, whereas 
WEU and the Northern Europe (NEU) region are relatively least impacted. The most 
noticeable change due to climate change is the strong increase in relative damage 
load in SEU in the coming decades. This relates mainly to the much stronger increase 
in this region of damages from heat waves and especially droughts compared to 
other regions. The spatial distribution across Europe of the damages of the other 
hazards are more stable under climate change, whereas cold-related damages tend 
to disappear everywhere in Europe. Relative windstorm damages are and will 
remain highest in WEU, CEU and NEU, where relative fire impacts are and will 
remain by far the highest in SEU. For inland flooding the relative impacts are highest 
in EEU and CEU under current and future climate, whereas for coastal flooding EEA, 
NEU and SEU will show the highest relative impacts.   
 
The hazard-specific shares at regional scale mask further local variations in risk 
patterns and dominant hazards. River and coastal floods, for example, will remain 
the most critical hazard in many floodplains and coastal stretches of Western, 
Central and Eastern Europe, including the British Isles, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Romania and northern coastlines of the Iberian Peninsula. 
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 (a) Region contribution based on absolute region damages 
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(b) Region contribution based on absolute region damages 
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(c) Region contribution based on region damages scaled by GDP 
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(d) Region contribution based on region damages scaled by GDP 
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Figure 5.6 Distribution of multi-sector EAD by regions calculated for the baseline (left) and 2080s 
(right). Upper row represents region contributions based on absolute damage per region, bottom row 
represents region contributions based on damages scaled by region GDP. 
 
More detailed space-time variations in impacts are visualized in the pan-European 
maps of multi-hazard EAD for the different sectors and time windows displayed in 
Figure 5.7. Although all regions of Europe are projected to experience a progressive 
increase in multi-hazard EAD, a prominent spatial gradient of increasing EAD 
towards southern regions of Europe becomes apparent with time for all sectors 
considered. The trend first manifests mainly in the Iberian Peninsula, south of 
France, Italy, Slovenia and Croatia, to expand towards the adjacent regions north, 
east and west as time proceeds. The most southern regions of Europe will 
progressively be much larger affected by future climate extremes compared to the 
rest of Europe. This is exemplified by the strong increase in relative and absolute 
damage shares of SEU to the total European damages during this century (see Figure 
5.6). A large part of the north-south gradient in damages relates to droughts. This 
hazard will strongly intensify in southern parts of Europe, whereas in northern 
regions droughts will become less severe and occur less frequent with climate 
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change. As such, for sectors sensitive to this hazard, namely the energy, industry and 
to a lesser extent the social sector, drought-induced damages will strongly increase 
in the south and decrease in the north of Europe. For the transport sector only 
inland navigation is sensitive to droughts. As this mode of transport is hardly 
utilized in southern and northern parts of Europe, the north-south damage gradient 
is somewhat less pronounced for the transport sector. Heatwaves also contribute to 
the north-south gradient but to a lesser extent than droughts, as heatwave damages 
are projected to rise significantly all over Europe.   
 
 
Figure 5.7 Multi-hazard risk scenarios for critical infrastructures in the energy, transport, industry 
and social sector.  
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Multi-hazard and multi-sector EAD values normalized by country GDP are shown in 
Table 5.2 for European countries. Higher shares of GDP at risk indicate larger 
impacts on the country overall economy and a higher potential of cross-sectorial 
shocks. Currently (baseline period), for EU+ the share of GDP at risk amounts to 
0.03%, where for most countries less than 0.06% of GDP is at risk. Note that these 
figures do not reflect total potential climate damages to the economy, rather they 
represent the damages induced by the 7 climate hazards to critical infrastructures in 
the energy, transport, industry and social sector. For EU+ the share of GDP at risk 
rises progressively to 0.28% by the end of century. There are, however, strong 
variations in the shares of GDP at risk within Europe, confirming earlier 
observations of the spread of climate hazards damages across Europe. Countries in 
northern Europe (with the exception of Denmark), the Benelux, the British Isles, as 
well as Poland and the Czech Republic show the lowest share of GDP at risk, with 
damages remaining below 0.1% of GDP up to the end of the century. Impacts by the 
end of the century remain below 0.2% of GDP in Germany (0.10%), Denmark 
(0.11%), Austria (0.14%), Hungary (0.15%), Lithuania (0.15%) and Switzerland 
(0.18%). Also Latvia (0.2%), France (0.23%), Estonia (0.25%) and Slovakia (0.27%) 
have damage shares below the European average. Southern and south-eastern 
countries will be most impacted. For Bulgaria (0.40%), Romania (0.45%), Italy 
(0.49%) and Slovenia (0.56%) damages remain below or close to 0.5% of GDP, 
whereas for Portugal (0.77%), Spain (0.87%) and Croatia (0.97%) damages could 
climb to nearly 1% of GDP by the 2080s. For Cyprus three (coastal and inland floods, 
and droughts) hazards are not modelled and for Malta two (floods and droughts), 
hence no damages for these hazards are reported for these countries. However, 
based on regional patterns of impacts it can be expected that the damages in these 
countries could represent a considerably larger share of the GDP as those reported 
in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2 Percentage of GDP at risk expressed by multi-hazard damage normalized by country GDP. 
*Note that for Cyprus (coastal and inland floods, and droughts) and Malta (floods and droughts) some 
hazards are not modelled hence no damages are reported for these countries.   
Country baseline 2020s 2050s 2080s 
AT 0.02% 0.03% 0.07% 0.14% 
BE 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.06% 
BG 0.04% 0.11% 0.17% 0.40% 
CH 0.03% 0.04% 0.11% 0.18% 
CY* 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.04% 
CZ 0.05% 0.06% 0.06% 0.08% 
DE 0.02% 0.03% 0.06% 0.10% 
DK 0.03% 0.04% 0.07% 0.11% 
EE 0.04% 0.07% 0.20% 0.25% 
ES 0.04% 0.15% 0.45% 0.87% 
FI 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.06% 
FR 0.02% 0.05% 0.13% 0.23% 
GR 0.02% 0.07% 0.51% 0.68% 
HR 0.04% 0.09% 0.34% 0.97% 
HU 0.05% 0.04% 0.10% 0.15% 
IE 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 0.03% 
IS 0.01% 0.01% 0.05% 0.07% 
IT 0.03% 0.12% 0.28% 0.49% 
LT 0.03% 0.07% 0.14% 0.15% 
LU 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.04% 
LV 0.05% 0.09% 0.20% 0.20% 
MT* 0.00% 0.11% 0.12% 0.14% 
NL 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 
NO 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 
PL 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 
PT 0.03% 0.15% 0.45% 0.77% 
RO 0.08% 0.15% 0.21% 0.45% 
SE 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.06% 
SI 0.05% 0.08% 0.18% 0.56% 
SK 0.03% 0.03% 0.11% 0.27% 
UK 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.05% 
EU+ 0.03% 0.08% 0.15% 0.28% 
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5.3.2 Impacts on EU investments of 2007-2013 programming period 
Here we present how the 7 climate hazards are projected to impact EU regional 
investments in the transport, energy, environment and tourism, ICT, and social 
sector in the coming decades up to the end of the century. Investments relate to the 
programming period 2007-2013 in the EU27. Damages reflect median ensemble 
results, are undiscounted and expressed in 2010 € assuming. Note again that 
impacts in Cyprus and Malta may be underestimated as they are not included in all 
model domains of the hazard analyses.  
 
5.3.2.1 Multi-hazard multi-sector impacts for EU27  
Figure 5.8 shows the evolution in time of overall climate risk of the EU27 Structural 
Investments for 2007-2013, with a breakdown of the total climate risk in (a) multi-
sector EAD per hazard and (b) multi-hazard EAD per sector. The EU27 baseline EAD 
amounts to 146 million €/year, or 0.04% of the total EU regional investments of 342 
billion € for the period 2007-2013. Damages rise rapidly due to climate change and 
reach 556 million €/year (382% baseline EAD) or 0.16% of total investments by the 
2020s. By the 2050s damages further climb to 1,109 million €/year (761% baseline 
EAD) or 0.32% of total investments, and by the end of this century the annual risk 
amounts to 1,703 million €/year (1,168% baseline EAD) or 0.49% of total 
investments.  
 
The breakdown per hazard (Figure 5.8a) shows that currently floods is the most 
damaging hazard, accounting for about half (51%) of total hazard damages, followed 
by drought (26%) and heat waves (10%). Cold, fire and wind each have a share of 
4%, whereas coastal floods contribute to the total damages for 0.5%. Drought 
damages increase significantly, from 38 million €/year now to 888 million €/year 
by the 2080s (2,315% baseline EAD), and form the largest share of future damages 
(52% by the end of the century). The strongest relative increase in damages, 
however, is projected for heatwaves and coastal flooding (increases both around 
+4,500%). As a result heatwaves will become the second damaging hazard to EU 
structural investments (40% of total damages by 2080s). Damages due to cold 
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waves will evanesce in the coming decades, whereas damages due to wind, floods 
and fires show more moderate increases, with absolute damages rising this century 
by 10%, 30% and 50%, respectively. Their relative contribution to the total damages 
logically reduces due to the pronounced increase in heatwave, drought and coastal 
flooding damages.  
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Figure 5.8 Overall climate risk of 2007-2013 EU27 Structural Investments: breakdown of total 
climate risk in (a) multi-sector EAD per hazard, and (b) multi-hazard EAD per sector. 
 
The breakdown of damages per sector (Figure 5.8b) shows that currently 48% of 
hazard impacts relate to the transport sector, and 37% to the environment and 
tourism sector. Annual damages in the transport sector rise by 722% from 70 
million €/year in the baseline to 573 million €/year by the 2080s. This value 
corresponds to 0.77% of total transport allocations. For the environment and 
tourism sector damages increase at a rate double as high (+1,619%) from 55 million 
€/year now to 940 million €/year by the end of the century. Hence, this sector will 
under future climate account for more than half of the total hazard damages (55% vs 
34% for the transport sector) to EU investments because of its larger sensitivity to 
the dominating hazards (droughts and heatwaves). The damage level reached by the 
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2080s represents 1.52% of the total EU regional investments in this sector. Damages 
in the energy sector increase by more than tenfold (+1,077%), with energy EAD 
rising from 13 million €/year in the baseline to 157 million €/year by the 2080s. 
The latter corresponds to 1.49% of EU regional energy allocations. The rise for the 
energy sector is similar as that for the overall losses, and as such the share of the 
energy damages to the total damages (around 9%) remains fairly constant in time. 
Impacts in the ICT and social sector are smaller, with an EAD of 1.9 and 6 million 
€/year, respectively, for the baseline period. They also show less pronounced 
increases compared to the other sectors. Where damages to ICT investments are 
expected to rise by 160% up to 5 million €/year by the 2080s, an increase of 363% 
up to 28 million €/year is projected by that period for the social sector. The 
damages for these sectors also represent a smaller share of the ICT and social 
investments, with impacts by the end of the century totaling 0.03% and 0.17% of EU 
allocations for 2007-2013 in these sectors.  
 
Note that the rates of change in damage per sector can deviate from those observed 
for the critical infrastructures. This is because EU investments may be aimed at 
different priority themes than those considered in the spatial layers of critical 
infrastructures. For the energy sector, for example, a large share of the damages for 
the critical infrastructures relates to fossil-fuel and nuclear power plants (see Figure 
5.5), to which EU regional investments are not targeted.   
 
5.3.2.2 Regional impacts on CPF investments 
The spatial distribution of the absolute impacts across the EU27 is presented in 
Figure 5.9. The highest absolute damages to EU regional investments under the 
2007-2013 period are projected for the Iberian Peninsula, Southern Italy, the EU27 
countries in the Balkan Peninsula, and the Baltic States. In these regions damages to 
investments could amount to tens of millions on an annual basis, locally sometimes 
more than hundred million (e.g., regions of Andalucía and Galicia), by the end of this 
year. This spatial pattern is largely driven by the large allocation of funds to these 
regions (see Figure 4.2) and further modulated by the changes in hazard patterns.  
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Figure 5.9 Spatial distribution of multi-hazard multi-sector EAD to 2007-2013 EU27 regional 
investments: (a) baseline, (b) 2020s, (c) 2050s and (d) 2080s.  
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Impacts expressed as a share of the investments are shown in Figure 5.10 for the 
2080s. The multi-hazard multi-sector expected annual losses (Figure 5.10a), which 
for the whole EU27 correspond to 0.49% of total investments (see section 5.3.2.1), 
can reach up to 3% in isolated regions of the Iberian and Balkan Peninsulas. Hence, 
in these regions total damages accumulated over a 30-year period would nearly sum 
up to the total investments. In most of north (apart from the Baltic States) and 
central (in terms of latitude, from British Isles to Poland) Europe, total expected 
annual damages remain below 0.1% of total investments.  
 
When looking at sector level, relative impacts can even be substantially higher in 
some parts of Europe. For the transport sector (Figure 5.10b), by the end of the 
century expected annual losses to investments rise to about 5% of the transport 
investments for Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria and regions of Spain. At this rate the 
cumulated losses to the investment could equal the size of the investment after 20 
years. For the energy (Figure 5.10c) and the environment and tourism (Figure 
5.10d) sectors, annual loss shares (with respect to sector investments) could go 
even up to 10% and higher, or an expected yearly loss of more than 1/10 of the total 
sector investment, for regions in the southwest and southeast of the EU. For the 
social and ICT sectors, expected annual losses at regional scale remain mostly below 
1% and 0.5% of sector investments, respectively.  
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Figure 5.10 Spatial distribution by 2080s of multi-hazard multi-sector EAD to 2007-2013 EU27 
regional investments expressed as a share of sector investments: (a) multi-sector, (b) transport, (c) 
energy, (d) environment and tourism.  
 
5.4 Main limitations and knowledge gaps  
We recognize that our risk estimates are subject to uncertainty due to 
methodological and data aspects that should be considered in addition to those 
described for the climate hazard, sensitivity and exposure components, already 
discussed in Chapter 2, 3 and 4, respectively.  
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Our multi-hazard risk framework is built on the propagation of baseline damages to 
future scenarios according to variations in the frequency of extreme events and the 
spatial distribution of exposed assets/investments. At present, our understanding of 
long-term climate risks is limited by the lack of in-depth knowledge on the impacts 
of climate hazards due to the absence of harmonised loss data recording. Baseline 
damages for this project are retrieved from hazard loss databases (EMDAT and 
MunichRe). As the data that populate these databases originate from different 
sources and are collected by multiple actors, their loss figures should be viewed in 
light of their potential biases (Gall et al., 2009). The databases may under-represent 
certain hazard types depending on their purpose and the audience, as well as on the 
type of impacts and how they are perceived (e.g., flood impacts are much more 
visible than heat impacts). A prominent example is the notoriously underestimation 
of droughts (Svoboda et al., 2002), being an insidious, slow-onset climate hazard 
inducing a wide range of impacts that affect many sectors of the economy. Also, 
coastal flooding events may be reported under floods or storms in general, therefore 
leading to an underestimation of coastal flood impacts. Furthermore, different 
threshold criteria used across EMDAT and MunichRe for data recording may result 
in disparities in collected disaster information (e.g., exclusion of small-scale events 
in EMDAT). Changes in political geography may affect how hazard loss data are 
reproduced in space and time. Loss data are reported in EMDAT and MunichRe 
according to the political geography at the time of the event. Boundary changes that 
have occurred in the last three decades (e.g., Germany, Balkan countries) may have 
affected the spatial accuracy of baseline loss data.  
 
Disaster risk databases mostly record direct damages at the time of occurrence or 
direct aftermath of the hazard event. Possible indirect, inter-sectorial effects and 
intangible damages, which may considerably amplify the impacts of hazards, are 
typically not considered in damage recording. This may lead to potential 
underestimation of the impacts of climate extremes on the investigated sectors. The 
estimates of baseline and future climate risk impacts reported herein are fully 
conditional on the reported country damages in EMDAT and the aggregated Munich 
Re damage figures. Hence, any deviations of the reported damages from the true 
impacts are inherently translated into our damage estimates.  
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The national recorded hazard damages retrieved from the disaster databases have 
been disaggregated across sectors and NUTS2 regions based on the regional societal 
and economic structure as represented by EUROSTAT statistics and the sensitivities 
to the specific hazards derived from the survey and literature. The assumptions 
beyond the proposed disaggregation of losses represent potential sources of 
uncertainty resulting from the incomplete knowledge about the true sectorial-
specific impacts and their spatialization (Meyer et al., 2013). Although reasonable 
assumptions have been formulated, such epistemic uncertainties are difficult to 
assess.  
 
In this study, we assume independent hazards and static vulnerability. However, 
hazards may induce or reinforce other hazards, they may overlap spatially and 
temporally, as observed in Chapter 2, influencing not only the overall hazard level, 
but also the vulnerability of elements at risk through possible hazard interrelations 
or cascade effects (Kappes et al., 2012). The fragility of a certain asset could be 
largely intensified when subject to simultaneous or cascade impacts of several 
hazards (Lee and Rosowsky, 2006). While we recognize the relevance of the effects 
of overlapping hazards on the vulnerability of elements at risks, very few studies on 
this topic are available in literature (Kappes et al., 2012). The scarcity of 
observational relations linking variations in multi-hazard impacts on vulnerability 
does not allow a reliable integration of such effects in large-scale predictive systems.  
 
The way observed damages are integrated in the methodology is by assuming for 
the baseline that they relate to events that happen every 50-years or less frequent 
for highly sensitive infrastructures and every 100-years or less frequent for 
infrastructures with medium sensitivity. For future time windows, we then translate 
changes in this high-end tail of the frequency distribution to project future damages. 
In principle, it is possible that for certain hazards more frequent (i.e., less extreme) 
events induce damages, or that impacts are avoided or minimized for more extreme 
events (e.g., very high flood protection standards in the Netherlands). This implies 
that we assume that the changes in the part of the frequency distribution that we 
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consider to be linked with the damages are representative for the true changes in 
the frequency of damaging events.    
 
Climate-change impact uncertainties are quantified in this study solely in terms of 
the spread induced by the climate-model projections, and do not account for all the 
sources of uncertainty detailed above. We recognize that the impact-model spread of 
our damage projections can be comparable to, or even larger than, the spread 
introduced by the different climate models considered (Piontek et al., 2014). 
However, whereas for (some) climate hazards (in certain regions) there exists 
uncertainty in both the direction and magnitude of change, uncertainty in the impact 
assessment only affects the magnitude of the impact and of the change therein.  
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6 Climate resilient critical infrastructures and investments 
6.0 Key messages 
General 
 A wide range of adaptation strategies exists, ranging from hard (capital-
intensive, large, complex, inflexible technology and engineering) to soft 
(prioritization of natural capital, community control, simplicity and 
appropriateness) measures. 
 In view of uncertain climate change, preference for no- or low-regret measures, 
the inclusion of a safety margin and reversible strategies. 
 Quantitative assessments for appraising costs and effectiveness are limited, 
comprehensive frameworks largely absent.  
 There is large uncertainty about the costs and appropriateness of various 
measures and additional studies are needed to fill the existing gaps and explore 
costs and appropriateness of measures, the optimal timing of action and the 
sensitivity of results to assumptions and uncertainties about future extreme 
events and costing methods.  
 
Critical infrastructures 
 Indicative estimates show that for EU+ (EU28 + Switzerland, Norway and 
Iceland) the total accumulated benefits (or avoided damages) amount to 100 
billion € when adapting critical infrastructures against short term climate 
changes (up to 2040), with an accumulated cost of 39 billion €. Costs incurred 
now could amount to 12 billion €, or 0.1% of EU+ 2010 GDP, plus a yearly 
operational and maintenance (O&M) cost of nearly 1 billion €. Expected annual 
benefits of these investments would amount to 3.3 billion €. 
 The investments for adaptation required to face changes in climate also in the 
medium term (including the 2050s) would amount to an upfront capital cost of 
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54 billion €, or 0.4% of EU+ 2010 GDP, and an annual O&M cost of 2.1 billion €, 
with expected annual benefits growing to 11.9 billion € by the 2050s. 
 For making infrastructures climate resilient up to the end of the century, the 
total cost rises to 461 billion €, of which 138 billion € capital cost to be incurred 
now (about 1% of EU+ 2010 GDP) and O&M costs of nearly 3.6 billion €/year. 
This would yield total accumulated benefits or avoided damages of 1,152 billion 
€ from now up to the end of this century, with expected annual benefits reaching 
23 billion € by the 2080s.   
 Adaptation costs will not fall equally across Europe. Some countries in Europe 
will potentially have to invest a significant share of their current GDP to abate 
the future impacts from climate hazards on critical infrastructures – notably 
Greece, Croatia, Portugal and Spain.  
 
EU Regional Investments 
 The cost of making CPF investments resilient against climate up to 2040 may 
amount to 1.1% of total CPF allocations, which grows to 6.2% and 10.4% for 
medium to long term climate changes, respectively.  
 There are considerable variations in adaptation requirements for different 
sectors, both in terms of overall magnitude and distribution across regions.  
 The sectors with the highest relative adaptation costs are the transport, energy, 
and environment/tourism sectors. For these sectors, several regions in southern 
and south-eastern Europe, but also some in France, can face short-term 
adaptation costs up to 10% of the sector investments, in localized regions in the 
Iberian and Balkan Peninsulas even up to 25% and more.  
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6.1 Introduction 
As critical infrastructures and key economic assets typically have long operational 
lifetimes they are subject not only to the existing climate but also to climate 
variations over their life span. The hazard and risk parts of this report have shown 
that much of the existing infrastructure and planned future investments will be 
increasingly put at risk by extreme climate events in many regions of Europe due to 
climate change. In order to mitigate impacts of climate change in the coming decades 
it is therefore needed to increase the resilience of both existing infrastructures and 
new investments to more frequent and intense climate hazards.  
 
The need to adapt for lowering the risks posed by unavoidable climate changes has 
in recent years received increased attention in the scientific and policy debate (e.g., 
EU Strategy on Adaptation). Adaptation to climate change can be a challenging 
activity as it must consider the full context in which adaptation takes place. Apart 
from the complexity and uncertainty of the factors that define (future) climate risks 
and vulnerability, adaptation requires technical know-how, substantial funding, 
adequate institutional structures and political will that can be constrained by limited 
physical, financial, institutional, political, cultural, and individual capacities to deal 
with climate-related changes and hazards.  
 
It is not the goal of this report to provide an extensive review of all possible 
adaptation options for key infrastructures in the different sectors, which are 
bountiful. Rather, the aim of the CCMFF project is to take stock at a minimum of the 
available evidence on the costs of climate proofing critical infrastructures and 
investments and to provide a methodology and first assessment of the additional 
investments needed to climate proof investments in different regions of Europe. 
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6.2 Climate hazard mitigation measures 
Adaptation options vary depending on the type of hazard and infrastructure. In 
general, they can be grouped into nine categories as presented in Table 6.1 (Bouwer 
et al., 2014), although that other ways exist to classify the large variety of options.  
 
Table 6.1 Comprehensive Categories of climate hazard mitigation measures (from Bouwer 
et al., 2014).  
 
 
The first category includes risk management planning, land-use planning, and 
climate adaptation aimed at reducing exposure and vulnerability. Land use planning 
and management is increasingly recognized to play a crucial role in climate risk 
reduction (Serrao-Neumann et al., 2015). Categories 2 (hazard modification) and 3 
(infrastructure) target a reduction of the hazard with measures that are typically 
taken at national or regional level (e.g., flood protection measures at catchment 
scale). Category 4 (mitigation measures stricto sensu) comprises small-scale 
measures applied at the local (community, company or household) level to reduce 
vulnerability. Communication measures (Category 5) in advance of an event can 
take place at all administrative levels. This includes, for example, flood risk maps by 
EU member states in compliance with the EU Flood Directive (EC, 2007), but also 
local information campaigns. Monitoring and early warning systems (Category 6) 
are typically operated by a central government organization that coordinates all 
related activities, for instance, for a coast or river basin. Supranational systems also 
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exist, like the European Drought Observatory and European Flood Awareness 
System that have been developed at the JRC. Whereas the measures under 
Categories 1 to 6 can be considered pre-event risk reduction measures, emergency 
response and evacuation (Category 7) take place during and in the immediate 
aftermath of the event. Finally, financial incentives (Category 8) can be used as 
stimuli for pre-event risk-reducing measures, whereas risk transfer measures 
(Category 9) allow post-event compensation of losses (adapted from Bouwer et al., 
2014). 
 
For critical infrastructures and key economic investments in specific, several 
documents provide overviews of possible risk reduction options for the energy and 
transport sector. For the energy sector, Table 10-1 and Table 10-2 of Chapter 10 of 
WGIIAR5 (Arent et al., 2014) describe the range of adaptation options for energy 
supply, and pipelines and the electricity grid, respectively. In general, more robust 
design specifications will allow structures to withstand more extreme conditions. In 
some circumstances, it may also be necessary to consider relocating or retrofitting 
extremely vulnerable existing infrastructure. Furthermore, decentralized generation 
systems (renewables) may reduce the need for large facilities in high-risk areas. For 
the transport sector, overviews of adaptation challenges and options across 
transport modes are, for example, provided in “Adaptation of transport to climate 
change in Europe” (EEA, 2014) and Doll et al. (2011). Adaptation options for 
transport includes engineering (structural) measures (subsurface conditions, 
material specifications, cross section and standard dimensions, drainage and 
erosion, and protective engineering structures), as well as non-engineering 
strategies (maintenance planning and early warning, alignment, master planning 
and land use planning, and environmental management). For other critical 
infrastructures (e.g., industry and social infrastructures) information is more scarce 
and fragmented.  
 
In general, especially in view of uncertain climate change, it is suggested in literature 
that adaptation options preferably have the following characteristics: 
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 No or low regret strategies that yield development benefits regardless of the 
nature and extent of changes in climate. 
 Include a safety margin to increase the robustness. 
 Should be reversible rather than irreversible. 
 Take into account synergies and conflicts between different options and 
between adaptation and mitigation. 
 Soft adaptation measure are often more flexible and better able to manage 
uncertainty than hard adaptation strategies. 
 
6.3 Costs and effectiveness of adapting to climate change 
There are many approaches to arriving at a priority setting for alternative 
adaptation options. To make optimal use of limited resources for investments in 
climate impact mitigation, information about the cost and the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of a range of adaptation options is needed.  
 
Whereas many studies have described qualitatively the wide range of potential 
adaptation options, the literature on the costing of these measures and their value 
for reducing impacts of natural hazards (to critical infrastructures) is limited and 
fragmented. Comprehensive frameworks for addressing costs and benefits of 
adaptation options are largely absent due to several reasons. Adaptation measures 
are very diverse and usually take place at the local level with diverse regulatory, 
legal and governance settings. These determine the type of measures chosen and 
level of investments as well as the scale at which the measures are implemented and 
the associating costing framework (Bouwer et al., 2014). Costs and benefits in 
various studies are difficult to compare as they are represented in a variety of ways. 
They can cover (a combination of) direct, indirect and intangible aspects, and can be 
presented on an annual basis or accumulated over time, discounted or 
undiscounted, and in absolute terms or as share of GPD. Many studies on adaptation 
fail to provide a quantification of the benefits, rather instead assume that certain 
types of impacts should be avoided. Benefits also often take place long after costs 
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are made and are more unpredictable as they depend on the possible occurrence of 
extreme events over the lifetime of the infrastructure.  
 
6.3.1 Indicative costs of adapting infrastructures to climate change 
The decision on the implementation of the optimal measure in a specific setting 
would require a detailed analysis of the costs and efficiency of a range of measures, 
as well as the consideration of non-monetary and non-market consequences, and of 
the equity impacts of alternative actions (Chambwera et al., 2014). A number of 
these items pose challenges for measurement and certainly for monetization. Within 
the current modelling framework it is not possible to undertake a detailed multi-
metric evaluation of potential adaptation measures across Europe. Hence, we do not 
provide a formal cost-benefit or multi-criteria analysis but instead surveyed the 
literature on cost and benefits of adaptation options related to infrastructures. Few 
studies have reported figures about benefits and costs of risk mitigation strategies 
across Europe, covering different regions, types of hazards, infrastructures, 
measures, accounting and appraisal approaches. These studies indicate that the 
uncertainty about the costs and benefits is large, but that many adaptation options 
could have high benefits when compared to costs, although capital investments can 
be large.  
 
The studies reviewed (see Table 6.2) provided a range of benefit to cost ratio (BCR) 
between 9 and 0.4, with an average value of 2.5. These BCR values have been used 
herein to provide indicative estimates (order of magnitude) of the potential cost of 
adaptation, similar as done by Rojas et al. (2013) for appraising flood adaptation 
costs. Ideally, adaptation would offset the increased risk from climate change, 
reducing future risk levels to equal current ones. In that case, the direct benefits of 
adaptation (apart from potential co-benefits such as enhancing development) equal 
the potential avoided adverse impacts, i.e., the increase in damages from the present 
to the future in the case of no adaptation. However, the theory and the evidence 
suggest that adaptation cannot generally overcome all climate change impacts and 
that some adaptation may not be physically possible or economically worthwhile 
(Parry et al., 2009). We assume that the unavoidable or residual damages from 
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climate change that take place even with adaptation equal 25% of the increased risk, 
hence the benefits of adaptation represent 75% of the potential avoided damages. 
The latter are obtained as a difference in the damages to infrastructures between the 
future time period and the present (baseline).  
 
To derive indicative costs of adaptation, the literature-based BCR values were 
combined with the projected benefits. Table 6.3 shows the indicative estimates of 
adaptation costs per country and for the EU+ (EU28 + Switzerland, Norway and 
Iceland) for the multi-hazard multi-sector analysis. Costs are provided for the three 
time periods and should be interpreted as follows. For the 2020s (period 2011-
2040), the values reflect adaptation costs assuming that adaptation would only take 
into account the projected changes in hazard in the short term (up to 2040, or 
adapting to short term changes). Cost estimates for the 2050s (2041-2070) are 
based on expected annual damages from now up to 2070, hence assume that 
adaptation considers also medium term projected climate changes. For the last 
period (2080s), adaptation costs take into consideration the changes in climate 
hazard and consequent damages up to the end of the century. Note that all estimates 
reported assume no discounting and no socio-economic changes. 
 
The total accumulated cost of adaptation (columns 2-4 of Table 6.3) reflects the total 
amount that should be invested in adaptation to achieve a 75% reduction in climate 
related risk (whereas the residual 25% is assumed as unavoidable impacts of 
climate change). For the EU+, the total accumulated cost for short-term climate 
change adaptation amounts to 39 billion €, which grows to 461 billion € when 
proofing infrastructures against long-term climate change. These costs will result in 
total accumulated benefits (or avoided damages) of 98 billion € by 2040 and 1,152 
billion € by the end of this century.   
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Table 6.2 Benefit to cost ratios (BCR) of adaptation measures reported in literature.  
Adaptation measure BCR (avg and range) Region Reference 
Infrastructures 
Prevention of storm damage to buildings 2.7 (1.3 – 4.8) Germany Tröltzsch et al. (2012)  
Local structural protection 1.7 Austria Holub and Fuchs (2008) 
Industry 
Awareness raising for companies 5.3 (1.0 – 9.7) EU Hjerp et al. (2012) 
Energy 
Adaptation of electricity grids 5.1 EU26, without Malta Hjerp et al. (2012) 
High efficiency ventilation 1.8 EU26, without Malta Hjerp et al. (2012) 
Transport 
Improved road pavement materials and design standards 3 Germany and Austria Doll et al. (2014) 
Adapting tracks to higher temperatures 2 (0.34 - 9) EU Hjerp et al. (2012) 
Adapting roads to higher temperatures 0.4 (0.2 - 0.9) EU Hjerp et al. (2012) 
Adapting roads to increase in precipitation 0.5 (0.1 - 1.9) EU Hjerp et al. (2012) 
Transport and spatial planning: general protection measures 1.3 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Transport and spatial planning: network redesign 1.2 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Infrastructure measures: incentives and information 2.4 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Infrastructure measures: supervision and maintenance 1.2 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Infrastructure measures: investments 1.5 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Vehicle technologies: detection and communication 1.2 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Vehicle technologies: vehicle engineering 1.9 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Vehicle technologies: maintenance 1 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Service operations: raising preparedness 1.4 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Service operations: co-operation strategies 3.8 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Service operations: system redesign 0.7 EU Doll et al. (2011) 
Cross-cutting 
Building dykes and beach nourishment 2.5 Germany Tröltzsch et al. (2012) 
Storm retention reservoirs 3.5 (0.5-9.4) EU Hjerp et al. (2012) 
Action plan on Flood Defence for Rhine River 3.4 River Rhine (Germany) Petrascheck (2003) 
Flood and coastal risk management in England 7.5 (4 – 11) UK EA (2009) 
Flood risk management plan in Belgium 4.1 Scheldt Estuary (Belgium) Broekx et al. (2011) 
Early warning for flash floods 9 Germany EWASE (2008) 
Groins 3.2 (1.6-4) Greece Kontogianni et al. (2014) 
Beach nourishment 2.1 (0.4-3.8) Greece Kontogianni et al. (2014) 
Revetments and geotextiles 3.7 (3.3-3.9) Greece Kontogianni et al. (2014) 
Bulkheads 3.3 (2.4-3.9) Greece Kontogianni et al. (2014) 
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The following two scenarios are then considered:  
1) Scenario 1: adaptation costs reflect maintenance, operation and replacement 
costs distributed in time (assuming capital costs are distributed equally in 
time). Under this scenario two different strategies are further considered: a) 
strategy 1: incremental adaptation goals that only take into account climate 
change in the next 30-year period; and b) strategy 2: long term adaptation 
goals taking into account long term climatic conditions; and  
2) Scenario 2: capital costs are incurred upfront and operation and maintenance 
(O&M) costs are spread equally in time.  
 
Below results of the different combinations are detailed.  
  
Scenario 1 – strategy 1 
Columns 5-7 present the annual costs of adaptation for the three different time 
windows, assuming incremental steps of adaptation (only accounting for marginal 
climate impacts in next 30-year period). The annual cost to adapt infrastructures 
against short term climate change is 1.3 billion €/year for EU+ in the period from 
now up to 2040. In the 2050s, 4.7 billion € would need to be invested annually in 
adaptation to lower risks to current levels (assuming that 25% of the projected 
increase in risk is unavoidable), which further rises to 9.3 billion €/year between 
2071 and 2100. There is a large variation in the cost of adaptation by country. These 
mirror the range of damage costs detailed in Chapter 5. Thus, countries with higher 
estimated damages will face higher adaptation costs. Expressed as a share of GDP, 
annual costs for incremental steps of adaptation grow from 0.01% now up to 0.07% 
by the end of the century for EU+.  
 
Scenario 1 – strategy 2 
Column 8 shows cost estimates assuming that adaptation strategies take into 
account long term climate changes with costs of adaptation distributed evenly over 
the 90 years (long term planning). In that case, annual expenditure for adaptation 
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from now up to 2100 would amount to 5.1 billion €/year, or approximately 0.04% 
of EU+ GDP. Comparison of these results with those of strategy 1 shows that 
incremental steps of adaptation may result in lower investments in the short term 
but higher investments on the longer term, hence the bulk of the burden is placed on 
future generations. This strategy may only be justifiable for infrastructures with 
short life times, for which impacts in the long run are not relevant. 
 
Scenario 2 
Adaptation measures often involve substantial capital expenses (Sussman et al., 
2014), which under scenario 1 were considered as part of the annual costs. Under 
this scenario it is assumed that capital costs reflect 30% of the total adaptation cost 
over its lifetime and that they are incurred now, whereas O&M costs (70% 
remaining costs) are spread equally in time. It is important to note that depending 
on the adaptation measure the share of capital costs to the total cost of adaptation 
may be higher (hard structural measures) or lower (soft adaptation measures).  
 
Results under this scenario (columns 13 to 20 of Table 6.3) indicate that for EU+, 
taking into account short term projected changes in climate, costs incurred now 
would equal approximately 12 billion €, or approximately 0.1% of EU+ 2010 GDP, 
plus a yearly O&M cost of nearly 1 billion €. Expected annual benefits of these 
investments would amount to 3.3 billion €. This, however, would only make 
infrastructures resilient to climate up to 2040. The investments for adaptation 
required to face changes in climate also in the medium term (including the 2050s) 
would amount to an upfront capital cost of 54 billion €, or 0.4% of EU+ 2010 GDP, 
and an annual O&M cost of 2.1 billion €. Expected annual benefits would grow to 
11.9 billion € by the 2050s. For making infrastructures climate resilient up to the 
end of the century, the capital cost rises to 138 billion € (about 1% of EU+ 2010 
GDP) and O&M cost grow to nearly 3.6 billion €/year, with expected annual benefits 
reaching 23 billion € by the 2080s.  
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While it is obvious that adaptation costs and impacts will not fall equally across 
Europe, this does have important implications. The analysis of indicative adaptation 
costs by country (if incurred now) accounting for medium to long term climate 
effects indicates that some countries in Europe would potentially have to invest a 
significant share of their current GDP to abate the future impacts from climate 
hazards on critical infrastructures – notably Greece, Croatia, Portugal and Spain.  
 
It is stressed that these indicative costs are subject to many factors, such as the 
shape of the marginal cost curve for increasing resilience against increasing extreme 
hazard intensity, the balance between soft and hard options, and the balance of 
capital and operating and maintenance costs, among others. Nonetheless, they 
suggest that adaptation (i.e., enhanced resilience) could be a highly cost-effective 
strategy, but that costs to be incurred could be considerable for several countries in 
Europe. 
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Table 6.3 Estimated cost of adaptation for multi-hazard multi-sector analysis. No discounting, expressed in € 2010 constant prices or share of 2010 GDP, assuming 
no socio-economic change in future scenarios. Scenario 1, strategy 1; Scenario 1, strategy 2; Scenario 2.   
 Accumulated total cost  
(in million €) 
Annual total cost  
(in million €) 
Annual total cost  
(share GDP) 
Capital cost 
(in million €) 
Capital cost 
(share GDP) 
Annual O&M 
cost (in million €) 
Country 2020 2050 2080 2020 2050 2080 2080 2020 2050 2080 2080 2020 2050 2080 2020 2050 2080 2020 2080 
AT 260 1,462 4,644 8.7 40 106 52 0.003 0.014 0.036 0.018 78 439 1,393 0.03 0.15 0.47 6.1 36 
BE 7 610 1,962 0.2 20 45 22 0.000 0.005 0.012 0.006 2 183 589 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.2 15 
BG 223 646 1,838 7.4 14 40 20 0.020 0.038 0.108 0.056 67 194 551 0.18 0.53 1.50 5.2 14 
CH 543 3,683 9,634 18 105 198 107 0.004 0.024 0.045 0.024 163 1,105 2,890 0.04 0.25 0.66 13 75 
CY 1 43 110 0.0 1.4 2.2 1.2 0.000 0.007 0.012 0.006 0 13 33 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.0 0.9 
CZ 26 92 450 0.9 2.2 12 5.0 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.003 8 28 135 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.6 3.5 
DE 1,839 11,374 29,518 61 318 605 328 0.002 0.012 0.023 0.013 552 3,412 8,856 0.02 0.13 0.34 43 230 
DK 249 1,201 2,912 8.3 32 57 32 0.003 0.013 0.024 0.013 75 360 874 0.03 0.15 0.36 5.8 23 
EE 40 245 517 1.3 6.8 9.1 5.7 0.009 0.046 0.062 0.039 12 73 155 0.08 0.50 1.05 0.9 4.0 
ES 11,605 51,749 132,710 387 1,338 2,699 1,475 0.036 0.124 0.250 0.136 3,482 15,525 39,813 0.32 1.44 3.68 271 1,032 
FI 127 587 1,453 4.2 15 29 16 0.002 0.008 0.015 0.009 38 176 436 0.02 0.09 0.23 3.0 11 
FR 5,304 24,901 63,325 177 653 1,281 704 0.009 0.033 0.064 0.035 1,591 7,470 18,997 0.08 0.37 0.95 124 493 
GR 1,095 11,067 24,483 36 332 447 272 0.016 0.147 0.198 0.120 328 3,320 7,345 0.15 1.47 3.25 26 190 
HR 182 1,331 5,065 6 38 124 56 0.015 0.085 0.277 0.125 55 399 1,519 0.12 0.89 3.38 4 39 
HU 0 472 1,395 0 17 31 16 0.000 0.017 0.031 0.016 0 142 419 0.00 0.14 0.43 0 11 
IE 26 313 633 0.9 10 11 7.0 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.004 8 94 190 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.6 4.9 
IS 0 38 98 0.0 1.3 2.0 1.1 0.000 0.013 0.020 0.011 0 11 29 0.00 0.11 0.29 0.0 0.8 
IT 13,335 49,296 115,411 445 1,199 2,204 1,282 0.028 0.075 0.137 0.080 4,001 14,789 34,623 0.25 0.92 2.16 311 898 
LT 89 350 655 3.0 8.7 10 7.3 0.011 0.031 0.036 0.026 27 105 196 0.10 0.38 0.70 2.1 5.1 
LU 3 38 144 0.1 1.2 3.5 1.6 0.000 0.003 0.009 0.004 1 11 43 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.1 1.1 
LV 72 318 569 2.4 8.2 8.4 6.3 0.013 0.046 0.047 0.035 22 95 171 0.12 0.53 0.95 1.7 4.4 
MT 67 138 219 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.4 0.034 0.036 0.041 0.037 20 42 66 0.30 0.63 0.99 1.6 1.7 
NL 34 644 1,570 1.1 20 31 17 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.003 10 193 471 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.8 12 
NO 35 433 1,150 1.2 13 24 13 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.004 10 130 345 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.8 8.9 
PL 43 203 453 1.4 5.3 8.3 5.0 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 13 61 136 0.00 0.02 0.04 1.0 3.5 
PT 2,072 8,997 20,998 69 231 400 233 0.038 0.128 0.222 0.130 622 2,699 6,299 0.35 1.50 3.50 48 163 
RO 847 2,323 6,629 28 49 144 74 0.022 0.039 0.113 0.058 254 697 1,989 0.20 0.55 1.57 20 52 
SE 122 1,136 2,551 4.1 34 47 28 0.001 0.009 0.013 0.008 37 341 765 0.01 0.09 0.21 2.9 20 
SI 106 543 2217 4 15 56 25 0.010 0.040 0.154 0.068 32 133 665 0.09 0.45 1.84 2 17 
SK 14 522 1,988 0.5 17 49 22 0.001 0.025 0.073 0.033 4 157 596 0.01 0.23 0.89 0.3 15 
UK 214 2,232 7,158 7.1 67 164 80 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.004 64 670 2,147 0.00 0.04 0.12 5.0 56 
EU+ 39,297 181,789 461,166 1,310 4,750 9,313 5,124 0.010 0.035 0.069 0.038 11,789 54,537 138,350 0.09 0.40 1.02 917 3,587 
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6.3.2 Climate proofing EU investments  
The above shows that the implementation of adaptation measures, whether it be 
physical adjustments to infrastructures and buildings, or organizational, 
institutional and other soft response actions, may require substantial resources 
(Bouwer and Aerts 2006), especially in regions that will be most affected by climate 
change. The Cohesion Policy Funds (CPF) are a key financing instrument of the EU, 
distributing about a third (347 billion € for the period 2007-2013) of the EU budget 
across regions, based on economic and social indicators, with the aim to stimulate 
development especially in less prosperous regions in order to achieve economic and 
social cohesion. Even though that adaptation only became a serious policy concern 
for the EU after the definition of the thematic priorities of the CPF 2007-2013, some 
of the thematic priorities can be linked with adaptation. Especially since funding is 
available not only for hard infrastructures but also for human capital, institution and 
capacity building as well as technological development, which may be tailored 
towards increasing the adaptive capacity of regions.  
 
We build on the work of Hanger et al. (2013) to appraise the amount of funding 
under CPF 2007-2013 that can be considered relevant to supporting adaptation-
related aims. From the 86 thematic priorities, adaptation-related expenditure is 
assigned based on the Rio marker methodology developed by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for reporting climate-related 
development assistance (OECD, 2011). This method distinguishes between three 
categories of priority themes: the first category (climate change as principal 
objective) is weighted 100%, the second (climate change as significant objective) at 
40% and the third (climate change not an objective) are assigned no weight. For 
priority themes of the first two categories that are also related to climate mitigation 
an equal share is assigned to mitigation and adaptation. Table 6.4 shows the priority 
themes that were retained in this analysis, with an indication of their relevance for 
climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. The sum of these contributions 
represents the climate adaptation potential of the EU CPF 2007-2013 investments 
(CPF-A).  
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Table 6.4 CPF priority themes marked according to OECD ‘Rio marker’ system as ‘climate change as 
principal objective’ (100 %) or ‘climate change as significant objective’ (40 %); together with a 
classification into adaptation relevant (A), mitigation relevant (M), or mitigation and adaptation 
relevant (M&A), and the share of total CPF funding (in percentage of total “Structural and Cohesion 
Funds, SCF”) – from Hanger et al. (2013).  
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The spatial distribution of CPF-A is presented in Figure 6.1. It shows highest 
adaptation-related allocations in regions of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Hungary, Poland 
and the Baltic States. Similar as for the distribution of CPF investments at risk 
(Figure 5.9) this pattern is largely driven by the total amount of allocations, as 
adaptation was not high on the agenda when the distribution amongst priority 
themes were agreed. Aggregated over EU27 CPF-A amounts to 6.2 billion €, or 
approximately 1.8% of the total allocations for 2007-2013. It should be noted that 
the EU allocations are indicative, proposed by the Member States and approved by 
the European Commission, hence may differ from actual spending. Ultimately the 
effectiveness of spending under each thematic priority can only be evaluated at the 
project level, for which no comprehensive data exist at the European level. 
Furthermore, the amounts earmarked for adaptation under the CPF 2007-2013 
refer largely to environmental measures, which may not necessarily be effective in 
reducing the impacts to all the investments at risk.  
 
 
149 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Adaptation relevant allocations (CPF-A, in million €) under the Cohesion policy during the 
2007-2013 programming period (based on Hanger et al., 2013).  
 
Specific investment allocation data for the on-going programming period (2014-
2020) were not available during the writing of this report. However, in recent years 
the EU has made strong efforts for augmenting the profile of climate change in their 
budget and policies. This is expressed by the following recent actions.  
 The European Council has set as political objective to earmark at least 20% of 
the entire EU budget for climate-relevant actions in the period 2014-202014.  
                                                        
14 Conclusions of the European Council (7/8 February 2013) as regards the Multiannual Financial Framework. 
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 The current programming period is the first in which climate considerations 
have been included. Major projects funded by ESIF will need to be screened 
against climate-related vulnerabilities during the preparation and 
implementation phase and necessary adaptation measures need to be 
reported15.  
 For European and Structural Investment Funds (ESIF) there is now the 
specific requirement that adaptation to climate change is part of the 
horizontal principle of sustainable development16.  
 One of the 11 thematic objectives under the new ESIF interventions includes 
specific measures for adaptation (Thematic Objective 5 – Promoting climate 
change adaptation, risk prevention and management)17.  
 
To optimally allot funds for adaptation across the EU it is important to understand 
the regional distribution of impacts and adaptation costs, such that higher 
adaptation efforts can be targeted towards the most impacted regions. To provide 
an indication of expenditures required for climate proofing CPF investments across 
the EU27, we map in Figure 6.2 adaptation costs expressed as a share of the total 
2007-2013 CPF allocations. These adaptation costs relate to the risks to EU 
investments and not to the total stock of infrastructure. The adaptation costs have 
been derived as follows.  The difference in multi-hazard damages (EAD) between the 
baseline and 2020s have been accumulated over a 30-year period. This reflects the 
total increased climate risk over the next 30 years compared to the baseline. Hence, 
it is assumed here that the life span of the investment is limited to 30 years, and 
therefore only climate changes in the short term are accounted for. This means that 
for investments and infrastructures with longer life spans the risks may be 
underestimated. Similar as in the analysis for critical infrastructures, we further 
assume that with adaptation we can avoid 75% of the increase in risk (= benefits of 
adaptation) and apply a benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR) of 2.5 to get indicative numbers 
                                                        
15 Article 101 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013; Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/207 – Annex II, Section F.8. 
16 Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013. 
17 Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013. 
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of the adaptation costs. In Figure 6.2 the latter are scaled by the total CPF allocations 
under the 2007-2013 programming period.  
 
For EU27 the cost of proofing CPF investments against climate up to 2040 amounts 
to 1.1% of total CPF allocations. This implies that the total adaptation relevant 
allocations under the 2007-2013 programming period as derived by the method of 
Hanger et al. (2013) should be sufficient to cover adaptation costs to face short term 
climate changes. When climate change in the medium term (including the 2050s, 
results not shown here) is also accounted for, however, total costs for EU27 rise to 
6.2%, whereas proofing investments against climate in the 2080s would require 
10.4% of total allocations. The maps in Figure 6.2 show that there is a large 
heterogeneity across the EU in adaptation costs, which follow the distribution of 
risks to CPF investments as described in Chapter 5. For regions in the south and 
southeast the costs of climate proofing all investments against short term climate 
change can reach 5% of total allocations (Figure 6.2a). There also exists 
considerable variation in adaptation requirements for different sectors, both in 
terms of overall magnitude and distribution across regions. The sectors with the 
highest relative adaptation costs are the transport, energy, and 
environment/tourism sectors, with EU27 aggregated costs for short-term climate 
change adaptation between 2 and 3% of sector investments (for longer term climate 
change adaptation cost could rise to 20-30% of sector investments). For these 
sectors, several regions in southern and south-eastern Europe, but also some in 
France, can face short-term adaptation costs up to 10% of the sector investments, in 
localized regions in the Iberian and Balkan Peninsulas event up to 25% and more. 
The ranking of the three most impacted sectors in terms of adaptation requirements 
can be different for each region, depending on the amount of sector allocations, the 
prevalence of climate hazards and the sensitivity of the investment to the hazards. 
The costs for climate proofing are considerably lower for the ICT and social sectors, 
amounting for the EU27 to 0.05% and 0.28%, respectively, of sector investments 
when only considering short-term climate change. For the social sector, however, we 
see that locally in Spain but also in France short-term adaptation costs could reach 
nearly 5% of sector investments.  
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Figure 6.2 Adaptation costs as share of CPF investments: (a) multi-sector, (b) transport, (c) energy, 
(d) environment and tourism, (e) ICT, and (f) social sector. Estimated adaptation costs only take into 
account short term climate changes.  
 
 
153 
 
 
 
We stress that the reported adaptation costs can be subject to large uncertainty. 
However, while these estimates are only indicative, they do highlight some 
important issues. The distribution in space and amongst sectors provides an 
indication of the regions and sectors that may face substantial efforts for climate 
proofing EU investments. The disproportionate distribution of economic costs – 
both adaptation and impacts – suggests that a better understanding of the regional 
and thematic distribution of costs could aid in targeting further EU investments such 
that cohesion policy also gains meaning as a burden sharing instrument for 
adaptation to climate change. 
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Annex I Structure of CPF and CI risk maps 
Maps representing (current and future) impacts of individual hazards on EU 
investments and critical economic assets are organized with the following tree 
structure 
 CPF map collection 
 Single hazard maps 
1. Hazard 1 
1. Sector 1 
1. Time step 1 
       
4. Time step 4 
 Namefile 
2. Sector 2 
 
6. Sector 6 
 
2. Hazard 2 
    
7. Hazard 7 
 
 Multi-hazard maps 
8. Multi-hazard 
1. Sector 1 
1. Time step 1 
   
2. Time step 4 
 Namefile 
2. Sector 2 
 
6. Sector 6 
Figure Annex.3 CPF folder structure 
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 CI map collection 
 Single hazard maps 
1. Hazard 1 
1. Sector 1 
1. Time step 1 
       
5. Time step 4 
 Namefile 
2. Sector 2 
 
5. Sector 5 
 
2. Hazard 2 
    
7. Hazard 7 
 
 Multi-hazard maps 
8. Multi-hazard 
1. Sector 1 
1. Time step 1 
   
2. Time step 4 
 Namefile 
2. Sector 2 
 
6. Sector 6 
 
Figure Annex.4 CI folder structure 
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The CPF folder refers to Cohesion Fund investments (2007-2013) at risk, with 
damages expressed in Euro per NUTS2 region. A collection of maps have been 
produced for each single hazard as well as for the aggregation of all the hazards. The 
CPF single hazard folder contains maps that show the CPF themes at risk for each 
hazard and time slice. Maps are in different folders per hazard and for each sector 
(See Figure Annex.1) 
 
The nomenclature of the files is as follows:  
Namefile = Hazard number + Sector number + Time step number + “CPF” + Time 
step name + Hazard abbreviation + Sector abbreviation 
 Hazard number/name = “1” for Cold wave, “2” for Drought, “3” for Wildfire, 
“4” for River floods, “5” for Heatwave,“6” for Coastal Flood and “7” for 
Windstorm. 
 Sector number/name = “1” for Energy, “2” for Environment and Tourism, “3” 
for Information, Communication and Technology, “4” for Social, “5” for 
Transport,   and “6” for Total. 
 Time step number/name = “1” for ts1 (1981-2010, except Windstorm hazard 
that has used 1961-1990 as baseline),“2 for ts2 (2011-2040), “3” for ts3” 
(2041-2070) and “4” for ts4 (2071-2100)  
 Hazard abbreviation = “C” for Cold wave, “D” for Drought, “F” for Wildfire, 
“RF” for River floods, “H” for Heatwave, “CF” for Coastal Flood and “W” for 
Windstorm. 
 Sector abbreviation = “ENER” for Energy, “ENV_TOUR” for Environment and 
Tourism, “ICT” for Information, Communication and Technology, “SOCIAL” 
for Social, “TRANS” for Transport,   and “TOTAL” for the aggregation of all the 
sectors. 
 
For instance, the namefile: “1.1.1 CPF_ts1_C_ENER” corresponds to the single map of 
annual damages in EUR of CPF Energy allocations to Cold waves in the time step 
1981-2010. 
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The CPF multi-hazard folder contains maps that show CPF themes at risk for the 
sum of all the hazards for each time slice. Maps are stored in different folders for 
each hazard.  
The nomenclature of the files is as follows:  
Namefile = Hazard number + Sector number + Time step number + “CPF” + Time 
step name + Hazard abbreviation + Sector abbreviation 
 Hazard number/name = “8” for Multi-hazard 
 Hazard abbreviation = “M” for Multi-hazard 
 
For instance, the namefile = 7.2.4 CPF_ts1_M_ENV_TOUR corresponds to the multi-
hazard map of annual damages in EUR of CPF Environment and Tourism to Multi-
hazard in the time step 2071-2100. 
 
The CI folder refers to the Critical Infrastructures (or Critical Economic Assets – 
CEA) under risk, with damages expressed in Euro per NUTS2 region. A set of maps 
have been created for each single hazard and the aggregation of all the hazards.  
The CI single hazard folder contains maps that show the CI at risk for each hazard 
and time slice. Maps are stored in different folders for each hazard first and secondly 
for each sector (See Figure Annex.2) 
 
The nomenclature of the files is as follows:  
Namefile = Hazard number + Sector number + Time step number + “CEA” + Time 
step name + Hazard abbreviation + Sector abbreviation 
 Hazard number/name = “1” for Cold wave, “2” for Drought, “3” for Wildfire, 
“4” for River floods, “5” for Heatwave,“6” for Coastal Flood and “7” for 
Windstorm. 
 Sector number/name = “1” for Energy, “2” for Industrial, “3” for Social ,“4” for 
Transport,   and “5” for Total. 
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 Time step number/name = “1” for ts1 (1981-2010, except Windstorm hazard 
that takes 1961-1990),“2 for ts2 (2011-2040), “3” for ts3” (2041-2070) and 
“4” for ts4 (2071-2100)  
 Hazard abbreviation = “C” for Cold wave, “D” for Drought, “F” for Wildfire, 
“RF” for River floods, “H” for Heatwave, “CF” for Coastal Flood and “W” for 
Windstorm. 
 Sector abbreviation = “ENER” for Energy sector, “INDUSTRIAL” for Industrial 
facilities, “SOCIAL” for Social facilities, “TRANS” for Transport infrastructures,   
and “TOTAL” for the sum of all the sectors. 
 
For instance, the namefile “1.2.1 CEA_ts1_C_INDUSTRIAL” corresponds to the single 
map of annual damages in EUR of CEA Industrial allocations to Cold waves hazard 
from 1981 to 2010. 
 
 
The CI multi-hazard folder contains maps that show CI at risk for the sum of all the 
hazards for each time slice. Maps are stored in different folders for each hazard.  
The nomenclature of the files is as follows:  
 
Namefile = Hazard number + Sector number + Time step number + “CEA” + Time 
step name + Hazard abbreviation + Sector abbreviation 
Hazard number/name = “8” for Multi-hazard 
Hazard abbreviation = “M” for Multi-hazard. 
 
For instance, the namefile = 8.5.4 CEA_ts4_M_TOTAL corresponds to the multi-
hazard map of annual damages in EUR of CEA Total investments to Multi-hazard in 
the time step running from 2071 to 2100. 
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Annex II CPF and CI risk maps 
 
1A: CPF single hazard maps 
 
Namefile  Caption 
1.1.1.CPF_ts1_C_ENER 1.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 1981-2010 
1.1.2.CPF_ts2_C_ENER 1.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2011-2040 
1.1.3.CPF_ts3_C_ENER 1.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2041-2070 
1.1.4.CPF_ts4_C_ENER 1.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2071-2100 
1.2.1.CPF_ts1_C_ENV_TOUR 1.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Cold wave hazard in 1981-2010 
1.2.2.CPF_ts2_C_ENV_TOUR 1.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Cold wave hazard in 2011-2040 
1.2.3.CPF_ts3_C_ENV_TOUR 1.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Cold wave hazard in 2041-2070 
1.2.4.CPF_ts4_C_ENV_TOUR 1.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Cold wave hazard in 2071-2100 
1.3.1.CPF_ts1_C_ICT 1.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 1981-2010 
1.3.2.CPF_ts2_C_ICT 1.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2011-2040 
1.3.3.CPF_ts3_C_ICT 1.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2041-2070 
1.3.4.CPF_ts4_C_ICT 1.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2071-2100 
1.4.1.CPF_ts1_C_SOCIAL 1.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 1981-2010 
1.4.2.CPF_ts2_C_SOCIAL 1.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2011-2040 
1.4.3.CPF_ts3_C_SOCIAL 1.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2041-2070 
1.4.4.CPF_ts4_C_SOCIAL 1.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2071-2100 
1.5.1.CPF_ts1_C_TRANS 1.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Cold wave hazard in 1981-2010 
1.5.2.CPF_ts2_C_TRANS 1.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Cold wave hazard in 2011-2040 
1.5.3.CPF_ts3_C_TRANS 1.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Cold wave hazard in 2041-2070 
1.5.4.CPF_ts4_C_TRANS 1.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Cold wave hazard in 2071-2100 
1.6.1.CPF_ts1_C_TOTAL 1.6.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 1981-2010 
1.6.2.CPF_ts2_C_TOTAL 1.6.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2011-2040 
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1.6.3.CPF_ts3_C_TOTAL 1.6.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2041-2070 
1.6.4.CPF_ts4_C_TOTAL 1.6.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Cold wave hazard in 2071-2100 
2.1.1.CPF_ts1_D_ENER 2.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.1.2.CPF_ts2_D_ENER 2.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.1.3.CPF_ts3_D_ENER 2.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.1.4.CPF_ts4_D_ENER 2.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
2.2.1.CPF_ts1_D_ENV_TOUR 2.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.2.2.CPF_ts2_D_ENV_TOUR 2.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.2.3.CPF_ts3_D_ENV_TOUR 2.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.2.4.CPF_ts4_D_ENV_TOUR 2.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
2.3.1.CPF_ts1_D_ICT 2.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.3.2.CPF_ts2_D_ICT 2.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.3.3.CPF_ts3_D_ICT 2.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.3.4.CPF_ts4_D_ICT 2.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
2.4.1.CPF_ts1_D_SOCIAL 2.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.4.2.CPF_ts2_D_SOCIAL 2.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.4.3.CPF_ts3_D_SOCIAL 2.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.4.4.CPF_ts4_D_SOCIAL 2.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
2.5.1.CPF_ts1_D_TRANS 2.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.5.2.CPF_ts2_D_TRANS 2.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.5.3.CPF_ts3_D_TRANS 2.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.5.4.CPF_ts4_D_TRANS 2.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
2.6.1.CPF_ts1_D_TOTAL 2.6.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.6.2.CPF_ts2_D_TOTAL 2.6.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.6.3.CPF_ts3_D_TOTAL 2.6.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.6.4.CPF_ts4_D_TOTAL 2.6.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
 
 
164 
 
 
3.1.1.CPF_ts1_F_ENER 3.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.1.2.CPF_ts2_F_ENER 3.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
3.1.3.CPF_ts3_F_ENER 3.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.1.4.CPF_ts4_F_ENER 3.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2071-2100 
3.2.1.CPF_ts1_F_ENV_TOUR 3.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.2.2.CPF_ts2_F_ENV_TOUR 3.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
3.2.3.CPF_ts3_F_ENV_TOUR 3.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.2.4.CPF_ts4_F_ENV_TOUR 3.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Wildfire hazard in 2071-2100 
3.3.1.CPF_ts1_F_ICT 3.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.3.2.CPF_ts2_F_ICT 3.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
3.3.3.CPF_ts3_F_ICT 3.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.3.4.CPF_ts4_F_ICT 3.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Wildfire 'Multi CEA'!M16hazard in 2071-2100 
3.4.1.CPF_ts1_F_SOCIAL 3.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.4.2.CPF_ts2_F_SOCIAL 3.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
3.4.3.CPF_ts3_F_SOCIAL 3.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.4.4.CPF_ts4_F_SOCIAL 3.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2071-2100 
3.5.1.CPF_ts1_F_TRANS 3.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.5.2.CPF_ts2_F_TRANS 3.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
3.5.3.CPF_ts3_F_TRANS 3.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.5.4.CPF_ts4_F_TRANS 3.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Wildfire hazard in 2071-2100 
3.6.1.CPF_ts1_F_TOTAL 3.6.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.6.2.CPF_ts2_F_TOTAL 3.6.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
3.6.3.CPF_ts3_F_TOTAL 3.6.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.6.4.CPF_ts4_F_TOTAL 3.6.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Wildfire hazard in 2071-2100 
4.1.1.CPF_ts1_RF_ENER 4.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.1.2.CPF_ts2_RF_ENER 4.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.1.3.CPF_ts3_RF_ENER 4.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
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River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.1.4.CPF_ts4_RF_ENER 4.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
4.2.1.CPF_ts1_RF_ENV_TOUR 4.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.2.2.CPF_ts2_RF_ENV_TOUR 4.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.2.3.CPF_ts3_RF_ENV_TOUR 4.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.2.4.CPF_ts4_RF_ENV_TOUR 4.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
4.3.1.CPF_ts1_RF_ICT 4.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.3.2.CPF_ts2_RF_ICT 4.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.3.3.CPF_ts3_RF_ICT 4.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.3.4.CPF_ts4_RF_ICT 4.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
4.4.1.CPF_ts1_RF_SOCIAL 4.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.4.2.CPF_ts2_RF_SOCIAL 4.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.4.3.CPF_ts3_RF_SOCIAL 4.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.4.4.CPF_ts4_RF_SOCIAL 4.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
4.5.1.CPF_ts1_RF_TRANS 4.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.5.2.CPF_ts2_RF_TRANS 4.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.5.3.CPF_ts3_RF_TRANS 4.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.5.4.CPF_ts4_RF_TRANS 4.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
4.6.1.CPF_ts1_RF_TOTAL 4.6.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.6.2.CPF_ts2_RF_TOTAL 4.6.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.6.3.CPF_ts3_RF_TOTAL 4.6.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.6.4.CPF_ts4_RF_TOTAL 4.6.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
5.1.1.CPF_ts1_H_ENER 5.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
5.1.2.CPF_ts2_H_ENER 5.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.1.3.CPF_ts3_H_ENER 5.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
5.1.4.CPF_ts4_H_ENER 5.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
5.2.1.CPF_ts1_H_ENV_TOUR 5.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
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5.2.2.CPF_ts2_H_ENV_TOUR 5.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.2.3.CPF_ts3_H_ENV_TOUR 5.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
5.2.4.CPF_ts4_H_ENV_TOUR 5.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
5.3.1.CPF_ts1_H_ICT 5.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
5.3.2.CPF_ts2_H_ICT 5.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.3.3.CPF_ts3_H_ICT 5.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
5.3.4.CPF_ts4_H_ICT 5.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
5.4.1.CPF_ts1_H_SOCIAL 5.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
5.4.2.CPF_ts2_H_SOCIAL 5.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.4.3.CPF_ts3_H_SOCIAL 5.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
5.4.4.CPF_ts4_H_SOCIAL 5.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
5.5.1.CPF_ts1_H_TRANS 5.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
5.5.2.CPF_ts2_H_TRANS 5.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.5.3.CPF_ts3_H_TRANS 5.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
5.5.4.CPF_ts4_H_TRANS 5.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros of CPF Transport allocations 
from Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
5.6.1.CPF_ts1_H_TOTAL 5.6.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
5.6.2.CPF_ts2_H_TOTAL 5.6.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.6.3.CPF_ts3_H_TOTAL 5.6.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
5.6.4.CPF_ts4_H_TOTAL 5.6.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
6.1.1.CPF_ts1_CF_ENER 6.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.1.2.CPF_ts2_CF_ENER 6.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.1.3.CPF_ts3_CF_ENER 6.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.1.4.CPF_ts4_CF_ENER 6.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2071-2100 
6.2.1.CPF_ts1_CF_ENV_TOUR 6.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Coastal flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.2.2.CPF_ts2_CF_ENV_TOUR 6.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Coastal flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.2.3.CPF_ts3_CF_ENV_TOUR 6.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Coastal flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.2.4.CPF_ts4_CF_ENV_TOUR 6.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
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Tourism allocations from Coastal flood hazard in 2071-2100 
6.3.1.CPF_ts1_CF_ICT 6.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.3.2.CPF_ts2_CF_ICT 6.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.3.3.CPF_ts3_CF_ICT 6.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.3.4.CPF_ts4_CF_ICT 6.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2071-2100 
6.4.1.CPF_ts1_CF_SOCIAL 6.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.4.2.CPF_ts2_CF_SOCIAL 6.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.4.3.CPF_ts3_CF_SOCIAL 6.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.4.4.CPF_ts4_CF_SOCIAL 6.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2071-2100 
6.5.1.CPF_ts1_CF_TRANS 6.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Coastal flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.5.2.CPF_ts2_CF_TRANS 6.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Coastal flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.5.3.CPF_ts3_CF_TRANS 6.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Coastal flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.5.4.CPF_ts4_CF_TRANS 6.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Coastal flood hazard in 2071-2100 
6.6.1.CPF_ts1_CF_TOTAL 6.6.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.6.2.CPF_ts2_CF_TOTAL 6.6.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.6.3.CPF_ts3_CF_TOTAL 6.6.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.6.4.CPF_ts4_CF_TOTAL 6.6.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Coastal flood hazard in 2071-2100 
7.1.1.CPF_ts1_W_ENER 7.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.1.4.CPF_ts4_W_ENER 7.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
7.2.1.CPF_ts1_W_ENV_TOUR 7.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.2.4.CPF_ts4_W_ENV_TOUR 7.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
7.3.1.CPF_ts1_W_ICT 7.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.3.4.CPF_ts4_W_ICT 7.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
7.4.1.CPF_ts1_W_SOCIAL 7.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.4.4.CPF_ts4_W_SOCIAL 7.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
7.5.1.CPF_ts1_W_TRANS 7.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.5.4.CPF_ts4_W_TRANS 7.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
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7.6.1.CPF_ts1_W_TOTAL 7.6.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.6.4.CPF_ts4_W_TOTAL 7.6.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
 
 
1B: CPF Multi-hazard maps 
 
Namefile  Caption 
8.1.1 CPF_ts1_M_ENER 8.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
8.1.2 CPF_ts2_M_ENER 8.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
8.1.3 CPF_ts3_M_ENER 8.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.1.4 CPF_ts4_M_ENER 8.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Energy allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
8.2.1 CPF_ts1_M_ENV_TOUR 8.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
8.2.2 CPF_ts2_M_ENV_TOUR 8.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
8.2.3 CPF_ts3_M_ENV_TOUR 8.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.2.4 CPF_ts4_M_ENV_TOUR 8.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Environment and 
Tourism allocations from Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
8.3.1 CPF_ts1_M_ICT 8.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
8.3.2 CPF_ts2_M_ICT 8.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
8.3.3 CPF_ts3_M_ICT 8.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.3.4 CPF_ts4_M_ICT 8.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF I.C.T. allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
8.4.1 CPF_ts1_M_SOCIAL 8.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
8.4.2 CPF_ts2_M_SOCIAL 8.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
8.4.3 CPF_ts3_M_SOCIAL 8.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.4.4 CPF_ts4_M_SOCIAL 8.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Social allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
8.5.1 CPF_ts1_M_TRANS 8.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
8.5.2 CPF_ts2_M_TRANS 8.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
8.5.3 CPF_ts3_M_TRANS 8.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.5.4 CPF_ts4_M_TRANS 8.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Transport allocations 
from Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
8.6.1 CPF_ts1_M_TOTAL 8.6.1  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
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8.6.2 CPF_ts2_M_TOTAL 8.6.2  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
8.6.3 CPF_ts3_M_TOTAL 8.6.3  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.6.4 CPF_ts4_M_TOTAL 8.6.4  Annual Damages in Euros to CPF Total allocations from 
Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
 
 
2A: CI single hazard maps 
 
Namefile  Caption 
1.1.1 CI_ts1_C.ENER 1.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 1981-2010 
1.1.2 CI_ts2_C.ENER 1.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2011-2040 
1.1.3 CI_ts3_C.ENER 1.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2041-2070 
1.1.4 CI_ts4_C.ENER 1.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2071-2100 
1.2.1 CI_ts1_C.INDUSTRIAL 1.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 1981-2010 
1.2.2 CI_ts2_C.INDUSTRIAL 1.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2011-2040 
1.2.3 CI_ts3_C.INDUSTRIAL 1.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2041-2070 
1.2.4 CI_ts4_C.INDUSTRIAL 1.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2071-2100 
1.3.1 CI_ts1_C.SOCIAL 1.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 1981-2010 
1.3.2 CI_ts2_C.SOCIAL 1.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2011-2040 
1.3.3 CI_ts3_C.SOCIAL 1.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2041-2070 
1.3.4 CI_ts4_C.SOCIAL 1.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2071-2100 
1.4.1 CI_ts1_C.TRANS 1.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 1981-2010 
1.4.2 CI_ts2_C.TRANS 1.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2011-2040 
1.4.3 CI_ts3_C.TRANS 1.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2041-2070 
1.4.4 CI_ts4_C.TRANS 1.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Coldwaves hazard in 2071-2100 
1.5.1 CI_ts1_C.TOTAL 1.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Coldwaves hazard in 1981-2010 
1.5.2 CI_ts2_C.TOTAL 1.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Coldwaves hazard in 2011-2040 
1.5.3 CI_ts3_C.TOTAL 1.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Coldwaves hazard in 2041-2070 
1.5.4 CI_ts4_C.TOTAL 1.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Coldwaves hazard in 2071-2100 
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2.1.1 CI_ts1_D.ENER 2.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.1.2 CI_ts2_D.ENER 2.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.1.3 CI_ts3_D.ENER 2.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.1.4 CI_ts4_D.ENER 2.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
2.2.1 CI_ts1_D.INDUSTRIAL 2.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.2.2 CI_ts2_D.INDUSTRIAL 2.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.2.3 CI_ts3_D.INDUSTRIAL 2.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.2.4 CI_ts4_D.INDUSTRIAL 2.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
2.3.1 CI_ts1_D.SOCIAL 2.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.3.2 CI_ts2_D.SOCIAL 2.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.3.3 CI_ts3_D.SOCIAL 2.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.3.4 CI_ts4_D.SOCIAL 2.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
2.4.1 CI_ts1_D.TRANS 2.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.4.2 CI_ts2_D.TRANS 2.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.4.3 CI_ts3_D.TRANS 2.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.4.4 CI_ts4_D.TRANS 2.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
2.5.1 CI_ts1_D.TOTAL 2.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Drought hazard in 1981-2010 
2.5.2 CI_ts2_D.TOTAL 2.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Drought hazard in 2011-2040 
2.5.3 CI_ts3_D.TOTAL 2.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Drought hazard in 2041-2070 
2.5.4 CI_ts4_D.TOTAL 2.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Drought hazard in 2071-2100 
3.1.1 CI_ts1_F.ENER 3.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.1.2 CI_ts2_F.ENER 3.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
3.1.3 CI_ts3_F.ENER 3.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.1.4 CI_ts4_F.ENER 3.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2071-2100 
3.2.1 CI_ts1_F.INDUSTRIAL 3.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.2.2 CI_ts2_F.INDUSTRIAL 3.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
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3.2.3 CI_ts3_F.INDUSTRIAL 3.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.2.4 CI_ts4_F.INDUSTRIAL 3.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2071-2100 
3.3.1 CI_ts1_F.SOCIAL 3.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.3.2 CI_ts2_F.SOCIAL 3.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
3.3.3 CI_ts3_F.SOCIAL 3.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.3.4 CI_ts4_F.SOCIAL 3.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2071-2100 
3.4.1 CI_ts1_F.TRANS 3.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.4.2 CI_ts2_F.TRANS 3.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
3.4.3 CI_ts3_F.TRANS 3.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.4.4 CI_ts4_F.TRANS 3.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Wildfire hazard in 2071-2100 
3.5.1 CI_ts1_F.TOTAL 3.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Wildfire hazard in 1981-2010 
3.5.2 CI_ts2_F.TOTAL 3.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Wildfire hazard in 2011-2040 
3.5.3 CI_ts3_F.TOTAL 3.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Wildfire hazard in 2041-2070 
3.5.4 CI_ts4_F.TOTAL 3.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Wildfire hazard in 2071-2100 
4.1.1 CI_ts1_RF.ENER 4.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.1.2 CI_ts2_RF.ENER 4.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.1.3 CI_ts3_RF.ENER 4.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.1.4 CI_ts4_RF.ENER 4.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
4.2.1 CI_ts1_RF.INDUSTRIAL 4.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.2.2 CI_ts2_RF.INDUSTRIAL 4.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.2.3 CI_ts3_RF.INDUSTRIAL 4.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.2.4 CI_ts4_RF.INDUSTRIAL 4.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
4.3.1 CI_ts1_RF.SOCIAL 4.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.3.2 CI_ts2_RF.SOCIAL 4.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.3.3 CI_ts3_RF.SOCIAL 4.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.3.4 CI_ts4_RF.SOCIAL 4.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
4.4.1 CI_ts1_RF.TRANS 4.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
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Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.4.2 CI_ts2_RF.TRANS 4.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.4.3 CI_ts3_RF.TRANS 4.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.4.4 CI_ts4_RF.TRANS 4.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
4.5.1 CI_ts1_RF.TOTAL 4.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from River Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
4.5.2 CI_ts2_RF.TOTAL 4.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from River Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
4.5.3 CI_ts3_RF.TOTAL 4.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from River Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
4.5.4 CI_ts4_RF.TOTAL 4.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from River Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
5.1.1 CI_ts1_H.ENER 5.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
5.1.2 CI_ts2_H.ENER 5.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.1.3 CI_ts3_H.ENER 5.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
5.1.4 CI_ts4_H.ENER 5.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
5.2.1 CI_ts1_H.INDUSTRIAL 5.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
5.2.2 CI_ts2_H.INDUSTRIAL 5.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.2.3 CI_ts3_H.INDUSTRIAL 5.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
5.2.4 CI_ts4_H.INDUSTRIAL 5.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
5.3.1 CI_ts1_H.SOCIAL 5.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
5.3.2 CI_ts2_H.SOCIAL 5.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.3.3 CI_ts3_H.SOCIAL 5.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
5.3.4 CI_ts4_H.SOCIAL 5.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
5.4.1 CI_ts1_H.TRANS 5.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
5.4.2 CI_ts2_H.TRANS 5.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.4.3 CI_ts3_H.TRANS 5.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
5.4.4 CI_ts4_H.TRANS 5.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
5.5.1 CI_ts1_H.TOTAL 5.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Heatwave hazard in 1981-2010 
5.5.2 CI_ts2_H.TOTAL 5.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Heatwave hazard in 2011-2040 
5.5.3 CI_ts3_H.TOTAL 5.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Heatwave hazard in 2041-2070 
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5.5.4 CI_ts4_H.TOTAL 5.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Heatwave hazard in 2071-2100 
6.1.1 CI_ts1_CF.ENER 6.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.1.2 CI_ts2_CF.ENER 6.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.1.3 CI_ts3_CF.ENER 6.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.1.4 CI_ts4_CF.ENER 6.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
6.3.1 CI_ts1_CF.INDUSTRIAL 6.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.3.2 CI_ts2_CF.INDUSTRIAL 6.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.3.3 CI_ts3_CF.INDUSTRIAL 6.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.3.4 CI_ts4_CF.INDUSTRIAL 6.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
6.4.1 CI_ts1_CF.SOCIAL 6.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.4.2 CI_ts2_CF.SOCIAL 6.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.4.3 CI_ts3_CF.SOCIAL 6.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.4.4 CI_ts4_CF.SOCIAL 6.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
6.5.1 CI_ts1_CF.TRANS 6.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.5.2 CI_ts2_CF.TRANS 6.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.5.3 CI_ts3_CF.TRANS 6.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.5.4 CI_ts4_CF.TRANS 6.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Coastal Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
6.6.1 CI_ts1_CF.TOTAL 6.6.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Coastal Flood hazard in 1981-2010 
6.6.2 CI_ts2_CF.TOTAL 6.6.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Coastal Flood hazard in 2011-2040 
6.6.3 CI_ts3_CF.TOTAL 6.6.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Coastal Flood hazard in 2041-2070 
6.6.4 CI_ts4_CF.TOTAL 6.6.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Coastal Flood hazard in 2071-2100 
7.1.1 CI_ts1_W.ENER 7.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.1.4 CI_ts4_W.ENER 7.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
7.2.1 CI_ts1_W.INDUSTRIAL 7.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.2.4 CI_ts4_W.INDUSTRIAL 7.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
7.3.1 CI_ts1_W.SOCIAL 7.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.3.4 CI_ts4_W.SOCIAL 7.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
 
 
174 
 
 
Infrastructures from Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
7.4.1 CI_ts1_W.TRANS 7.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.4.4 CI_ts4_W.TRANS 7.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
7.5.1 CI_ts1_W.TOTAL 7.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Windstorm hazard in 1981-2010 
7.5.4 CI_ts4_W.TOTAL 7.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Windstorm hazard in 2071-2100 
 
 
2B: CI Multi-hazard maps 
 
Namefile  Caption 
8.1.1 CI_ts1_M.ENER 8.1.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
8.1.2 CI_ts2_M.ENER 8.1.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
8.1.3 CI_ts3_M.ENER 8.1.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.1.4 CI_ts4_M.ENER 8.1.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Energy 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
8.2.1 CI_ts1_M.INDUSTRIAL 8.2.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
8.2.2 CI_ts2_M.INDUSTRIAL 8.2.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
8.2.3 CI_ts3_M.INDUSTRIAL 8.2.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.2.4 CI_ts4_M.INDUSTRIAL 8.2.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Industry 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
8.3.1 CI_ts1_M.SOCIAL 8.3.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
8.3.2 CI_ts2_M.SOCIAL 8.3.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
8.3.3 CI_ts3_M.SOCIAL 8.3.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.3.4 CI_ts4_M.SOCIAL 8.3.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Social 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
8.4.1 CI_ts1_M.TRANS 8.4.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
8.4.2 CI_ts2_M.TRANS 8.4.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
8.4.3 CI_ts3_M.TRANS 8.4.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.4.4 CI_ts4_M.TRANS 8.4.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Critical Transport 
Infrastructures from Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
8.5.1 CI_ts1_M.TOTAL 8.5.1  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Multi-hazards in 1981-2010 
8.5.2 CI_ts2_M.TOTAL 8.5.2  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Multi-hazards in 2011-2040 
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8.5.3 CI_ts3_M.TOTAL 8.5.3  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Multi-hazards in 2041-2070 
8.5.4 CI_ts4_M.TOTAL 8.5.4  Annual Damages in Euros to Total Critical Infrastructures 
from Multi-hazards in 2071-2100 
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As the Commission’s  
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throughout the whole  
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